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Cover Image
Sultan Muhammad Khan

The father of Faiz Ahmad Faiz, went to Afghanistan in 1888 and was appointed as Chief Secretary by King Amir Abdur Rahman, in 1892. He left Afghanistan and arrived at Lahore in 1897. In 1898 he became the Ambassador of Afghanistan in London, UK.

Source: Jameel, S. M., (2013): Zikr-e- Faiz (Biography) (Urdu). Cultural Department, Government of Sindh, Karachi. .

PAK-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: HISTORICAL LEGACIES AND NEW BEGINNINGS

Nazir Hussain Quratulain Fatima***

Abstract

Pakistan-Russia relations have remained over-shadowed by Pakistan-United States union for most part of the history. Pak-Russia relations had some positives and much trumpeted negatives. Many opportunities to thaw the strained relations were missed either due to Pakistan's pro-western stance or suspicions on Russian-Indian alliance. However, in the post 9/11 period, Pakistan as a frontline state in war against terror and Russian regional resurgence offers opportunity for revitalization of relations. There are strategic as well as economic opportunities available to both the countries in this era of economic and regional blocs. Both countries decision makers have avenues for cooperation especially in the post US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Pakistan is anxious to maintain its importance as a key player in Afghanistan whereas Russia wants to represent its interests in the region by claiming a stake in the post-2014 Afghanistan scenario. New beginnings in Pak-Russia relations would primarily depend on the priorities of their decision makers.

Introduction

The historical legacy of Pakistan-Russia relations has been an interesting pattern of blow hot and blow cold. Pakistan interpreted its relation with Russia since 1947 through an India-centric prism. The past pattern of Pakistan-Russia interaction and future opportunities for revival of viable ties in the shadow of momentous Indo-Russian friendship and emerging Indo-US alliance is the subject of this paper. Foreign Policy is a tool to achieve the best self-interest of a state. Pakistan's foreign policy in respect of Russia has always stopped short of achieving anything but self-interest. The 2014 post-US withdrawal Afghanistan scenario places Pakistan

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in a peculiar position where improved Russia-Pakistan relations are in the interest of both the countries. As India eye a lead role in the post-US withdrawal regional security environment, Pakistan needs to rethink for an alliance of convergence with Russia. Therefore, this paper endeavors to analyze Pak-Russia relations through historical, social, economic, political and military realms and explore the possibility of a new beginning in the fast changing regional and global security environment that opens window of opportunities for cooperation and interdependence.

Historical Analysis

The “Great Game” being played between Britain and Russia dates back to the first Anglo-Afghan war (1839-1842).¹ The Indian Subcontinent has contacts with the Soviet Union since the times of Bolshevik Revolution of the October, 1918.² A number of Indians commuted between the British Raj India and the new Communist Russia. The famous “Peshawar Conspiracy Case” and other such cases shocked Britain to the extent of communist infiltration in the Indian Subcontinent. The India Congress party was also ideologically closer to the communist ideals of the Soviet Union. Partition of the Indian Subcontinent in 1947 was viewed with contempt by the then Soviet Union. It was considered as the British imperialist “Divide and Rule” policy going as far as terming the Muslim League as a ‘British Tool.’³ Its resonance can still be found in the *Pushtoon* belt and some political parties of the North Western Frontier Province, now, Khyber Pakhton-Khuwah bordering Afghanistan. The Russian leaders did not extend facilitations upon independence to the new Governor General of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The diplomatic relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union were established in May, 1948 whereas Pakistan’s first ambassador to Moscow took charge as late as December, 1949 and his counterpart in Pakistan handed his credentials to the Governor General of Pakistan in March, 1950.⁴ Therefore, even the establishment of proper diplomatic contacts took a long time to develop fully. There were however, no fixed perceptions for Pakistan’s future policy makers particularly to join any specific camp.

Political and Diplomatic Relations

¹ Kennedy, P.M., *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 To 2000*. Random House, New York 1987, p 223.

² Malik, H., ed., *Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan*. St. Martin's Press, New York 1987, p 186.

³ Khan, A. W. K., *Facts are Facts: The Untold Story of India's Partition*. Vikas Pub. House, New Delhi 1987, p 14.

⁴ Malik, H., *Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan*. pp.186-187.

Pakistan in its infancy encountered economic challenges, dearth of civil and military assets, human resource constraints and constitutional problems and was in desperate need of aid. Pakistan was weighing its alliance probabilities in proportion to assistance offered for resolving its teething problems. Pakistan during this era started evaluating relations with the Soviet Union through the prism of its relations with India. In response to Indian Premier Nehru's plan to visit the United States of America on May 7, 1949; the Soviet Union extended invitation to Pakistan's Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. This could have been the turning point of Pakistan-Soviet relations; however, Liaquat Ali Khan instead chose to visit the US as a clear rebuff to the Soviet Union.⁵

Pakistan's favorable response to the United States' overtures paved the way for closer USSR-India ties. Pakistan at this juncture explicitly joined the Western Camp by signing the SEATO (1954) and CENTO (1955) alliances.⁶ The relations were strained at the time as Soviet Union considered Pakistan as friend of its enemy and consequently openly supported India on all issues especially Kashmir. During his tenure (1956-57) Prime Minister Husain Shaheed Suharwardy, despite being reputed as architect of the pro-west foreign policy of Pakistan tried to improve its relations with the Soviet Union.⁷ His efforts were, however, stalled due to Pakistan's obvious encampment with the United States during the simmering Cold War and his own resignation in 1957.

The infamous U-2 incident of the US spy plane flying reconnaissance missions from a Pakistani Airbase in Peshawar over the Soviet airspace was a glaring example of miscalculation of Soviet response and its own vulnerability by Pakistan. The Soviets were able to shoot down the U-2 plane on 1st May, 1960 and discovered Pakistan's connivance to the US plans. The Soviet president, Nikita Khrushchev threatened to mark Pakistan as a bombing target if any more missions are to be flown from its soil against the Soviets.⁸ Pakistan instead of safeguarding its own sovereignty and pursuing its national security interests played in the hands of the Western Alliance and infuriated the next door giant super power.

Pakistan's relations during this period were usually seen in the backdrop of 1965 Indo-Pak war. Pakistan was left in the cold when in the 1965 war between Pakistan and India, the US did not support Pakistan despite Pakistan's signatory state status in SEATO and CENTO. The Soviet Union overtly emerged as the biggest supplier of weapons and military hardware to India. After the 1965 war, the arms race between India and Pakistan became

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Rizvi, H.A., *The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-1997*. Sang-e-Meel Publishers, Lahore 2000, p 77.

⁷ Malik, H., *Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan*, pp. 193-198.

⁸ Shah, Sabir, A Brief Recap of the Troubled Pak-Russia Relationship. In *The Daily News*, October 4, 2012.

even more asymmetrical and India was outdistancing Pakistan with a big margin. The Soviet Union did intervene to broker peace between Pakistan and India and facilitated the ceasefire agreement known as ‘Tashkent Agreement.’⁹ Pakistan’s reluctance to indulge with the Soviet Union was partly effected by its close ties with China; as by 1961, China and Soviet Union were at logger heads upon the respective versions of communism.¹⁰

The 1971 war was a reality shock for the West allied Pakistan when it was again disappointed by its Western allies. The Soviet Union after signing the ‘Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation’ with India played an important role in the 1971 Indo-Pak war.¹¹ Soviet Union then openly supported India by ensuring its naval presence in the region. Soviet Union sympathized with the *Mukti Bahni* and saw the creation of Bangladesh as an opportunity to damage its opponents; the United States and China. Interestingly, several decades later in 2012, in an official press release by the Russian Consulate-General in Karachi, the Russian ambassador remarked that former Soviet stance against Pakistan in 1971, was a “somewhat embarrassing for our relations.”¹²

In the aftermath of traumatic defeat of 1971 war and the betrayal of Western powers, Pakistan under Z.A Bhutto pursued the policy of “Look East” and active “Bilateralism.”¹³ This era marked the brief improvement of Pakistan-Russia relations. In March 1972, Z.A Bhutto paid a state visit to the Soviet Union, becoming the first prime minister to visit the super power since the independence of Pakistan in 1947.¹⁴ From 1973 till 1979, both countries enjoyed a strong relationship which also benefited the Soviet Union. This era saw Pakistan Steel Mills being financed into existence by the Soviets. However, this cooperation between the two states was short lived and got halted by the results and aftermath of 1977 elections in Pakistan.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was another crucial point in Pakistan-USSR relations, it is generally reported that the Soviet Union conveyed to Pakistan that it does not intend to cross the Durand Line and Pakistan remaining neutral will be seen positively.¹⁵ Many believe that Pakistan’s use of Mujahedeen against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan was

⁹ Noor ul Haq, ed., Positive Turn in Pakistan-Russia Relations. In *IPRI Factfile*, 14(11-12), November-December 2012, p 9.

¹⁰ Rizvi, H.A., Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Overview 1947-2004, In *Pildat Briefing Paper*, 11(April 2004), p 15.

¹¹ Malik, H., *Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan*, p 191.

¹² Consulate-General of the Russian Federation, "Russian-Pakistani Relations", Consulate-General of the Russian Federation in Karachi, December 21, 2012.

¹³ Look East policy meant to look towards the non-western powers, especially USSR, China and the Arab World. The active bilateralism was to ensure country’s relations on mutual interests of two countries without the involvement of third party.

¹⁴ *Foreign Relations*. Retrieved from at www.bhutto.org, accessed on December 27, 2014.

¹⁵ Malik, H., *Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan*. p 219.

in retaliation to its unflinching support to India especially in 1965 and 1971 wars.¹⁶

Upon Soviet Union's disintegration, the successor state Russian Federation went into the downward spiral of security and economic difficulties. The same continued till 2000, however, President Vladimir Putin was able to turn around the situation and make Russia economically stable. Russia understood the value of peace for a thriving economy and resolved its long standing border conflicts with China and Turkey.

In 1994-1995, Russian Federation and Pakistan could have improved ties during the Benazir Bhutto's government, however this opportunity was lost when Pakistan recognized Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan and created delay in resolving issues of Soviet POWs.¹⁷ At the time of nuclear tests by both Pakistan and India in 1998, Russian Federation did not immediately condemn Pakistan indicating a soft stance towards country's security concerns. In April 1999, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif paid an important state visit to the Kremlin, which was the first trip to Moscow by a Pakistani Prime minister in 25 years. Russians also welcomed the warming up of relations between India and Pakistan through the Lahore Declaration in 1999.

In the aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan's decision to join war on terror was welcomed by the Russian Federation.¹⁸ Russian Federation stayed out of any NATO or ISAF contingent in Afghanistan; it only conducted joint operations to curb narcotic smuggling with the ISAF forces. In February 2003, President Musharraf's visit to Moscow resulted in the establishment of Joint Working Group on Counter Terrorism, Joint Working Group on Strategic Stability and Inter Governmental Joint Commission. Since then both countries have worked in coordination to combat narcotic trade.¹⁹

Relations between Pakistan and Russian Federation witnessed another positive note when Pakistan caught Chechen Terrorists from the Pak-Afghan border in 2004 and handed them over to the Russian forces. In 2007, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov became the first Russian Prime Minister ever to visit Pakistan in the post-Soviet-era in 38 years.²⁰

In 2011, Russian Federation openly supported Pakistan's aspiration to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Pakistan returned the favor by supporting Russian Federation's aspirations for the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) membership.²¹ In 2012, the Russian President Vladimir Putin cancelled his much anticipated visit of Pakistan, reportedly

¹⁶ Akhtar, H. N., *If Truth be Told, An Alternate History of Pakistan*. Sang-e-Meel Publishers, Lahore 2007, p 333.

¹⁷ Rizvi, H.A., *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Overview 1947-2004*. p 20.

¹⁸ Noor ul Haq, *Positive Turn in Pakistan-Russia Relations*. p 14.

¹⁹ Khan, M. N., and Altaf, B., On the Way to Tomorrow. In *The Diplomatic Insight*, 6, 2013, p 12.

²⁰ Noor ul Haq, *Positive Turn in Pakistan-Russia Relations*. p 112.

²¹ Russia Endorses Full SCO Membership for Pakistan. In *Daily Dawn*, November 7, 2011.

under Western and Indian lobby influence.²² In his place Foreign Minister of Russian Federation, Sergei Lavrov visited Pakistan and signed “Memorandum of Understandings” (MOUs) with Pakistan on metallurgy, energy production and railroad transportation. India also acknowledges the fact that Pakistan-Russian Federation relations are improving in the backdrop of India-US closer relations.²³ Pakistan and Russian Federation celebrated 65 years of diplomatic relations in 2013 with the commencement of strategic dialogue on bilateral issues and agreed on comprehensive cooperation.²⁴ In order to further soften the relations as an act of solidarity President Vladimir Putin extended a letter of condolence to President Asif Ali Zardari over Shia killings in Quetta in 2013.²⁵ In April 2014, a Pakistani parliamentary delegation led by Chairman Senate, visited Russia and held meetings with the Russian leadership. Senate Chairman, Nayyer Hussain Bokhari said that Pakistan and Russia have convergence of views on most of the international and regional issues. The Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov reciprocated by saying that “Russia gives high importance to its relations with Pakistan as it is an important country in the region and Muslim World.”²⁶

Economic and Trade Relations

Pakistan’s economic relations with the Soviet Union has been rather lukewarm since the inception of Pakistan. Soviet Union and Pakistan established trade relations in the early 1950s when Soviet Union agreed to import cotton, jute and leather. Soviet Union bought Pakistani jute in exchange for 150,000 tons of wheat in summer of 1952 amid famine fears in Pakistan.²⁷ In 1958, Pakistan and Soviet Union finally established an oil consortium, Pakistan Oilfields, and expressing interests in establishing the country’s first steel mill. In 1961, Soviet Union gave a loan of 27 million Rubles to Pakistan for oil and gas exploration, which later enabled the establishment of Oil and Gas Development Organization in Pakistan.²⁸

The Soviet Union provided technical expertise and extended a loan of \$200 million to Pakistan for the establishment of Pakistan Steel Mills in 1972 which was to be repaid in kind by Pakistan. This arrangement was sabotaged by some Pakistani companies that over-invoiced the low quality

²² Dikshit, S., Growing Russia-Pakistan Ties a Reality that India Will Have to Live With. In *The Hindu*, October 8, 2012.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Diplomatic Ties: Pakistan, Russia Agree on a ‘Comprehensive Partnership. In *The Express Tribune*, April, 26, 2013.

²⁵ Putin Offers Condolences Over Quetta Killings. In *The Nation*, February 20, 2013.

²⁶ Visit to Moscow: Bokhari for Closer Ties with Russia. In *The Express Tribune*, April 28, 2014.

²⁷ Malik, H., *Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan*, p 188.

²⁸ *Company History*. Retrieved from www.ogdcl.com, accessed on December 27, 2014.

goods and eventually Soviet Union refused to abide by the arrangement. This outstanding loan remained a bitter tinge in the Russian Federation-Pakistan Relations.²⁹ Russian Federation has again pledged to finance up-gradation of Pakistan Steel Mills in 2012.³⁰ The bilateral trade between Pakistan and Russia lingered at \$80 million has swelled up to \$542 Million in 2012.³¹

Volume of Bilateral Trade

Year	Volume of Trade (US \$ Million)
2003	\$ 92 Million
2006	\$ 411.4 Million
2008	\$ 630 Million
2009	\$ 400 Million
2012	\$ 542 Million

Source: Ministry of Commerce, Government of Pakistan, 2013

Despite trade opportunities, the exports from Pakistan to Russian Federation \$210 million (2012) are a meager 0.04% of the total Russian trade volume. Similarly, imports by Pakistan from Russian Federation at \$332 million (2012) stands at 0.07% of the total Russian trade volume.³² Pakistan has been the biggest exporter of potato to the Russian Federation in 2010-2011. It exported 125,000 tons of potato to Russian Federation.³³ Pakistan is a major exporter of “Kinnow” to Russian Federation. There is a huge potential of textile, leather goods, vegetables and fruits. The main issue hampering the export of goods is the quality, non professional attitude of exporters and the bureaucratic hurdles at the government level.

²⁹ Malik, H., *Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan*, p 191.

³⁰ Russia and Pakistan: Prospects of Interaction, Commemorating the 65th anniversary of Bilateral Relations, H.E. Mr. Igor V. Morgulov, Deputy Foreign Minister of The Russian Federation. In *The Diplomatic Insight*, 6, 2013, p 4.

³¹ Ministry of Commerce, “Trade Statistics July 2012-2013” <http://www.commerce.gov.pk> accessed on May 12, 2013.

³² Ministry of Commerce, *Trade Statistics July 2012-2013*. Retrieved from <http://www.commerce.gov.pk>, accessed on May 12, 2013.

³³ Ibid., *Trade Statistics 2010-2011*.

Major Exports of Pakistan to Russian Federation (2012)

Products	Volume US \$ Million
Vegetable, Fruits, Rice	\$111.11 Million
Textile Goods	\$ 78.9 Million
Chemical fibers and Filaments	\$ 52.8 Million
Cotton	\$ 29.5 Million
Leather Goods	\$17.3 Million
Pharmaceutical Products	\$ 10.6 Million
Sports Goods	\$ 4.9 Million

Source: Ministry of Commerce, Government of Pakistan, 2013.

Major Imports of Pakistan from Russian Federation (2012)

Products	Volume US \$ Million
Ferrous Materials and Products	\$ 124.5 Million
Fertilizers Exports	\$ 53.5 Million
News print and Paper Board	\$ 18.1 Million

Source: Ministry of Commerce, Government of Pakistan, 2013.

In the aftermath of 2010 floods in Pakistan, the Russian Federation decreased the custom duty up to 35% on Pakistani goods as a goodwill gesture. As measures to boost trade, two Pakistani trading houses have been opened in Saint Petersburg. A trading house is also established in Moscow to promote Pakistani products. Pakistan Russia Business Forum (PRBF) was established in 2009 to promote commerce and tourism. Another such forum, “Business Council for Promotion of Trade with Pakistan” is quite effectively working since its establishment in 2011. Also in order to enhance economic cooperation between Pakistan and Russia a governmental commission has been formed.

In terms of Russian investment in Pakistan, it offered various options; financing the Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline and expansion of Pakistan Steel Mills production from 1 to 3 million tons per annum.³⁴ It also offered to finance various energy projects in Pakistan such as Tarbella expansion, Diamer Bhasha Dam, CASA-1000, up-gradation of Gaddu, Muzafargarh and Jamshoro Power Plants.³⁵

³⁴ Putin Keeps Pakistan Alive. In *Pravada*, November 8, 2011.

³⁵ Address of Trade Representative of the Russian Federation in Pakistan, Mr. Yuri M. Kozlov, Activities of the Russian Federation in Pakistan. In *The Diplomatic Insight*, no.6, 2013, p 8.

Social Relations

In the early 1950s Pakistan and Soviet Union shared many social and cultural activities. Their cultural troupes visited each other's countries and film shows were held. The Soviet Union also provided economic and technical assistance in social sector development, agricultural productivity such as pest control, desalination and soil erosion, and flood control. The Soviet Union assisted to put into operation 1000kw medium-wave broadcasting station near Islamabad which went on to become the major radio station of the country. The Soviets also supplied three medium-wave and two short-wave length transmitters. A Soviet news magazine *Tulu* was regularly published from Karachi since 1967; however it got discontinued in 1982 in the backdrop of Afghan war.³⁶

Pakistan's mega city Karachi used to be a hub for the Soviet tourists till 1990s. There were 8 flights daily from Moscow to Karachi to accommodate this boom of visitors. The trend however died down with deteriorating situation of the city and development of Dubai as an alternate economic hub. Russian Federation provided aid to the people of Pakistan in the aftermath of 2005 earthquake and 2010 Floods.³⁷ Pakistan receives enthusiastic Russian and Central Asian climbers every year in a bid to climb the perilous mountain K-2. One of the posh restaurants of the Russian Federation's capital Moscow is "*Gandhara*." It is a Pakistani restaurant that features Buddha Statues from the Gandhara Civilization along with Pakistani cuisines.³⁸ Russian Federation has a native 13 million Muslim community³⁹ that have their natural sympathies towards the Muslims of Pakistan.

Around 2000 Pakistani community is settled in the Russian Federation including 500 students. The Moscow State University has an Urdu Faculty and Punjab University has signed an agreement on student exchange program with Moscow State University.⁴⁰ The detail of the students and respective universities is tabulated below.

³⁶ Malik, H., *Soviet-American relations with Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan*, p194.

³⁷ Noor ul Haq, *Positive Turn in Pakistan-Russia Relations*. p 221.

³⁸ *Gandhara Restaurant*. Retrieved from <http://www.gandhara.ru/en/pressa.html>, accessed on May 20, 2013.

³⁹ The figures vary between 13-15 million. However these figures are taken from Robert D. Crews, 'Moscow and the Mosque: Co-opting Muslims in Putin's Russia. In *Foreign Affairs*, March/April, 2014.

⁴⁰ *Punjab University, Government of Pakistan*. Retrieved from [http://pu.edu.pk/del/MOUsigned byPU\(international\).pdf](http://pu.edu.pk/del/MOUsigned%20byPU(international).pdf) , accessed on May 20, 2013.

University Wise Distribution of Students

University	No. of Students
People's Friendship University, Moscow	97
Moscow State University , Moscow	85
Russian Medical Academy , Moscow	52
Russia Medical University, Moscow	42
Tula Technical & Political University, Tula	95
St. Peters Burg University , St, Petersburg	12
Submarine University, St. Petersburg	20
Russian chemical & Technical University, Moscow	32
Tevr Medical University, Tevr	13
Varunish University, Varunish	4

Source: Higher Education Commission, Pakistan Embassy in Moscow, 2013.

“An Association of Pakistani Graduates Russia and Commonwealth of Independent States” is active in Pakistan. Subsequently, NUML University, Islamabad has a Russian faculty as well. A Pakistan Study Center is also established in Moscow.⁴¹

Compilation of the first Urdu-Russian dictionary by Pakistan-based Russian Dr. Tashmirza Khalmirev in 2012 is a positive step to lower the language barrier between Russian Federation, CIS and Pakistan.⁴² *Voice of Russia* that broadcasts for Pakistan in Urdu and runs a similar website conducted an ‘All Pakistan Voice of Russia Conference’ in Lahore during December, 2013 to bring lost listeners back.⁴³ *Shahslik* is a famous dish in Pakistan with Central Asian-Russian origin, which is made with meat and vegetables on skewers made of wood.

Strategic and Military Relations

In 1967, Government of Pakistan acquired land for the construction of “Heavy Electrical Complex” with the possible funding by the Soviet Union at Taxila. The project, however, could not achieve completion. Pakistan, despite its desire could not develop any tangible military ties with the Soviet Union, mainly due to the Cold War politics and alliance systems in South Asia.

⁴¹ Pakistan Study Centre opens in Moscow. In *Pakistan Times*, August 14, 2012.

⁴² Urdu-Russian Dictionary Launched. In *The News*, August 3, 2012.

⁴³ *Pakistani Listeners of The Voice of Russia Run Conference in Lahore*. Retrieved from www.voiceofrussia.com , accessed on December 15, 2013.

In 2001, Russia willingly agreed to launch Pakistan's satellite, *Badr* from its *Baikonur* Launch Station for the lowest possible charges.⁴⁴ Russian Federation has two major problems that link it directly or indirectly to Pakistan. First is Afghanistan's narcotics trade that ends up in Russian Federation before trickling down to the rest of Europe. The other issue is the illegal immigrants. Illegal immigrants from Pakistan use Russian Federation as a launching pad to enter Europe. Russian Federation is looking forward to enhanced cooperation in these critical matters in the post-2014 withdrawal scenario Afghanistan.

Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, Ashfaq Pervaiz Kiani's visit to Russian Federation in 2012 is seen as a positive step towards Pakistan-Russian Federation cooperation in the post withdrawal Afghanistan.⁴⁵ The Chief of Pakistan Air Force, Air Marshal Tahir Rafique Butt also visited Russia in 2012. Pakistan has shown interest in buying MI-35, MI-17 helicopters, engines for JF-17 program, missile defense systems, and submarines.⁴⁶ In the same connection, Commander of the Russian Air Force visited Pakistan on 17 April, 2013 to discuss military deals for the first time in the history of Russian-Pakistani relations.⁴⁷ The same was indicated in the words of Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, during his 2012 visit to Pakistan; "Russia is unlikely to sell Islamabad an air defense system or fighter aircraft, still, dual-use systems, such as the MI-17 helicopter, could be supplied, in addition to combat training and the exchange of military experts."⁴⁸ In early 2014, as an important strategic move, Russian Federation started negotiation to sell MI-35 helicopters to Pakistan, lifting a de-facto arms embargo on Pakistan despite implicit displeasure of its long standing ally India.⁴⁹

The Russian Federation can also provide greater insight to the Pakistani counterparts on the war on terrorism, due to their experience with the war in Chechnya. Russian Federation encountered the same situation in the context of war on terrorism in Chechnya and overcame that. This cooperation can be very beneficial for both the countries.

Future Prospects

Sergei Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister, stated in 2012 that "Pakistan exerts huge influence over Afghanistan. Moscow is racking its brains over how to ensure the safety and security of the southern borders of the CIS when U.S. and NATO troops finally pull out of Afghanistan. If Russia

⁴⁴ Satellite *Badar-II* Launched. In *Daily Dawn*, December 11, 2001.

⁴⁵ Russian FM Arrives as COAS Flies to Moscow. In *Daily Dawn*, October 4, 2012.

⁴⁶ Pakistan, Russia Agree to Boost Defence Cooperation. In *Daily Dawn*, August, 15, 2012.

⁴⁷ Commander-in-Chief, Russian Federation Air Force Visits PAC Kamra. In *Daily Dawn*, April 17, 2013.

⁴⁸ Strokan, S., Pakistan and Russia Move Closer Toward Military Cooperation. In *Kommersant Daily*, October 10, 2012.

⁴⁹ Keck, Z., Russia Ends Arms Embargo Against Pakistan. In *The Diplomat*, June 4, 2014.

continues to snub Pakistan in favor of India, it would ultimately run contrary to the interests of Russia's security.”⁵⁰

In December 2014, Pakistan and Russia signed \$1.7 billion energy deal to lay LNG pipeline between Karachi and Lahore during the Joint Commission meetings in Islamabad and Moscow.⁵¹ Also during the visit of Russian Defence Minister, General Sergey Shoygu to Pakistan in November 2014 a defence and military cooperation deal was signed to provide MI-35 helicopters to Pakistan. Russia has already lifted self-imposed embargos on selling arms to Pakistan and they conveyed Pakistan about the readiness of Russian companies for discussion with the state and private companies of Pakistan for possibility of supply of Russian produced aviation equipment, including Sukhoi S-100 Civilian aircraft, An Tu-404 CM, MS-21, and helicopters. Russian Military Companies are interested in supplying commercial/civilian version helicopters for needs of the Government of Pakistan as well as commercial organizational, and supplying special “Tiger” armored vehicles to Pakistan.⁵²

The post-2014 Afghanistan is seen in comparison to the civil war scenario after the Russian withdrawal in 1989. The spillover effects will harm Pakistan the most due to its porous border with Afghanistan and shared legacy of drugs and violence amid acceptance of Afghan refugees. Pakistan cannot burden its economy any more with the excessive baggage of refugees and allied evils as it once did in the post-Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. The internal situation amidst war on terror as a non-NATO ally of USA does not allow Pakistan to bear any further resurgent wave of terrorism.

Furthermore, the US inclination to support India as a regional leader in South Asia has a decisive effect on the balance of power in the region. China, Russia and Pakistan eye this situation with clear suspicion. Here the convergence of interest arises in the China-Russia-Pakistan triad. After successful overcoming the economic meltdown of post-Cold War, Russian economic recovery is an evidence of its commitment with economic prosperity. Pakistan has a huge potential market in Russian economy expandable to further into Central Asian countries for its textile, leather goods and agriculture produce especially vegetables and fruits. Consequently, Russia can tap a healthy market for mechanical goods, metals and chemical products in Pakistan. Both countries interact at the common forums of SCO and OECD; the same platforms can be used for enhancing bilateral trade relations. Additionally, Pakistan with appropriate strategy can proceed to acquire dual use systems like MI-17 and transport vehicles and

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Bhutta, Z., Pakistan, Russia Ink \$1.7 b Energy Deal. In *The Express Tribune*, December 23, 2014.

⁵² Yousaf, K., Boosting Defence Ties: Pakistan, Russia Sign Landmark Cooperation Pact. In *The Express Tribune*, November 21, 2014.

pave the way for some ice breaking, which may lead to acquisition of more sophisticated military technology from Russia. Russia has successfully curbed the Chechen rebels and has Cold War experience of military force fighting the irregular armed forces in Afghanistan which is today's Taliban. An exchange of experts between the two states can greatly benefit Pakistan's military expertise in the ensuing war on terror.

The US interest in the Silk Route restoration as an effort to access the natural gas and oil reserves of the Eurasian Caspian Sea is being perceived by Russia as a move to hamper Great Russian Resurgence. This situation is emerging as Russia on the one hand has rallied the Central Asian Republics in alliance and on the other hand has seen improving relations with China by expanding trade and resolving border disputes. Pakistan can also contemplate an access to warm waters for Russia with the help of China in return for trade concessions and much needed financial assistance. In the wake of new "Energy Great Game" in the region and its ensuing energy crisis, Pakistan can revive the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline which already has the support of USA and deems a fair chance of completion with enhanced Russian support along with the Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline.

Russia is also aspiring to maintain military bases in the post-2014 scenario in Afghanistan. The reason is its concern about terrorist threats and narcotic trade emerging from Afghanistan and destabilizing Russia and Central Asia. The same concern is shared by Pakistan being immediate neighbor of Afghanistan and frontline state for war against terrorism. Pakistan needs to protect its stakes in Afghanistan as much as Russia wants to increase its role in the post-2014 regional politics.

Conclusion

In the post 2014 withdrawal from Afghanistan, Russia is anxious to find itself a role in the regional security milieu. It also understands that Pakistan is a major stake holder in this renewed great game. Russia has expressed its views that it cannot compromise its interest in the region for the sake of India. The military visits and warming up of strategic relations between Pakistan and Russian Federation is a step towards better relations by both the sides. The era of military alliances has lapsed; today is the world of economic and trade alliances. Russian Federation is a host to 13 million native Muslim population and this factor can be used as an advantage for Pakistan-Russian Federation Relations. Pakistan capitalizing on this strength can create strong social and economic ties with the Russian Federation. Pakistan has a huge potential market for its agriculture produce, textile, leather and sport goods in Russian Federation and Central Asian states. Pakistan is aspiring for permanent membership in the SCO and Russian Federation has hinted openly to support Pakistan's contention. The

cooperation in SCO can become a new era in 'Look East' policy for Pakistan. The presence of India, China, Afghanistan and Central Asian states render SCO as an effective platform for economic and trade cooperation. Pakistan's geostrategic location especially Gwadar port is assessed by Russian Federation as an ideal access to the warm sea. Russian Federation is visualizing a mega advance in the future as the "Gulf-Bering Strait" railroad and Pakistan is its route to the warm waters.

Foreign policy approach of Pakistan should be self-interest rather than India centric. Arch rivals like USA and China, China and Russia, China and India are improving relations amongst themselves and finding convergence in divergence; Pakistan must also learn from these examples of changing perceptions of the world. A diversification of its basket of allies in view of 2014 United States withdrawal from Afghanistan is the need of the time. Russian Federation is also anxious to play an important role in the changing geostrategic realm. Pakistan should keep self-interest before all and must formulate its foreign policy keeping in mind the importance of better relations with the Russian Federation.

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MIR MUNSHI AALA SULTAN MUHAMMAD KHAN AND HIS SERVICES TO AFGHANISTAN

Sarfraz Khan Noor Ul Amin***

Abstract

This paper aims to examine life, works and services of Mir Munshi Aala Sultan Muhammad Khan for the development of Afghanistan. A well versed man in Persian (Dari) and English invited by the Afghan Government to assist the Amir Abdur Rahman to run the affairs of the state, especially, to translate correspondence of the Amir with the British Indian Government. He offered invaluable services towards constitutional development in, bringing political stability to, and strengthening Independence of Afghanistan by adeptly assisting Amir in negotiating Afghan borders with her neighbors. Sultan Muhammad Khan authored/edited several books, contributing towards Constitution making road map and state affairs of Afghanistan. He had to flee Afghanistan, following successful conspiracies in the Court of Amir, in Kabul, dubbing him a British government's spy. He was subsequently imprisoned in Lahore by the British Indian government. His friendship with the royal physician, a British lady, Dr. Lillias Hamilton, enabled his release from jail. His services as Afghanistan's Ambassador in England were also significant.

Key Words: Early life, Mir Munshi Aala in Afghanistan (Chief Secretary), British spy or Afghanistan's spy, Ambassador to England, a lawyer from Christ's College, Cambridge, his works as well as Dr. Lillias Hamilton's novels, sons of Sultan Muhammad Khan.

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Introduction

Afghanistan found itself caught between two great rival powers, i.e., British Imperialism in India and Czarist Russia, during the ‘Great Game’, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Afghanistan needed a ruler, who could secure and safeguard her interest, despite presence of both imperial powers and their covert and overt activities to subdue Afghans. Amir Abdur Rahman (r. 1880-1901), following death, in 1863, of his grandfather, Amir Dost Muhammad Khan (r.1826-39 and 1845-63) had to fight numerous wars of succession to secure throne of Afghanistan. Banished from Afghanistan in 1868, he took refuge in Tashkent, till he returned to northern Afghanistan in March 1880¹ and recaptured Afghan throne, in 1880, with the support of the British.² After a great loss and bloodshed during fratricidal wars, Abdur Rahman successfully established a government in Afghanistan. Later Afghanistan became a buffer,³ between two rival imperial powers. Amir Abdur Rahman in Afghanistan raised a standing army to quell internal rebellion and strengthen the country in face of external aggression. He was also able to dilute influence of the liberals over the state by intimidating and deporting political rivals. In 1880s, thousands of Kandahari families left for Persia along with *Sardar* Muhammad Yaqub, victor of Miawand. Other political deportee families included: *Charkhi*,⁴ Tarzi,⁵ and *Musabeheen/Yahya Khels*.⁶ They departed for India and Ottoman Empire from Afghanistan, in fact, were exiled by Amir Abdur Rahman.⁷

¹ Dupree, L. *Afghanistan*. Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1980, p 59.

² *Ibid.*, p 60.

³ Aitchison, C. U., *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads vol. 13*. Original Text of Anglo Russian Convention 1907, p 125.

⁴ Charkhi Brothers, belonging to a village, Charkh, in the administrative district of Logar Province: Ghulam Siddiq Charkhi, Ghulam Nabi Charkhi and Ghulam Jilani Charkhi were sons of Amir Abdur Rahman’s famous General Ghulam Haider. They later supported King Amanullah and were hostile to a new dynasty established by Mohammad Nadir Khan. Ghulam Nabi Charkhi was executed in 1932; and Ghulam Jilani Charkhi in 1933 by Nadir Khan. Ghulam Siddiq stayed outside Afghanistan with exiled King Amanullah (d. 1962) and buried in Afghanistan. See: Ludwing, W. A., *Biographical Encyclopedia of Afghanistan*. Pentagon press, Delhi 2008, pp. 65, 95-96.

⁵ Tarzi, Muhammadzai of the line of Painda Khan, born in Ghazni, Mahmud Tarzi (1865-1933), son of a literary figure Ghulam Muhammad, pen name Tarzi, exiled in 1881. Mahmud received his early education in British India and then proceeded with his father in 1885 to Baghdad, Istanbul and later to Damascus. The caliphate of Islam had lost its luster and the Tarzi family comprising more than a dozen individuals, partly receiving financial assistance from the Ottoman Court. Mahmud equipped with both formal and practical knowledge returned to serve his country in 1902.

⁶ The *Musabeheen Yahyakhel*, descendants of Sultan Muhammad Khan, who ruled Peshawar as governor for the Sikhs. One of Sultan Muhammad’s sons, Yahya Khan, had followed Yakub into exile in India after the death of Cavagnari and the renewed British invasion in 1879. His son Muhammad Yousaf Khan had five children who played an important part in

Amir Abdur Rahman demarcated Afghan boundaries with the Czarist Russia, in 1885⁸ and with British India, in 1893. Inside Afghanistan, he introduced various reforms to develop Afghan society.⁹ The Amir hired various people from diverse regions and held periodic consultations with them. Such consultants included: Dr. John Gray (1857-1929),¹⁰ an English Physician from British India;¹¹ Dr. Lillias Anna Hamilton M.D., (1858–1925), an English pioneer female doctor, successor to Dr. John Gray as court physician (1894 to 1898) of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan; *Munshi* Abdur Razaq of Delhi, a well-known printer; Chaudhry Sultan Muhammad Khan (1862-1931), a translator, secretary and Ambassador from Punjab and Dr. Abdul Ghani (1864-1943) later founded *Habibia* School, his brother Najaf Ali (1860-1949) translator and sub-editor.¹² Dr. Lillias is also known for authoring two novels on Amir Abdur Rahman, one published in 1900, the second, unpublished, still lying in India office record. Sultan Muhammad Khan wrote several books and worked on highest positions in royal Afghan administration.

Early Life

Information on the early life of Sultan Muhammad Khan is scanty. One of the most important sources has been writings and speeches of his son, the renowned poet, Faiz Ahmad Faiz. The book compiled and edited by Sheema Majeed, *Culture and Identity: Selected English Writings of Faiz*. Oxford university press, USA 2006 sheds some light on the subject.¹³ Vassilyeva, Ludmila Alexandrovna in her book 'Pervarish Loho Qalam, Faiz Hayat aur Takhliqat' (Nurturing Tablet and Pen, Faiz Life and Works Oxford university press Karachi also devotes some space to it.¹⁴ Rashid Hameed's article in

the development of modern Afghanistan. The five-Muhammad Aziz, Nadir Khan, Hashim Khan, Shah Wali and Mahmud were all educated in India and returned to Afghanistan, in 1901.

⁷ Abdur Rahman ascended the throne of Afghanistan with the British support, surrendered to them control of his foreign affairs, in lieu, of an annual subsidy of £80 thousand.

⁸ Khan, M. S., *The Life of Amir Abdur Rahman*. Oxford University Press, Karachi 1980, p 31.

⁹ Centenary Celebrations of Faiz Ahmad Faiz. *The Daily Dawn*, Islamabad, dated 11.02.2011.

¹⁰ *British Medical Journal (BMJ)*, November 30, 1929, p 1034.

¹¹ Ram, S. & Bajpai., *Encyclopedia of Afghanistan Vol-III, Kingship in Afghanistan*. Anmol Publications, India 2002, p 13.

¹² Ghani, A., *A Brief History of Afghanistan*. Najaf Publishers, Lahore 1989, p 6.

¹³ Sheema, M., *Culture and Identity Selected English Writings of Faiz*. Oxford University Press, Karachi 2006, p 5.

¹⁴ Vassilyeva, L. A., *Pervarish Loho Qalam, Faiz Hayat aur Takhliqat' (Nurturing Tablet and Pen, Faiz Life and Works)*. Oxford university press, Karachi 2013, pp. 2-4.

Urdu, Faiz Ahmad Faiz ‘Sawanhi Khaka’ (Life Sketch),¹⁵ Saleem Ahmad’s article written in Urdu, ‘Kala Qadir ka Chervaha’ (Shepherd of Kala Qadir)¹⁶ and an article published in The Daily Dawn, on 11 Feb. 2011 on Centenary Celebration of Faiz Ahmad Faiz¹⁷ also briefly point towards life of Faiz Ahmad Faiz’s father, Sultan Muhammad Khan, son of Sahib Zada Khan.¹⁸ They agree that Faiz’s father was a landless peasant, employed by land owning peasants, to cater to their cattle, in a village, Kala Qadir, named after two poor brothers, Kala and Qadir, in District Sialkot.¹⁹ ‘I used to take the cattle out of the village and I found there was a school, a little distance from the village. I would leave the cattle to graze and attend the school’²⁰ Faiz quotes his father.

Acknowledging his inherent capacity instantly, his village school teacher not only allowed him to attend his class but also encouraged him to continue studies. This became a daily routine, he took the cattle out to graze, left them a while in the field, reached school for previous day work to be checked and get work assigned for the day, and return back to his cattle. He progressed swiftly and passed his village school examinations in 1873 ahead of all the other children.²¹ He earned a scholarship of two rupees a month, of Education Department Govt. of Punjab.²² He was admitted, in 1874, to Govt. High School at a distance from his village. He had to walk back and forth to school covering long distance during inclement weather. He passed High School examination in 1880 with distinction.²³ During studies he assisted lawyers at the district Courts to pay for his expenses. He earned fame as the “educated” son of the village.²⁴

Sultan Muhammad Khan had been good looking²⁵ intelligent, polite young man. Easy going as he was earned him friends every where and he survived in all sorts of company. After completing education at Sialkot in

¹⁵ Hameed, R., *Faiz Ahmad Faiz: Sawanhi Khaka*.(Urdu). Academy Adbiyat Pakistan, Islamabad 2009, p 307.

¹⁶ Saleem, A., *Kala Qadir Kaa Charwaha* (Urdu). *Quarterly Adbiyat*, Academy Adbiyat Pakistan, Islamabad 2009, p 303.

¹⁷ Centenary Celebrations of Faiz Ahmad Faiz. The *Daily Dawn*, Islamabad, dated 11.02.2011.

¹⁸ The name of Sultan Muhammad Khan’s grandfather was Sir Buland Khan and the name of his father was Sahib Zada Khan.

¹⁹ Hameed, R., *Faiz Ahmad Faiz: Sawani Khaka*.(Urdu). Academy Adbiyat Pakistan, Islamabad, 2009, p. 306.

²⁰ Sheema, M., *Culture and Identity: Selected English Wirting of Faiz*. Oxford University Press, New York 2006, p 19.

²¹ Vector, K., (Tr.and Ed). *Poems by Faiz* . Oxford University press, Karachi 1973, p 48.

²² *Ibid.*, p 51.

²³ Sheema, M., *Culture and Identity: Selected English Wirting of Faiz*. Oxford University Press, New York 2006, p 29.

²⁴ Sheema, M., *Culture and Identity: Selected English Wirting of Faiz*. Oxford University Press, New York 2006, p 26.

²⁵ See: his photographs of later years from London to testify on page no. 33.

1883 he continued higher education at Lahore and found abode free of cost in a local mosque. His voice was soft and fit for 'qirat' (reciting Quran), hence, began delivering private recitations of the Quran.²⁶ After his studies and return in the evening to the mosque instead of resting, he fulfilled any task apportioned to him. Moreover, he worked at Lahore Railway Station as a 'coolie' (porter) to earn additional income to support his family back home in the village. He was untiring to the extent that hard labour could not be lower his interest in education. He demonstrated extraordinary ability in learning languages and developed fluency in English and Persian, the two leading languages of the region besides the local Urdu.²⁷ Sultan Muhammad Khan developed grip over Persian and English at school, in the evening he attended mosque to learn Arabic and religion.²⁸ Sardar Amir Muhammad, Councilor of Afghanistan came to offer *Juma* prayer in the Hind Sharif Mosque. After *Juma* prayer, Sultan Muhammad Khan held conversation, both in Persian and English, with Afghan Councilor and immensely impressed him,²⁹ this eventually led to his hiring by the Afghan Councilor to translate documents of Persian into English.³⁰

Departure to Afghanistan

Faiz described the scene, 'when he (Sultan Muhammad Khan) was living in this mosque, it so happened that an Afghan grandee was Counsel to the Government of the Punjab. He used to come and pray in this mosque. He saw this young boy and rather liked him and said, 'Look, we want an English interpreter for Afghanistan'.³¹ It shall be taken into account that the Afghan Amir, at that time, was trying to establish closer links with the rulers in British India in order to consolidate his own rule in Afghanistan. Anyone who could assist in furthering this goal was welcomed as friend. Therefore, Afghan Councillor offered Sultan Muhammad Khan briskly an appointment to tutor his own household, in English, initially.³² Later, in 1888, Afghan councilor took Sultan Muhammad Khan to Afghanistan and introduced him

²⁶ Jamil, S. M., *Zikr-e- Faiz (Biography)* (Urdu). Cultural Department, Government of Sindh, Karachi 2013, p 46.

²⁷ Ansari, S., The life of Abdur Rahman,. Daily *The News*, Islamabad, dated 17.08.2014.

²⁸ Saeed, A., *Islamia College Lahore ki Sad Sala Tarikh (Urdu)*. Azhar Sons Printers, Lahore 1992, pp 18-20.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.21

³⁰ Centenary Celebrations of Faiz Ahmad Faiz. The *Daily Dawn*, Islamabad, dated 11.02.2011.

³¹ Sheema, M., *Culture and Identity Selected English Writings of Faiz (Urdu)*. Oxford University Press, Karachi 2006, p 18.

³² Ansari, S., The life of Abdur Rahman,. Daily *The News*, Islamabad, dated 17.08.2014.

to Afghan ruler Amir Abdur Rahman Khan.³³ The Amir offered him a job of translator in his court. He was to translate documents and letters written in Afghan Persian (henceforth, Dari) of Amir into English and letters written in English to Amir into Dari.³⁴

It may be safely assumed that anyone fluent in English and Dari, who could assist in mediation and negotiations with the British was considered a valuable asset by the Afghan rulers. This fluency in English and Dari and hardwork earned Sultan Muhammad Khan eventually the position of the *Mir MunshiAala* (Chief Secretary). He ably performed the job of Royal interpreter conducted all correspondence and negotiations with the British.³⁵

These were tumultuous times in Afghan history, rival competing powers, Czarist Russia and British India, both were busy in power game, intrigues and spreading rumours inside and outside Afghan court. There were rumours that Amir was severely ill and suffered from deadly disease which has adversely affected his mobility.³⁶ Though Amir's sickness did generate numerous rumours amongst Afghan courtiers and much discussion in India, Britain and Russia, Sultan Muhammad Khan, in his official "biography" of Abdul Rahman Khan,³⁷ barely makes a passing reference to the *Amir's* sickness. It is evident that the secretary, witness to Amir's frequent attacks of "gout",³⁸ did not disclose to neither Amir's own subjects nor Britain or Russia, how severely ill Amir had been. Amir's immobility and worsening mental condition subjected him to hallucinations, paranoia, mania and other psychotic disorders directly affected internal and foreign policy of Afghanistan.³⁹ Relevant quarters, both internal and external, could be encouraged to depose him and replace by someone qualified better mentally and physically, to protect British interests in the region.⁴⁰

The illness of Abdur Rahman Khan has been recounted by two British physicians, John Alfred Gray and Dr. Lilius Hamilton who recurrently attended the Amir during 1880s-90s. John Alfred Gray in, *At the Court of the Amir: a Narrative* (1895), 1st addition⁴¹ and *My Residence at the Court*⁴², refers to Amir's illness, diagnoses, and symptoms. Hamilton, though wrote

³³ Lee, J., *Abd al-Rahman Khan and the Maraz Ul- Muluk*. Cambridge University Press, Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland 1991, p 209.

³⁴ Wheeler, S., *The Amir Abdur Rahman*. Frederick Warne & Co, New York 1896, pp. 125-127.

³⁵ Kakar, H. K., *Government and Society in Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir 'Abd Al-Rahman Khan* (Cmes Modern Middle East Series). University of Texas Press, New York 2011, p 68.

³⁶ Khan, M. S. (Ed.), *The Life of Amir Abdur Rahman*, Vol-I. John Murray Albemarle Street, London 1900, p 270.

³⁷ Ibid., p 271.

³⁸ John, A. G., *At the Court of Amir*. Richard Clay & Sons, London 1895, p 166.

³⁹ Gray, J. A., *Residence at the Court*. Darf Publishers Ltd, London 1987, p 170.

⁴⁰ Khan, M. S. (Ed.), *The Life of Amir Abdur Rahman*, Vol-I. John Murray Albemarle Street, London 1900, p 146.

⁴¹ John, A. G., *At the Court of Amir: A Narrative*. Richard Clay & Sons, London 1895, p 170.

⁴² Gray, J. A., *Residence at the Court*. Darf Publishers Ltd, London 1987, p 172.

two novels about Amir of Afghanistan: *A Vizier's daughter*;⁴³ and *The Power that Walks in Darknesses*,⁴⁴ did not mention Amir's illness in either. She did not record any memoirs of the time she spent in Kabul, however, upon her return to England, in 1898, she extensively delivered talks on Afghanistan and did publish short articles in British journals and magazines, where she spoke about Amir's illness.⁴⁵ Sultan Muhammad, at the court of the Amir, met and befriended Dr. Lillias Hamilton, the court physician,⁴⁶ a British Lady, in the service of the Amir.⁴⁷ In addition, numerous other Europeans and Afghans at the Amir's court published details of the king's sickness, or reported privately to the government in India on his condition, albeit from a layman's view point.⁴⁸

Dr. Gray reported, in 1888, that Amir suffered a "long and severe" attack of "gout", the worst and most prolonged period of sickness that Abdur

⁴³ Khan, M. S., *The Constitution and Laws of Afghanistan*. John Murray Albemarle Street, London 1900, p 45.

⁴⁴ Hamilton, L., *The Power that Walks in Darknesses (Unpublished Novel)*. The Indian Office Record, typescript copy.

⁴⁵ Hamilton, L., *A Vazir's Daughter*. John Murray, Albemarle Street, London 1900, p 36

⁴⁶ Dr. Lillias Anna Hamilton M.D., (7th February 1858 – 6 January 1925) was English pioneer female doctor and author. She was born at Tomabil Station, New South Wales to Mr. Hugh Hamilton (1822 – 1900) and his wife Margaret Clunes (nee Innes). After attending school in Ayr and then Cheltenham Ladies' College, she was trained first as a nurse, in Liverpool, before going to study medicine in Scotland, qualifying as a Doctor of Medicine in 1890. She was a court physician to Amir Abdur Rahman Khan in Afghanistan in the 1890s, and wrote a fictionalized account of her experiences in *A Vizier's Daughter: A tale of the Hazara War*, published in 1900. After a spell in private practice in London, she became Warden of Studley Horticultural College in the years before World War 1, leaving the College in 1915 to serve in a typhoid hospital in Montenegro under the auspices of the Wounded Allies Relief Committee. Her other published works include *A Nurse's Bequest*, 1907. Similarly, she had typed a novel which could not be published still lying in the India office record, "*The Power that Walks in Darknesses*".

⁴⁷ In 1894, Dr. Lillias Hamilton arrived in Kabul from India. Before her arrival in Afghanistan, Dr. John Alfrad Gray was the court Physician of Amir Abdur Rehman (1888-1894). Hamilton arrived in Kabul on 25th April 1894, Hamilton's arrival in Kabul seems mysterious it was rumoured that Gray was suspected by Amir as British Agent. In her private letters she states despite poor health, she proceeded to replace court physician, the costs of her road expenses were covered by the Indian government. Her former headmistress at Cheltenham Ladies' College, wrote to Hamilton: "We think you have received a special call from God to prolong, perhaps save, the life of the Ameer", Principal, Cheltenham Ladies' College to Dr. Hamilton, Oct. 1894, WHIML:PP/HAM/Ai. 70 Trans-Frontier Journal, June 1894, IOLR:SLEI/L/PS/7/75 fol. 109. 71 KN, 9-12 June 1894, IOLR:SLEI/L/PS/7/75 fol- 131 72

⁴⁸ Unpublished record in the India Office Library and Records, such as the diaries of the various native news writers in Kabul, Qandahar, Herat etc., the confidential reports of British agents, diplomats and travelers, and translations of letters, proclamations and tracts by Abdul Rahman Khan himself, also provide considerable detail about the Amir's mental and physically health.

Rahman Khan had ever experienced i.e., for nearly six months.⁴⁹ The *Amir* did not wish anyone, except his most intimate advisors and family, to observe impact of disease on him including: his physical inaction; periods of unconsciousness, and disturbed mind. His secretary was able to cover Amir's illness,⁵⁰ though rumours still spreaded and remained in currency. Growing belief in *Amir's* death or incapacity encouraged rebellion in Afghan Turkistan, leading to proclamation of *Amir*, in Mazar-i-Sharif, of Ishaq Khan, son of the former Afghan *Amir*, "Azam Khan."⁵¹ This compelled Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, in December 1888, to write to the Viceroy in India to replace English physician, Dr. Gray, ostensibly by a "gout" specialist. It seems Sultan Muhammad had gradually earned Amir's trust, owing not only to hard work but also by keeping confidential his diseases and his tactics during parleys with British India. He rose to the position of Chief Secretary (*Munshi Aala*) in 1892⁵² and entered into wedlock with the niece of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan.⁵³

Afghan courtiers, felt annoyed and fearful of Sultan's growing stature and influence and conspired to create rift between Amir and non- Afghan Sultan Muhammad, but Amir paid no attention to their complaints knowing his competence. The year 1893 marks beginning of Joint British-Afghan demarcation survey that covered 2450 km long border known as Durand Line eventually resulted into buffer zone between "Great Game" rival British and Russian interests in the region.⁵⁴ Following paragraph can provide ample evidence to Amir's depth of trust in Sultan Mahomed Khan:

"I had arranged for Mir Munshi Sultan Mahomed Khan to sit behind a curtain without being seen or heard, or his presence known of by anyone else except myself, to write down every word they spoke to me, or among themselves, either in English or Persian. He wrote in shorthand every word uttered by Durand and myself, and this conversation is all preserved in the record office."⁵⁵

⁴⁹ Khan, M. S. (Ed.), *The Life of Amir Abdur Rahman*, Vol-II. John Murray Albemarle Street, London 1900, p 273.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p 276.

⁵¹ Kakar, H. M., *Afghanistan: A Study in International Political Developments 1880-1896*, Punjab Educational Press, Lahore 1971, p 147

⁵² Hamilton, L., *A Vazir's Daughter*. John Murray, Albemarle Street, London 1900, p 34.

⁵³ The name of his wife was Sayra Jan, she was the daughter of Sardar Muhammad Rafiq Khan, the brother of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, unfortunately, within two years, she died and buried in place namely Budkhak situated four miles away from Kabul city. She had given birth to a girl Bibi Gul. Later on at the age of eighteen Bibi Gul came to Jehlam and on ward to Sialkot. She had looked after Faiz Ahmad Faiz. Bibi Gul died in Abbotabad at the age of 50. See Jameel, S. M., *Zikr-e-Faiz* (Urdu). Cultural Department, Government of Sindh, Karachi 2013, p 31.

⁵⁴ Warburton, R., *Eighteen Years in the Khyber, 1879-98*. Oxford Univ Press, Lahore 1975, p 46.

⁵⁵ Khan, M. S. (Ed.), *The Life of Amir Abdur Rahman*, Vol-II. Oxford University Press, Karachi 1980, p 160.

The Amir conducted most vital negotiations to demarcate borders and define fate of his country with Sultan's assistance. The inclusion of Sultan Muhammad Khan into inner circle of Amir can be further substantiated by the following excerpt from Amir's biography where he talks about return of Durand's Mission. "Two days before their departure all the English members of the Mission, together with Abdur Rahim Khan (their Oriental Secretary), Afzal Khan (British Agent at Kabul), and Nawab Ibrahim Khan, were invited by my son Habibullah to dine with him in the Baber Gardens. They were there received by my sons Habibullah and Nasrullah, and by Ghulam Haidar Khan (Commander-in-Chief), Mir Munshi, and two or three of my officials."⁵⁶

The following excerpts may give reader the idea and nature of conspiracies prevalent at Amir's court:

In 1894, Dr. Hamilton a replacement of Dr. Gray arrived in Kabul from India and attended him during the worst part of Amir's illness. His hand caused substantial pain and the Amir had ordered many executions and confiscations of property. After examining Amir she realized, "his was not a trouble for which I could treat him single-handed or for which, indeed, he could be treated successfully under any circumstances in Kabul. He was suffering from a disease which must, I knew, eventually be fatal".⁵⁷ The appearance of blood in the urine, for her, pointed towards "haemorrhage" of kidneys,. The native *hakim*, fearing Amir's imminent death and mindful of his own life, blamed Hamilton's prescriptions for patient's turn to worse, result of her medicines.⁵⁸ Hamilton reported grave nature of Amir's illness to Salter Pyne (1860-1921), another European in Kabul who at that time was acting as a secret news gather for the British government.⁵⁹ This can be verified by

⁵⁶ Khan, M. S. (Ed.), *The Life of Amir Abdur Rahman*, Vol-II. Oxford University Press, Karachi 1980, p 161.

⁵⁷ Lee, J., *Abd al-Rahman Khan and the Maraz Ul- Muluk*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991, p 176 .

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p 177.

⁵⁹ Sir Thomas Salter Pyne, 1860 – 1921) was a British engineer based in Afghanistan. He was born in Shropshire and apprenticed to an engineer at the age of 15, becoming manager of a foundry and engineering works by 1879. In 1883 went out to India, where he worked for the merchant Thomas Martin for a few years. In 1887, when Martin was appointed Agent by Abdur Rahman Khan, the Amir of Afghanistan, he was sent by Martin to Kabul to be Chief Engineer of Afghanistan. There, as the first European to live in Afghanistan since the Second Anglo-Afghan War of 1879–81, he trained the local people to make guns, swords, ammunition, coins, soap, candles, etc. On behalf of Martin's firm, he built an arsenal, a mint and various factories and workshops, employing in total some 4000 workers. In 1893 he was sent to India by the Amir as a Special Ambassador, and at the conclusion of the negotiations was invested a Companion of the Order of the Star of India (CSI) and knighted by the British government in recognition of his services. He was also a vital contact with the Durand Mission who were defining the borders of Afghanistan. He left the Amir's service in 1899

urgent telegram informing Calcutta that the Amir was “hourly expected to die” from a “haemorrhage of the kidney”.⁶⁰ Hamilton’s life was in danger due to successful intrigues of the *Amir’s* native hakim. She believed that in case of Amir’s death, she will face execution or imprisonment on the charge of poisoning the Afghan ruler. She kept a fast horse tethered near the entrance to the palace to flee, in the event of the *Amir’s* death till. Habibullah, Amir’s son personally reassured her and pledged his protection to Hamilton in case of his father’s death.⁶¹

Hamilton had been very close and affectionate to Sultan Muhammad Khan; was well aware of the conspiracies hatched by the courtiers; advised him “to be aware about the changing situations and moods of the rulers”, she elaborated that today’s “kind King might be cruel tomorrow”, what was in hand of him had to be saved.⁶² Thus, Sultan heeding her advice transferred all his wealth abroad through her and she became his finance minister.⁶³ Alarmed, in 1897, sensing changed situation of the court, Sultan Muhammad Khan decided to flee Afghanistan.⁶⁴ Along with Imam Bakhsh, his guard, at night, he swiftly but secretly left for Hindustan on horse’s back. Upon arrival at Lahore, he was arrested by the British officials and put into jail.⁶⁵ Wondered Sultan Muhammad Khan, “why he was sent to Jail”?⁶⁶ He was arrested as an Afghan spy and placed in custody in the same Lahore fort where Faiz Ahmad Faiz was to be imprisoned many years later. Sultan Muhammad could secure his release from British government’s jail through good office of Dr. Hamilton.⁶⁷

There exists general agreement that Sultan Muhammad earned trust of the Amir and also wrote Amir’s biography, “The Life of Amir Abdur Rahman vol: I & II ’, there is disagreement about his departure from the Afghan court. One version, more widely believed that the increased trust of the Amir upon his Chief Secretary, invited jealousy and envy against him since he was not an ethnic Afghan and had no family or other connections within the court (his wife, niece of the Amir, died within two years of his

because of failing health and was replaced by Thomas Martin’s younger brother Frank. He died in 1921.

⁶⁰ Lee, J., *Abd al-Rahman Khan and the Maraz Ul- Muluk*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991, p 178.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Khan, M. S. (Ed.), *The Life of Amir Abdur Rahman, Vol-I*. Oxford University Press, Karachi 1980, p 28.

⁶³ Hameed, R., *Faiz Ahmad Faiz: Sawani Khaka*.(Urdu) . Academy Adbiyat Pakistan, Islamabad, 2009, p 306.

⁶⁴ Kakar, H., K. *Government and Society in Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir 'Abd Al-Rahman Khan (Cmes Modern Middle East Series)*. University of Texas Press, New York 2011, p 38.

⁶⁵ Ibid.p.43.

⁶⁶ Khan, M. S., *The Constitution and Laws of Afghanistan*. John Murray Albemarle Street, London 1900, p 46.

⁶⁷ Hamilton, L., *A Vizier’s Daughter*. John Murray, Albemarle Street, London 1900, p 19.

marriage). He fled Afghanistan following warning of intrigues against him and on advice of Dr. Hamilton. She agreed to transfer his accumulated wealth to London in her name.⁶⁸

Another plausible reason of Sultan Muhammad departing the Afghan court can be that the Amir appointed him Ambassador to England due to his meticulous service during parleys with Durand's mission, confidentiality, intelligence and faithfulness. Whatever the situation, before 1898. Sultan Muhammad left Kabul and after a brief stay in Kala Qadir, proceeded to United Kingdom. There, in addition to his duties as the Ambassador of the Amir of Afghanistan to the British Court, he also got himself enrolled at Cambridge University to earn a law degree. Sultan Muhammad had previously been working on the Dari version of the Amir's biography which the Amir personally had partially dictated to him. The English version was published, in 1900, entitled, *The Life of Amir Abdur Rahman Vol.1 & Vol.2* in haste since the Amir was extremely ill at this time.

British Indian Government on the other hand had been considering him an Afghan agent, a spy.⁶⁹ The report was based on Sultan Muhammad Khan's interview granted to Sir Salter Pyne in 1896-7 stating he had "fled" Afghanistan to avoid the Amir's wrath and eventually spent some time in London.⁷⁰ It was only after his return to India a few years later that it was clear that he had been acting as the Amir's agent all the time.⁷¹

Meanwhile, the younger cousin⁷² brother of Sultan Muhammad Khan, Nabi Bakhsh, the Principal of Islamia College Lahore (1892-1898) introduced *Anjuman Himayat-e-Islam* Punjab, Lahore to the Government of Afghanistan,⁷³ during reign of Amir Abdur Rahman. In April 1895, Sultan facilitated his visit to Afghanistan to collect financial assistance for the

⁶⁸ Majeed, S. (Ed.), *Culture and Identity: Selected English Writings of Faiz*. Oxford University Press, Karachi 2005, p 7.

⁶⁹ Cunningham to Lee Warner, India Office, 14 Sept. 1897, IOLR : SLEI/L/PS/7/95 no. 959, the annual indexes of the Political and Secret Department.

⁷⁰ Lee, J., *Abd al-Rahman Khan and the Maraz Ul- Muluk*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991, p 177.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Jameel, M. S., *Zikr-e-Faiz*, Culture Department, Govt. of Sindh, Karachi 2013, p 79.

⁷³ Munshi Chiragh Din founder of the *Anjuman-e-Himayat-e-Islam* Punjab, Lahore and his colleagues established it in 1884. The founding members of the *Anjuman Himayat-e-Islam* Punjab Lahore, besides, *Munshi Chiragh Din*, included *Khalifa Hameedud Din*, *Maulana Ghulam Ullah Qasoori* and *Pir Shams-ud-Din*. Kahlifa Hameed-ud-Din, *Maulana Ghulamullah Qasoori* became the first President and General Secretary respectively of the *Anjuman*. The aims and objectives of the *Anjuman Himayat-e-Islam* included: To counter the anti-Muslim propaganda of the Christian Missionaries; To establish Islamic educational institutions and Islamic social welfare for orphans; Launching monthly, later Weekly, Magazine, titled, *Himayat-e-Islam*. In 1884 to 1972, the *Anjuman* established five colleges including, Islamia College Lahore, Amir Habibullah Khan of Afghanistan, in 1907, inaugurated its new building.

Anjuman. He stayed seven days as state guest with prince Nasrullah Khan, son of Amir Abdur Rahman. His salary and travel expenditures were paid by Afghan host. On 1st October, 1895, Prince Nasrullah Khan proceeded to England via Lahore;⁷⁴ and donated Rs.1000 to the *Anjuman*.⁷⁵

In United Kingdom

Upon release from Lahore Fort, in 1897, Sultan Muhammad Khan decided to visit United Kingdom and secured admission in Bar at Law at Cambridge University. Amir Abdur Rahman found out that “the gentleman is now in Christ’s College, Cambridge University”⁷⁶ and he appointed Sultan Muhammad Khan Ambassador of Afghanistan to United Kingdom, in London.⁷⁷ Hence, in 1898, Sultan Muhammad Khan became the Ambassador of Afghanistan in London. He served in this capacity for three years; and also completed his Bar at Law there. Sultan Muhammad continued his service as Ambassador after death of Amir during reign of new Amir Habibullah in 1902-1905 too.⁷⁸ In London, Sultan Muhammad had opportunities to meet Indian noted Muslim personalities from India such as Allama Iqbal (1877-1938), Sir Shafi (1869-1932), Sir Fazal Hussain (1877-1936) and Sir Abdul Qadar.⁷⁹ He began practice as a Barrister in London in 1905 and continued

⁷⁴ Prince Nasrullah Khan, second son of Amir Abdur Rahman was born in 1874 in Samargand during exile of his father in Russian occupied Turkistan. In 1880, his father reoccupied his throne, his elder brother Habibullah became the Prince. Nasrullah, not well versed in English, at the age of twenty, had the opportunity to meet the Queen Victoria during his visit to England in 1895. He met the Queen in Windsor while visiting Railway of Liverpool overhead. He had the opportunity to go to Paris, Rome and Naples and came back to Karachi on 16th October, 1895. He went to Kabul via Quetta, Chaman and Kandahar.

⁷⁵ Saeed, A., *Islamia college Lahore Ki Sad Saala Tareekh* (Urdu). Lahore: Azhar sons printers, 1992, p 26.

⁷⁶ Christ’s College was first established as God’s House in 1437 by William Byngham, a London Parish priest, for training grammar school masters. In 1505, with a royal charter from the King, the college was re-founded as Christ’s College. Lady Margaret Beaufort has been honored ever since as the Founders. Christ’s was noted for several eminent scholars who sought to harmonise traditional Christian faith with the new truths of natural science. These included Cambridge Platonists such as Ralph Cudworth, and William Paley, whose *Evidences of Christianity* (1794) remained set reading in Cambridge until the 20th century.

⁷⁷ Quarterly *Adbiyat*, No 82. Islamabad: editor in Chief Fakhr-ul-Zaman, Academy Adbiyat Pakistan, 2009, p 306.

⁷⁸ Saeed, A., *Islamia College Lahore ki Sad Saala Tareekh* 1892-1992. Azhar Sons Printers, Lahore 1992, p 39.

⁷⁹ Sir Abdul Qadar (1874-1951) was an eminent lawyer, journalist and critic born in Lodyana. He was appointed as the editor of the first English newspaper “Observer” in 1895. He went to England for higher studies and returned to India in 1906 after completing his Bar at Law. He served in different influential capacities throughout his life. He served as Judge of High court (1921), President of Punjab Assembly (1922), minister of Education (1925), Participated in League of Nation conference in Geneva (1926), Member of Punjab Executive Council (1928), High Court Judge (1930), Member of viceroy Executive Council (1939) and Chief

till 1907. He decided to return to his native village in 1908, voyaged from England to Bombay and by train to Lahore and Sialkot. He had been in Sialkot and began practicing law and also married fifth time.⁸⁰ Sultan Muhammad was awarded the title of ‘Khan Bahadur’ in 1908 by the crown.⁸¹ His Afghan wives finally joined him in Sialkot too. Youngest wife, barely older than some of his daughters was Sultan Fatima (mother of Faiz) was the daughter of a landowner in the nearby village of Jessar. In 1909, Sultan Fatima gave birth to first son, Tufail Ahmed, followed three years later by second Faiz Ahmed Faiz.⁸² Two more sons, Inayat and Bashir were born too. All Sultan’s sons, except Bashir, a physically and mentally disabled child from birth, rose to prominent positions in their careers. Tufail Ahmed, a judge, Faiz, a teacher, Editor and eminent poet, Inayat, a Major in the Army.⁸³ Sultan Muhammad of Kala Kader, well acquainted with British and Afghan aristocracy easily moved in the British aristocracy much of his pictures, preserved by his successors are witness to it.⁸⁴ He was bestowed upon numerous decoration and honours by the British crown including the title of “Khan Bahadur” and vast tracts of land in Sargodha.⁸⁵

Works

Sultan Muhammad Khan’s intellectual and literary contributions include: “*The Constitution and Laws of Afghanistan*”, comprising 164 pages, published in London, in 1900 by Jon Marry Printing press; Biography, *The Life of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan*, in two volumes, printed in 1900, by John Murray, Albemarle Street London, reprinted, in 1980, by Oxford University Press, Karachi. The original version vol.1 of the book contains 295 pages,

Justice of Bahawalpur High Court (1942) Sir Abdul Qadar was a lover of Urdu language. He started a literary journal of Urdu named “*Mekhzan*” having contribution of top literary critics and poets. He was a close friend of Allama Muhammad Iqbal and wrote preface of “*Bang-e-Dara*”, remained the president of *Anjuman Himayat-e-Islam* Punjab and wrote two travelogues “*Darbar-e-khilafat*” about Turk Caliphate and “*Safar nama-e-Europe*”.

⁸⁰ Sultan Fatima was the fifth wife of Sultan Muhammad Khan, in 1908 gave birth to her first son Chaudhry Tufail Ahmad, M.Sc. Physics from Aligarh, later on a Judge, three years later, 1911, the second son Chaudhry Faiz Ahmad was born, the third son had been Chaudhry Inayat Ahmed, a Barrister, later he joined Army as Major and the last son Chaudhry Bashir Ahmad was physically and mentally disabled.

⁸¹ Jamil, M., *Zakir Faiz*. (Urdu). Sindh Cultural Board, Government of Sindh, Karachi 2014, p 11.

⁸² Ibid, p 15.

⁸³ Ahmad, S., *Kala Qadir Kaa Charwaha* (Urdu). Islamabad: Quarterly Adbiyat, Academy Adbiyat Pakistan, 2009, p 310.

⁸⁴ Hameed, R. *Faiz Ahmad Faiz: Sawanhi Khaka*. (Urdu). Academy Adbiyat Pakistan, Islamabad, 2009, p 306.

⁸⁵ *Centenary Celebrations of Faiz Ahmad Faiz*. The Daily Dawn, Islamabad February 11, 2011.

Note of the publisher, preface, twelve chapters and list of illustrations. Sultan Muhammad Khan's "*The Constitution and Laws of Afghanistan*" comprises an introduction ten chapters and two appendices. First chapter begins with *Historical Outline* and last Chapter is comments on *Private Law*. The professed aim of writing this book has been to compare private and constitutional laws of Afghanistan with advanced European countries.⁸⁶ His research question has been how far laws and customs practiced in Afghanistan were based upon ancient oriental customs and Muhammadan law?⁸⁷ Additionally, how much Afghanistan, in terms law, borrowed from India and other neighbouring countries?⁸⁸ He also tried to distinguish contribution of Amir Abdur Rahman in this regard. He fondly refers to Wheeler, former stae Secretary that Amir *Abdur Rahman* was the first ruler of Afghanistan who made official work formal by constructing a Government Secretarite, in his supervision⁸⁹

The Life of Amir Abdur Rahman Vol.1 & Vol.2 reveals originality of Sultan Muhammad's work. The author states that:

"...the first part of the book was written by Amir himself and I am depositing in the British Museum, oriental reading room, a copy of the original. The rest was written in my hand writing from the Amir's dictation, during the time of my holding the office of Mir Munshi."⁹⁰

However, an eminent Afghan scholar, Muhammad Hassan Kakar, in his book, *Afghanistan A Study in International Political Developments 1880 – 1896*, argues:

"... it is not an autobiography in its entirety, however, for only the first part, covering the events of Abd al-Rahman's early life up to his arrival in Afghanistan, was written by the Amir himself. The manuscript is undated and preserved in the Mss[sic.--] Department of Kabul Public Library. It is not definite when the Amir wrote it, but in 1303/1886 it was published under the title of *pandnama-i-dunyawa din*, (a Book of Advice on the World and Religion). Sultan Mahomed has simply incorporated its English translation in the so-called Autobiography of the Amir."⁹¹

⁸⁶ Khan, M. S. M., *The Constitution and Laws of Afghanistan*. John Murray, London 1900, p vi.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p vii.

⁹⁰ Sultan, M., *The life of Abdur Rahman Amir of Afghanistan*. Oxford University press, Karachi 1980, p 06

⁹¹ Kakar, M. H., *Afghanistan: A Study in International Political Developments 1880-1896*. Punjab Educational Press, Lahore 1971, p 219.

Hassan Kakar further comments on second part of the book:

*"About the rest of the book, Sultan Mahomed, a Panjabi native of "humble" origin in the service of Amir Abd al-Rahman as an interpreter and secretary (munshi), claims he wrote it as dictated by the Amir himself, but this is not true. In 1895, Mr. Gray, the Amir's former physician sent him his book, "My Residence at the Court of the Amir" – a collection of personal impressions of rather insignificant matters."*⁹²

According to Hassan Kakar, Amir Abdur Rahman was displeased with the book and later his son and successor, Amir Habibullah Khan, expressed extreme displeasure at Sultan Muhammad. Resultantly, he was never allowed to return to Kabul, despite the fact that he was tutor of Amir Habibullah Khan.⁹³ Although, some Indian governmental circles considered Sultan Muhammad was sent abroad to spy for the Amir of Afghanistan.⁹⁴ However, others believe that Sultan Muhammad was a spy of British Indian Government rather than Amir of Afghanistan.⁹⁵ Upon discovery that he worked for British Indian Government his own pupil Amir Habibullah Khan did not allow him to come back to Afghanistan.⁹⁶ Sultan Muhammad Khan passed away in 1931 in Sialkot.

Conclusion

It can be concluded that Sultan Muhammad Khan worked not only to preserve and strengthen independence of and stability in Afghanistan but also assisted in modernization of and promotion of constitutional rule in Afghanistan. He tried to tightly guard Amir's secrets despite prevalence of spies of the British and Russian government in the Afghan Court. Although, he was accused of being a spy of the British government, his services for the advancement of Afghanistan cannot be undermined. Keeping in view his political and constitutional services, literary contribution, and his work as *Mir Munshi Aala* (Chief Secretary) especially, during parleys of the Amir with British Mission to demarcate Afghan borders, and the trust Amir reposed in him testifies to the fact that he remained a friend of Afghanistan. This can be also substantiated by the fact that he was arrested by and jailed

⁹² Gray, J. A., *My Residence at the Court*. Darf Publishers Ltd., London 1987, p 29.

⁹³ *The Daily Dawn*. Karachi, dated 11.02. 2011.

⁹⁴ Kakar, M.H., *Afghanistan: A Study in International Political Developments 1880-1896*. Punjab Educational Press, Lahore 1971, p 218.


⁹⁵ Wheeler, S., *The Amir Abdur Rahman*. Frederick Warne & Co., New York 1895, p 216.

⁹⁶ Kakar, H. K. *Government and Society in Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir 'abd Al-Rahman Khan* (Cmes Modern Middle East Series). University of Texas Press, Texas 2011, p 147.

in Lahore Fort by the British Indian Government where later Faiz Ahmed Faiz was jailed by the successor Pakistani government who opposed British and US imperialism in the 1950s. Moreover, suffice to say that not only Amir Abdur Rahman (who trusted him) appointed him as Afghan Ambassador to England for three years but his successor Habibullah Khan, reposing confidence in him, also allowed him to continue as Ambassador till 1905.



Faiz's father, Sultan Muhammad Khan
(*Mir Munchi Aala* in Afghanistan 1888-1898)



A painting of Dr. Lillias Hamilton, Sultan Muhammad's friend at the Afghan court (1894-1898)

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PAKISTAN'S STAKES IN AFGHANISTAN IN THE REALM OF REGIONAL GEO POLITICAL DYNAMICS

Jehanzeb Khalil Saima Perveen***

Abstract

Foreign policy of any country does not function in isolation and is dependent upon certain non-tangible factors directly influencing national policies such as geography, demography, economy and overall socio political environment in the region. Regions like ours having additional factors like terrorism emanating from instability in our neighboring country like Afghanistan having presence of two nuclear powers with a history of conflicts, further exacerbates the challenges. These factors combined put Pakistan in a catch twenty two position. Such challenges also portend opportunities if manipulated sensibly and countries like ours can still accrue benefits to safeguard its national interests. Afghanistan has assumed a paramount leverage on and pivotal position in the Central and South Asian region due to its undeniably geo-political uniqueness. In this region Pakistan being the immediate bordering country and its Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province and Tribal Areas experience immediate fall out of any turmoil within Afghanistan. Scarlet thread in Pak-Afghan relationship is to have a friendly and stable Afghanistan or in the worst scenario at least a neutral Afghanistan would suit our national integrity and internal stability. Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan have been undeniably stretched to political horizons where Pakistan not only wishes to have a favorable Afghan government but also desires to have peaceful western border, to counter Indian enhanced influence as well as to relegate Pashtunistan issue to the backburner. Similarly Pakistan can have access to the Central Asian Republics, rich in oil and gas reserves, through a safe land route via Afghanistan. Afghanistan has strategic significance for Pakistan who can benefit from our advanced defense industries and military training. It will not only stabilize our internal situation but in future enable Pakistan and

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India work together to improve bilateral relations ensuring a safe a secure eastern and western borders in the long run.

Key Words: National Interests, Strategic, Defence, Militants, Durand Line, Pashtunistan.

Introduction

Pakistan and Afghanistan are intertwined, whose sphere of relations is not only inclusive of neighborhood but encircling the longest border, same ideology, Pashtun ethnicity. Both states are interconnected for serving their national interests. National interests are of prime significance in aspect of foreign policy. "National interests is a concept which could be used to describe, explain and assess the foreign policies of nations."¹ National interest is a basis for evaluating the appropriateness of foreign policy. "Each state plots the course it thinks will best serve its interests."² Realists have attributed to the domain of national interests. For Morgenthau, national interests are legitimization of foreign policy while for Kenneth Waltz national interests are survival of state in anarchical world. Anarchy determined the national interests, if not power based but at least to serve material ends. Afghanistan is connected with Pakistan in such a way that stability in Pakistan cannot prevail in case of insecurity inside Afghanistan. Peace and stability in Afghanistan is paramount for Pakistan national interest. Pakistan is dependent on Afghanistan for channeling its access to not only Central Asian Republics but cordial strategic and economic relations with China are also possible only due to stable Afghanistan.³ Moreover, the bilateral relations can take a significant turn by mutual cooperation regarding Gwadar sea Port, Durand Line and Pashtun issue. Furthermore, this ambit encompassed the regional interests and reservations of Pakistan against India while keeping balance of power notion in consideration, and is apprehensive about Iran's for her instigation of Shia militia in Baluchistan.⁴ Friendly and stable Afghanistan provides depth to Pakistan against India.⁵

¹ J.N. Rosenhaus, *National Interests in Sells*, D.L. (ed) International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, Vol. II, New York 1964, p 35.

² Waltz, K., *Theory of International Politics*. McGraw Hill Inc, New York 1979, p 113.

³ (Retd) Col. Zahur ul Haq, interview with Author. 20th August 2013.

⁴ Larry, H., *India's and Pakistan's Strategies in Afghanistan*. RAND Corporation, 2012.

⁵ Amjad Amin, Councilor, Interview with author, 28th July 2013.

Pakistan's Stakes in Afghanistan

Pakistan's stability is pervasively interlaced to Afghanistan because the ongoing turmoil across the western border has infested militancy and extremism inside Pakistan. Trans-border clientelism is the main obstacle in restoring peace and security in many countries like Pakistan, Central Asian Republics, Afghanistan and Iran.⁶ Ethnic nationalism, ethnic strife and further its exploitation by the major powers have been the essence of regional geopolitics. Pakistan's security has been trembled by infiltration of militants across Durand Line. Pakistan has long border with Afghanistan, which is not well-managed and people sometimes move without visa. Some of that movement is healthy while other are unhealthy so the situation in Afghanistan has direct effect on Pakistan.⁷ For example people after Swat operation were flee to Afghanistan and Pakistan government of PPP repeatedly asked Afghanistan to handed them over.⁸ Therefore Pakistan has always asked neighboring countries to play their role in this regard by fixing intelligence devices, deployment of military check posts on the Afghan side of Durand line so as to curb militant's infiltration.⁹

Pakistan is apprehensive of the US goals in Afghanistan which are not only limited to Afghanistan but through Obama 'Afpak strategy' has taken Pakistan in its folds as well. One of the US main aim seems to watch Pakistan nukes and nuclear proliferation which are the only survival tools against India.¹⁰ Moreover, Pakistan is suspicious about the US motives in Afghanistan of building stable government which could ever favorable to Pakistan or at least not hostile to Pakistan's interests. Contemplating historical political set ups in Afghanistan, the Taliban government has served Pakistan's cause to the utmost but now due to intricate transformations it can only be damp squib. Furthermore, on the horns of a dilemma Pakistan is to comply with any of government coming to the forefront. The US is headstrong about her deep politics in Afghanistan and the obvious manifestation in this regard is the presence of troops beyond the exit.¹¹

Pakistan is unflinching for having cordial and peaceful relations with Afghanistan. But Afghan Taliban's infiltration across Durand Line into Pakistan has ratcheted the parameter of stable bilateral relations by escalating militancy in tribal areas. This intricate security situation has been troubling to the country and demand exigency because resultantly it has

⁶ Amin, S., Afghan Ethnic Strife. In *International Institute of Strategic Studies*. Survival, 40(2), Summer 1998.

⁷ Hina Rabbani Khar. Interview with Author. 1st December, 2013.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Stopping Terrorist. In *The Daily News* (Karachi) June 10, 2008.

¹⁰ http://www.mofa.gov.pk/press_Release/2008/july/PR_208_08.htm

¹¹ Vanda., F.B., *Security and Politics in Pre-Transition Afghanistan*. Brookings, May 9, 2012.

¹¹ Ibid.

doubted Pakistan's role in war on terror. Pakistan has been accused by the US on more than one ground that ISI is backing, nourishing and harboring Taliban as according to Ahmad Rashid, Pakistan assisted Taliban with military and political aid envisaged that they would concede and legitimize Durand Line as boundary, which is capable of dismantling Pakistani state. Contrary to Pakistan's expectation Taliban inflamed Pashtun nationalism by giving religious tinge to nationalism.¹²

If a realistic look is taken of Pakistan and Afghanistan relations, then it comes to the surface that Pakistan and Afghanistan relations have been remained murky due to various reasons, among which Pashtunistan has been one of the main troubling aspect since long. On Afghan side, Pashtun nationalism is based not only on argument that Pakistan's Pashtun are integral part of Afghanistan but also that Baluchistan being an outlet of Afghanistan to the Indian Ocean is inevitable to be merged with Afghanistan. Due to these factors Afghanistan had refuted the validity of 1947 referendum and its foreign policy till 1980s revolved around Pashtunistan.¹³ The Afghanistan since long had been trying to change the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to greater extent. According to Lord Curzon, territorial frontiers inhabited by major ethno-linguistic group are sort of tension for all foreign offices in social and civilized world. It is a base on which matter of war and peace or life and death hinged on.¹⁴ There are myriad examples of it, like Kashmir between Pakistan and India, tussle on Abkhazia between Russia and Georgia, Nagorno Karabagh has endangered terms of Armenia and Azerbaijan, border tussle of China and India, dispute of Cambodia and Thailand and most critical of all is Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan is averse to the Afghanistan claim on Pashtun inhabitants of Pakistan.¹⁵ In order to settle the issue of Pashtunistan, Pakistan wants a client state in Afghanistan because this grave issue can bifurcate Pakistan on the basis of ethnic strife.¹⁶

Pakistan and Afghanistan have common religion, culture, customs and traditions but to the great dismay the superpower involvement in both minor states has made the situation murky. Undoubtedly, in Pakistan the non-state actors with their external patrons have threatened national security with exacerbated extremism and sectarianism which are the direct fallout of Afghanistan turmoil. Pakistan's foreign policy in war on terror decades is on head on not only for regional stability and peace but is neutralizing the

¹² Rashid, A., *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*. Yale University Press, New Haven 2010, p 187.

¹³ Ahmad S. Q., Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations: Border Controversies as Counter Terrorist Impediments. In *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 09 March, 2007, p 72.

¹⁴ G.N. Curzon, *Frontiers, Romanes Lecture*. Oxford 1907, p 1.

¹⁵ Rashid, A., *Taliban: Militants, Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*. Yale University Press, New Haven 2010, p 87.

¹⁶ Marving. W. and Janathan B. H., *Pakistan's Afghanistan Policies and Their Consequences*. Contemporary South Asia, 16(1), 2008, p 28.

immediate threats and leverages in Afghanistan from India.¹⁷ Whereas, the US is also dependent on Pakistan's role for degrading the momentum of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks.

Indian Influence

India has envisaged Afghanistan pivotal significance in its foreign policy after 1990s at the demise of bipolar world structure. Both countries had instigated friendship treaty in 1950 with good pace of diplomatic terms. Her enhanced cordial relations with Afghanistan after 9/11 and special turn of relations have come to the forefront in October 2011 with signing of strategic partnership agreements. Basically, India carves to be most dominant power and player in South Asia and within Indian Ocean basin, to cater for its strategic interests and to grapple with all hurdles in this regard.¹⁸ India is farsightedly investing in Afghanistan in order to foster her nexus with Afghanistan, which could make it powerful stake holder at the exit and beyond 2014.¹⁹ She is Afghanistan fifth largest bilateral donor, who has ventured so many infrastructure related construction projects.²⁰ Moreover, she is contributing in development of Afghanistan and training Afghan integral security forces. Wherein India has disbursed more than \$2 billion in Afghanistan and have strategic ties with Afghanistan, therefore Afghanistan looks up to India for her development.²¹

India has always remained averse to Taliban regime and sided along Iran, Tajikistan and Russia to Northern Alliance because Taliban are considered closely allied to Pakistan. As far as India role in Afghanistan is concerned then it can pose challenge to Pakistan's foreign policy because both India and Afghanistan are boisterous to Pakistan throughout the history. Southern and South Eastern Afghanistan is known to the Pashtun dominating areas, these appears to be a majority of Pro-Pakistan population, whereas presence of considerable number of Indian councillets on Af-Pak border indicates a certain degree of Indian interests with availability of some liberty of action.²² India sought proactive statecraft and pro-Indian lobbies in Afghanistan and has been succeeded to the great extent in this regard. It has flourished diplomatic missions in strategically significant areas which are maximizing Indian influence at the expense of Pakistan.²³

¹⁷ Ayesha S., Pakistan Counterinsurgency Strategy: Separating Friends From Enemies. In *The Washington Quarterly*, Routledge, 16 December, 2010.

¹⁸ C. Christine F., Under the Shrinking US Security Umbrella: India's End Game in Afghanistan. In *The Washington Quarterly*, Routledge, 22 March, 2011. P. 180.

¹⁹ Director (Retd) ISI, Ghazanfar.interview with Author, 16th August, 2013.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Aftab Sherpao, Former Interior Minister, Interview with Author, 24th September 2013.

²² Amjad Amin, Councillor of Pakistan Embassy, Islamabad, 28th July 2013.

²³ Safdar H., Issues and Challenges in Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations after 9/11. In *South Asian Studies*, 27(1), January-June 2012, p 93.

Apparently, Washington had its own priorities for this region as part of its China-driven larger Asian agenda and its ongoing post-9/11 Central Asia-focused 'great game' in pursuit of its worldwide political and economic power. In 2005, it signed a long-term multi-billion dollar military pact with India to keep its military industry running. It also entered into a country-specific discriminatory nuclear deal with India introducing an ominous dimension to the already volatile and unstable security environment of the region. Delhi is covetous to access Central Asia energy market and for an effective trade, transportation and infrastructure in Afghanistan. As China is nightmarish for US in this region but dominant role of India will curtail China influence in South and Central Asia which is desired by US and Delhi.²⁴

In 2012 Leon Panetta eulogized India role in Afghanistan economic and commercial sectors and Delhi assistance in training of integral Afghanistan armed forces. India pivotal role in Afghanistan's security could sideline Pakistan role in war on terror. Furthermore, Afghanistan agreements with Russia and Central Asia for logistical support would relegate Pakistan to background. General McChrystal in 2009 expressed his apprehension about India hegemonic role that it could ignite Pakistan and as an aftermath violence would be escalated inside Afghanistan and India by Pakistan.²⁵

Pakistan was on tenterhooks by Karzai visit to India in 2011 for contracting strategic ties as it will enhance Indian influence in Afghanistan. It is doubted that in order to balance the power of region, in retaliation of India covert activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan province Baluchistan, hence Pakistan will come to grips by allowing Jehadi and Taliban groups Lashkar-e Tayyiba, Jammāt-ud Dawa, and Tahrir-e Taliban-e Pakistan for instigating instability in both India and Afghanistan.²⁶

On the other hand, Indian hegemonic status in Afghanistan is strategic defeat to Pakistan.²⁷ India reopened embassy in Kabul soon after Taliban was toppled. It has also opened four consulate offices in major Afghan cities of Qandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat and Jalalabad. Prior to that there were no consular offices.²⁸

Pakistan has doubted Indian consulates at Qandahar and Jalalabad that these are not for commercial purposes but are used by Indian intelligence agency, Research and Analytical Wing (RAW) for covert activities inside Pakistan. India has established its consulates on multi ethnic basis as two

²⁴ Harsh V. P., India in Afghanistan: A Test Case for a Rising Power. In *Contemporary South Asia*, 18(2), 2010, p 147.

²⁵ Opcit. Larry. *India and Pakistan*, 2012, p 23.

²⁶ Alam P., Inside Afghanistan 23 Years After the Soviet Withdrawal. In *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 2013.

²⁷ Commander International Security Assistance Force and US Force Afghanistan COMISAF's Initial Assessment, Memorandum to Security of Defence Robert Gates. August 30, 2009, pp. 2-11.

²⁸ Ibid.

consulates in Pashtun region (Jalalabad, Quetta) and two in non-Pashtun (Mazar-e-zsharif and Herat). Her reconstruction projects in Pashtun belt are pertinent to erase the label of anti-Pashtun from her. India has same position and standpoint as that of Afghanistan on all violent activities and treatment of militants. Both are high handed about Pakistan and set her responsible for all these insurgency rather than to contemplate the real root cause.²⁹ There is mistrust between Pakistan and India and both are accusing each other.

Pakistan alleged Indian complicity in flourishing militants networks in Afghanistan various areas especially near Gereshk, in southern Helmand province; at army basis of Qushila Jadid, in the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul; northeast of Kabul; and at Kahak and Hassan Killies in western Nimruz province.³⁰ Mushahid Hussain, Former Chairman of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs stated in July 2006 that RAW had been involved in 600 Baluchi training inside Afghanistan and is igniting radicalism in Baluchistan. Moreover he emphasized on Afghanistan covert agency inter-linkage with RAW.³¹ India is said to be providing funding to Baluch dissident groups for exerting pressure on Pakistan.³² India is utilizing consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar, cities closer to the border, in order to instigate anti-Pakistan feelings in Baluchistan and FATA.³³ Her interference and involvement in Baluchistan is a formidable threat. There is RAW, CIA, MOSSAD combined centre in Mazari Sharif which is very active in Baluchistan and had operated in Swat.³⁴ This alliance is still playing in North and South Waziristan. It has been clearly manifested from the weapons recovered at Swat operation, which were labeled as 'Made in Banaras'.³⁵ Pakistan military considered India role in Baluchistan's turmoil which needs to be taken at exigency.³⁶ On the other hand there are reservations from India side that Lashkar e Tayyiba (LeT) is working in Kahmir in order to counter India there and considered it insidious.³⁷ There have been resentment that militant groups are sided with Pakistan military as expert on military affairs Ayesha Siddiqas has depicted that Jaish e Muhammad (JeM) has linkages with Pakistan army which is working against India. JeM is aboded in Karachi, where they have relaxed living. Mullah

²⁹ Ahmad Q. S., *Afghanistan's Political Stability: A Dream Unrealised*. Ashgate Publishing Group, England 2009, p 158.

³⁰ Grare F., *Pakistan Afghanistan Relations in the Post 9/11 Era*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, South Asia Project, Number 72, October 2006.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Hasan Askari Rizvi, Defence Analyst, Interview with Author, 6th October 2013.

³³ Howard B. S. and B. T. C. Schaffer., *How Pakistan Negotiates With The United States: Riding The Roller Coaster*. United States Institute Of Peace, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 20.

³⁴ Opcit Brig. Ghazanfar Interview with Author.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Musharraf. India Supporting Militancy in Baluchistan. In *The Express Tribune*, October 10, 2010.

³⁷ Yahya M., Interview with Ayesha Siddiqi, Islamabad, October 10, 2010.

Abdul Baradar was captured from Karachi in 2010.³⁸ So if these grounds are to be contemplated than it is evident that militants are easing military cause, however, there is no concrete justification in this regard.

Pakistan is reinforcing the statements of security personnel that Pakistan is under strategic challenges by foreign powers who have conspired to decay Pakistan. Afghanistan is on cordial terms with India and is tying agreements, the decision for it has been taken in October 2011, and the ensuing May 2012 U.S.-Afghanistan tie-up, is apprehensive for Pakistan. Indian presence in Afghanistan is contributing towards internal situation of Pakistan. Pakistan cannot beat India in Afghanistan, it can just raise the costs of India active role in Afghanistan due to its geo-strategic location. Denial of ground transit to India is one step in this regard.³⁹

As Afghanistan is landlocked and India has no direct transit route to Afghanistan, the more she has at her disposal in this regard comprised three air lines Indian Airline, Ariana Airlines, the Kam Air.⁴⁰ So what Pakistan can do is to block the transit route in order to impede the trade. Pakistan, by blocking two way India-Afghan trade has allowed the commodities of Afghanistan through her territory to south while refuted the same facility to India to access north.⁴¹ No doubt, Pakistan wants bilateral favorable trade relations with India for which MFN status has been granted to India but blocking the transit trade to her is only due to reason that Indian enhanced influence in Afghanistan is despicable to Pakistan's national interests.⁴² Islamabad objective is to prevent India from strengthening its strategic interests in Afghanistan, and to establish pro-Pakistan political set up in Afghanistan.⁴³ There is no doubt, that Indian presence in Afghanistan creates problems of many kinds in Pakistan. If India is hostile on Kashmir border, how can it be friendly on Afghanistan border?

In order to counter Indian leverage in Afghanistan, Pakistan can adopt following policy options to counter India in Afghanistan. It can impede Afghanistan export to India through Pakistan, can abort pipeline construction project among Turkamanistan, Afghanistan and India, to foster bilateral pipeline project with Iran, further to invigorate military, commercial, infrastructure development with China and to the most constraining will be blocking the US convoy.⁴⁴ Pakistan can render

³⁸ Opcit, Ayesha, *Pakistan Counterinsurgency*. p 155.

³⁹ Allow Transit to Afghanistan, India Asks Pakistan. In *Pakistan Tribune*, 24 January, 2007.

⁴⁰ Opcit, Qaseem. *Afghanistan Political Stability*. p 158.

⁴¹ Pranab Mukarjee., External Affairs Minister, Speech at Research And Information System for Developing Countries and South Asia Centre for Policy Studies Conferences, Economic Cooperation in SAARC: SAFTA and Beyond. New Delhi. March 19, 2007.

⁴² Rodriguez and Mark M., Pakistan, India Take another Cautious Step Forward. In *Los Angeles Times*, November 7, 2011.

⁴³ Ben A., *How the Afghanistan War Became Tangled in India Vs Pakistan Rivalry*. Christine Science Monitor, January 20, 2011.

⁴⁴ Opcit, Christine, *Pakistan India Strategies*. p 25.

diplomatic offensive against Indian presence. Pressure on the Kabul government to control Indian activities can also be helpful. Furthermore, in case India deploys military forces in Afghanistan then Pakistan should have security options ready to deal with it.⁴⁵

For any regional approach, India-Pakistan equation must be kept straight. The US must not ignore Pakistan's legitimate concerns about India's role in the region especially its overbearing strategic ascendancy in the region and its unprecedented leverage in Afghanistan with serious nuisance potential against Pakistan's security interests. It is already involved in fueling subversion and instability in our tribal areas and Baluchistan.

However there can be positive side of the picture as well. According to some of military officers and diplomats, Indian presence in Afghanistan poses no challenge to Pakistan's foreign policy. In case of any ill will against India, Pakistan should submit reservations along evidences to the United Nations and to the India so that can be justified.⁴⁶ Afghanistan is known as a grave yard for super powers hence India can never be nightmarish if it engages itself in Afghanistan. It shouldn't make any difference to Pakistan.⁴⁷ India is assisting in reconstruction of Afghanistan and has contributed to Afghanistan's development more than Pakistan.⁴⁸ India has civilization linkages and relations with Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a sovereign country so it can better decide about its interests. Pakistan can only ask that Afghanistan soil should not be used against any regional stakeholder.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Brig (Retd) Nadir Mir. Interview with Author, 20th September 2013.

⁴⁶ Brig. Asad Munir, Interview with Author, 19th August 2013.

⁴⁷ Brig (Retd) Mahmud Shah. Interview with Author, 9th September 2013.

⁴⁸ Opcit. Hasan, Interview with Author.

⁴⁹ Rustam Shah Mohmand, Former Ambassador. Interview with Author, 17th September 2013.

China Factor

China presence in Afghanistan is to serve her national interests, which encompassed mining contracts in Afghanistan, economic activities and to deter from strategic relations such weapons supply.⁵⁰ China sought narrow than broader interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan because of rising extremism and terrorism in both countries. Due to these narrow interests, Chinese workers have security threats in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, wherein both minor states are grappling with the US egregious designs and cannot secure Chinese interests at the costs of the US.⁵¹

It is the utmost preference of China to take Pakistan and Afghanistan peace and stability head on in order to restore peaceful atmosphere in her Northwest province, where Chinese minority, the Uighur are of prime concern to Beijing. Because in that province, besides supply of weapons, militants and drugs, Pan ideological Pan-Islamic Jihadi groups are also exacerbating the security of Xianjiang and has activated pro-independence. China is with firm conviction that militants trained in FATA and Afghanistan East and Southern part are assaulting china.⁵² These militants are associated with across the border Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan Islamic party (TIP) East Turkmenistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) which are striving for an Islamic state in East Turkmenistan in Xianjiang.⁵³ Keeping these threats in consideration, China is trying to develop economic relations with Afghanistan as in Afghanistan China metallurgical construction groups have contributed \$3.2 billion Aynak Copper Mine investment in Eastern province of Logar, holding as much as third of China Coal Reserves.⁵⁴ China has supplied substantial aid to Afghanistan as \$150 million in 2002⁵⁵ and \$75 million from 2009⁵⁶ Gwadar energy transshipment route if once get connected to expanded Karakoram Highway (KKH) then it can be utilized for naval purpose. China has started projects in Afghanistan, it has Ainak project and project on Amu Darya from where gas is to be exploited.⁵⁷ China is covetous for access to Central Asian Republics and especially Kazakhstan where china have 22% oil reserves.⁵⁸

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Andrew S., China's Caution on Afghanistan-Pakistan. In *The Washington Quarterly*, Routledge, 24 June, 2010.

⁵² Interviews by Andrew Small in Beijing in July 2009 and Islamabad in August 2009.

⁵³ Murad B. S., Journal of Turkistan Islamic Party Urges Jihad in China. In *Terrorism Monitor* 7(9), April 10, 2009.

⁵⁴ Opcit, Andrew. *China Caution*. p 3.

⁵⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The People Republic of China Official of the Foreign Ministry Briefs the Resident Journalists in Briefing about the visit of Afghanistan Interim Government Chairman Karzai, January 30, 2002.

⁵⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People Republic of China Foreign Ministry WuDawei Attends International Conference on Afghanistan. April 1, 2009.

⁵⁷ Brig. Ghazanfar interview with Author, 16th August 2013.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

As consider the US response on China's leverage in Afghanistan and Pakistan, then the US is comfortable with Chinese contribution to the region such as investment, civilian capacity and aid in Northern distribution network for NATO-Led ISAF. There is consideration that China can play a pivotal role in bringing Pakistan to the point of rendering headway in subjugating insurgency emanating from western border rather than confined only to India and eastern border. But this notion of the US has gone awry due to Chinese negligence. It is palpable that China can exercise leverage by asking Pakistan to settle militancy and extremist threats, which have been arise from Central and South Asia. Pakistan will concede with it hence these threats are detrimental to both Pakistan and China internal security.

By taking comparison of the US and China foreign policies it is evident that China has different strategy than that of the US. She know better that Pakistan and Afghanistan's trained groups are hitting China and pose threat to China security but the latter individually consult Pakistan military and other Islamic parties to curb these elements. Historically, China have contracted agreements with Taliban before 9/11 to deter militants and Uighur training on Afghanistan soil. China contemplated that the US objective in invading Afghanistan is not counterterrorism but is geopolitical because the US sought energy and mineral resources of the region and furthermore to counter China.⁵⁹ In order to undermine India influence in South Asia, China is working on nuclear related programs with Pakistan, as Chashma III and IV plants are to be realized in coming time.⁶⁰ China is so cautious about her interests as when militancy in Swat and Buner was alarming, China was apprehensive that may it not stretch to the Karakuran Highway (KKH), due to this fear China disbursed economic and military aid to Pakistan military to conclude this Operation successfully.

China is hungry for natural resources. Pakistan should cooperate with China because its natural resources are exploited in China. Pakistan will provide transit route for carrying it to china and Pakistan can assist in setting up natural resource extraction industries as well.⁶¹ The huge investment in Afghanistan has been carried out by China in order to be fully benefited by Afghanistan natural resources as Chirtian Le Miere, Jane's Intelligence Review editor stated China is very interested in Cheap resources of neighbouring country and is already with lion investment \$3.5 billion the project of Aynak, fields of copper which is situated in the province of Logar.

Glen Howard and Russell stated in January, 2012, The China Brief of institute of Jamestown that china is actively engaged in Wakhan strip which have so much strategic significance, in 2009 some infrastructure

⁵⁹ Ibid. P. 9.

⁶⁰ Geoff d., Farhan Bokhari and James Lament, China to Build Reactors in Pakistan. In *Financial Times*, April 28, 2010. Retrieved from <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/o/cf731b28-52d2-11df-a192-00144feab4pa.html>

⁶¹ Tasneem Noorani, Former Interior Minister. Interview with Author, 20th September 2013.

mobilization in that area has been undertaken. This infrastructure comprised 75 kilometers road which stretched up to 10 kilometer from Afghanistan-China border. Chinese ministry of defense has constructed this road which is so crucial for carrying military concerned equipment to frontiers guards of China. Moreover a depot has been built by China in order to ameliorate quality of food items for police.⁶²

China does have its own regional and global concerns and is not oblivious of the challenges resulting from the US-led uni-polarity or its 'pivotal' ascendancy in Asian regions. For this purpose the establishment of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was a step towards creating a regional bloc to withstand American ascendancy in this region.⁶³ Chinese economy is already nightmare for the US because the US economy has come to the shutdown.

Access to Central Asian Republics

Central Asia emerged on the global scene in 70s decade when Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan and resultantly Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan played pivotal role by providing bases in that turmoil.⁶⁴ The demise of Soviet Union has given birth to Central Asian Republics (CARs). This was the entry of new strategic dimensions with resulting orientation of policies and objectives of great powers. No doubt, at initial stages myriad demographic, strategic, economic and political challenges were confronted by CARs. How much these states could be strong by other aspects but militarily they are weak.

Pakistan close and cooperative relations with CARs based on shared bonds of history, culture and traditions. Since their independence in 1992, Pakistan maintained close contact with CARs and have established resident diplomatic missions in all the six former Soviet Republics of Central Asia and Caucasus, namely, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Also, we have exchanged frequent high-level visits with these countries and are pursuing collaboration with them bilaterally as well as within the framework of ECO in the fields of transit routes, credit facilities, banking, and training and technical assistance programs.

Russia has paramount influence and dominance in this region to the extent that hitherto these independent states are firmly tied to the Russia. The US is still grappling to overcome the regional aspiring powers. According to Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism Russia is

⁶² Opcit. Brig. Ghazanfar, Interview with Author.

⁶³ Shamshad Ahmad, Former Foreign Secretary, interview with Author, 7th September 2013.

⁶⁴ Martin M. *Afghanistan and Central Asia: A Modern History*. Pearson Education Limited, Great Britain 2002, pp. 57-59.

apprehensive to the US⁶⁵ whereby the US has not been succeeded because there is effective inter-regional cooperation in the form of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Originally Shanghai five of China, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Russia and Kazakhstan) but later on Uzbekistan joined this organization. This organization is with motive to settle boundary line conflicts and to trample Islamic terrorism and fanaticism.⁶⁶ Moreover, this organization is a great pressure on the US due to China and Russia cooperation.

Regional countries are striving to have market in these countries. Pakistan is connected to CARs through channels of history, common tradition, religion and culture. Pakistan is in dire need of oil and natural gas and central Asian Republics are abounds with mineral resources so Pakistan through trade agreement can import such commodities from these states.⁶⁷ Pakistan can be shortest outlet for landlocked CARs to connect them to world economy and to Arabian Sea. CARs could provide its mineral treasure like gas, oil and electricity to Pakistan in order to recover this dearth to her. Pakistan throughout its history has grappled to have cordial political, economic and social relations with CARs on the basis of sovereign equality, non-interference in each other's affairs and shared interests.⁶⁸

India and CARs are closely connected in ties especially after 9/11 because both want to counter terrorism across the border and to flourish trade. India has put forwards proposal for energy supply line from Russia across Central Asia and China. Another gas pipeline of vital importance in this regard is that, which will connect India to Turkmenistan through Pakistan and Afghanistan. All this depend on Afghanistan better security and undoubtedly on Pakistan and India relations which have been remained uncertain for most of the time. India as strategic ally of Tajikistan has established military base at Farkhor. This has alarmed Pakistan regarding her strategic concerns in Central Asia.⁶⁹

There are myriad hurdles in Pakistan access to CARs market as for instance economic factors like infirm industrial infrastructure, literacy lower ratio, no advance in science and technology and financial turbulence. There are other competitors in this region as India, Iran, Turkey who are trying to surpass each other. India is main hurdle in this background which is favorite to CARs than Pakistan. To cap it all, India is successful in creating strained atmosphere for Pakistan in this area. Pakistan has no railway link with CARs. Afghanistan's imbroglio has hampered Pakistan economic

⁶⁵ Ibid., pp.160-162.

⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 120-121.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Muhammad Javed, *The Emergence of Central Asian Republics and its Impacts on South and West Asia (Turkey, Iran, Pakistan)*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Department of International Relations, University of Karachi, Karachi 2002.

⁶⁹ Pakistan Ties with CARs. In *Conflict and Peace Studies*, 4(1), January March 2011, p 5.

agreements with CARs and still its fulfillments are connected with peace and stability in Afghanistan.⁷⁰

Our relations with CARs are not good due to many Uzbek and Tajik training inside Pakistan who are involved in terrorist activities. Even China is not happy over their training in North Waziristan.⁷¹

Pakistan is passage to the sea and Afghanistan is pass to the CARs so both are complimentary. Trade is not flowing, air travel is costly, commerce and trade is not happening because logistics are awful. Unless and until Afghanistan is not calm we cannot have trade with these countries. For instance Tajikistan is rich in electricity but we cannot import electricity because transmission lines cannot pass through Afghanistan with prevalent turmoil.⁷² With Afghanistan still in turmoil and India-Pakistan peace as elusive as ever, there is no prospect of an early breakthrough towards meaningful economic integration in this part of Asia. Peace in Afghanistan remains crucial for the success of our relations with CARs. One must also admit that on regional level, SCO and ECO, like SAARC, will also remain captive to the globally-driven geopolitics in our part of the world.⁷³

One must acknowledge, however, that our opening to Central Asia is hindered by the continuing Afghan crisis. Unfortunately, our relations with these states could also not flourish as desired due to divergent views on Afghanistan and Pakistan's relations with the Taliban regime. Therefore, despite many high level visits and agreements signed, we were not able to lay down a solid foundation to intensify our economic and political relationship.

After an analysis of Pakistan's stakes in Afghanistan it is apparent that when Pakistan and Afghanistan relations are contemplated then both countries national interests are inter-connected because stability of one is leading to stability of other. Both are minor states, where their main national interests are security, survival and to defend territorial integrity. Their foreign policies are to serve the same ideology, religion and culture and to strive against foreign threat to their states. As the national interest theorized by neo-realist conceded that international order is anarchical and national interests should serve material ends. Considering Pakistan-Afghanistan terms then it is clear that despite the host of opportunities, these bilateral relations are acrimonious. The US engagement in Afghanistan has instigated a series of mistrust and accusations by both the states for the sake of national interests. In this background across the border infiltration has muddled security in Pakistan tribal areas and her interests have been transformed into strategic challenges. National interest demand that for defense of territory and population a state has to wage war in case of having adequate means,

⁷⁰ Opcit, Javed Thesis, *The Emergence of CARs*.

⁷¹ Brig (Retd), Asad Munir. Interview with Author, 19th August 2013.

⁷² Opcit, Rustam Shah Mohmand. Interview with Author.

⁷³ Opcit, Shamshad. Interview with Author.

Pakistan was with no other option than to launch military operation in FATA as these were militants hubs and imminent threat to the state. The use of military force is still continued with ongoing suicide blasts and extremism. Moreover, the turmoil in Afghanistan has led to the radicalization of Baluchistan, where segregation ideology is flourishing with regional and international conspiracy.

Conclusion

Pakistan's foreign policy stands for cordial relations with immediate neighbors, especially Afghanistan on western border, a country religiously, culturally and strategically connected to Pakistan. Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan have been stretched to political interests, where Pakistan not only to have favorable Afghan government but to have peaceful western border, to counter Indian enhanced influence, to relegate Pashtunistan issue to the background. Economically, Pakistan wants to have trade and commercial agreements with Afghanistan, where Afghanistan is also dependent on Pakistan for transit route to the outside world. Through Afghanistan as channel Pakistan's can access the Central Asian Republics, which are rich in oil and gas. Afghanistan has strategic significance for Pakistan by providing defense industries and military training.

Pakistan's stability is interconnected with that of Afghanistan. Afghanistan's turmoil has affected Pakistan's internal security, economy and foreign policy. Recently, our foreign policy is 'Afghan centric', where fall out from western border has triggered militancy and extremism in FATA. There is strategic stalemate and Pakistan interests in Afghanistan have been transformed into challenges which need to be grappled at exigency. The incomprehensive skepticism has halted various developmental aspects. Both minor states of Pakistan and Afghanistan have common problem of militancy and insurgency with is a palpable gnaw and can be fissiparous to their state structure.

As far as the US role is contemplated in Afghanistan for enhancing Indian leverage then any policies that create strategic imbalances in the region and fuel an arms race between the two nuclear-capable neighbors with an escalatory effect on their military budgets and arsenals are no service to the peoples of the region. The risk of a Pakistan-India proxy war in Afghanistan is fraught with perilous implications for regional and global peace, and must be averted at all cost.

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- Brig. Nadir Mir, a Defence Analyst, Lahore, 20th September 2013.
- Col. Zahur ul Haq, an Academician, Lahore, 20th August 2013.
- Hasan Askari Rizvi, Defence Analyst, Lahore, 6th October 2013.
- Hina Rabbani Khar, Former Foreign Minister, Islamabad, 1st December 2013.
- Rustam Shah Mohmand, Former Ambassador to Afghanistan, 17th August 2013.
- Shamshad Ahmad, Former Foreign Secretary, Lahore, 7th September 2013.
- Tasneem Noorani, Former Interior Minister, 20th September 2013.

STATE FAILURE AND FRAGILITY INDICES: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL

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Abstract

‘Failed states’ and ‘state failure’ have emerged as the dominant themes of discourse and analysis in the post-Cold War period. Ever since the first time usage by Helman and Ratner almost two decades ago,¹ these concepts have inspired conceptual insights from scholars, policy makers and practitioners. Such insights not only attempt at defining the concept of ‘state failure,’ but also focus upon developing indices and indexes for measuring state failure across a broad spectrum of socio-political and economic indicators. This paper argues that the state failure indices, which measure political, economic and social indicators for predicting state’s present status and future risks of failure, reveal a strong pro-Weberian bias. The indices place emphasis on failed states being characterized by lack of monopoly over force, service provision and democratic legitimacy. This is notwithstanding the fact that all these concepts are highly debated and contested. It further criticizes the state failure indices for using dissimilar indicators to predict instability and, therefore, producing indices that are reasonably at variance with each other. It also raises objections on these indices being based on empirical data and therefore, ignoring the socio-political undercurrents in a state, which may burst out and result in complete regime displacements. Therefore, none of the indices could predict authoritarian Arab regimes being challenged by popular discontent and falling like house of cards.

Key words: State failure, failure and fragility indices, Weberian and Western state, socio-political and economic indicators.

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¹ They defined it as a non-self sustaining state, inflicted by civil war, violence, regime instability and economic problems that endangered host population and threatened the neighbours through refugee flows, political turmoil and random warfare. See Helman, Gerald B. and Ratner, Steven. (Winter, 1993). Saving Failed States. *Foreign Policy*, 89, 3.

Introduction

The state as defined and understood today is a more recent European phenomenon. But, taken as a politically organized community, it has over the centuries existed as a physical reality and construed as an abstract idea. In pre-modern political theory, the state and society were indistinguishable; the Greeks conceived of it as an all inclusive, natural and necessary institution from which an individual derived the meaning of his existence. Plato emphasized the state's origin from individual's lack of self sufficiency, which forced him to live in a society; 'it (the state) springs...from our needs,' he declared.² The state's naturalness, to Aristotle, stems from its emergence out of other natural associations, including families, households and villages. And since the state to him embodies a whole, it has a clear priority over its parts and therefore, superiority over other earlier forms of associations.³ It was on the ashes of the Greek City States⁴ that the Great Roman Empire arose, whose contribution to the rise of modern statehood was state's peculiarity from the individuals it represented. The conflation of state and society in Greek political thought was replaced by Roman theory's distinction of an individual from the state. Rome granted citizenship rights to its citizens and governed them under a systemized code-the Roman Law.⁵ The decline of the Roman Empire led to a period of decentralized governance system under feudalism in Medieval Europe. Modern state system grew out of the contradictions of feudalism and the need for a single sovereign to assert his authority over rival lords, the Church and other contenders to his sovereignty.

Modern state system's rise at the end of medieval period in Europe stimulated political theorizing on the nature and function of the state. It was seen as a relationship of contract between the rulers and the ruled by the contract thinkers. While Hobbes, surrendered individual's freedom to an absolute sovereign in return for guarantees of peace and security, Locke, conditioned the exercise of sovereign powers by the ruler on popular consent. And Rousseau, explored general will or a shared understanding of common good and well being as the basis of contract between the ruler and ruled and therefore, contended that citizens under such a contract remained

² Plato (1955). *The Republic*, translated with an introduction by H. D. P. Lee. Penguin Books, London, p 102.

³ Aristotle (1962). *The Politics*, translated with an introduction by T.A. Sinclair. Penguin Books, Middlesex, p 28.

⁴ On political organization of the city-states, see Barker, E. (1918). *Greek Political Theory: Plato and His Predecessors*. Mathuen & Co Ltd., Great Britain, pp. 19-46.

⁵ For a discussion on Roman political thought, see Wanlass, L. C. (1956). *Gestell's History of Political Thought*. Surjeet Publications, Delhi, pp. 75-80.

free in fulfilling legal obligations and obeying state laws.⁶ The state's perception as a contractual binding between the ruler and the individuals is reflected in definitions of the state as a set of social relations between the political authority/government and the society, which underlines citizen's acknowledgement of state's regulatory authority in return for provisions of security and social justice (Lockean tradition). This is the functionalist approach to defining a state.

The nature and character of the state was further theorized by the Marxists, who saw the state as a manifestation of class struggle between the pre-state kinship based social order characterized by low development of wealth and labour, with the new classes that resulted from a progression of growth in productivity of labour, private property and exchange. In the class struggle that is a product of differences of wealth and control over the utilization of the labour powers of others, old kinship based society withers away giving way to the emergence of a new one based on control over the state. This materialistic explanation for state emergence through a class struggle is forwarded by the Marxists as the basis for the origin of the state throughout written history.⁷ The state is perceived as a tool of exploitation used for perpetuation of dominant ruling class's power. And therefore, the revolution by proletariat is supposed to do away with the state and create a basis for a classless, stateless society.

The understanding of the state corresponding to its modern image as the holder of monopoly over force, developed with the rise of the European state system from 15th Century onwards. The state as the ultimate holder of monopoly over force and violence was defined in the early 20th Century by the German sociologist Max Weber. He chose to emphasize the means peculiar to the state-physical force (organizational and structural aspects), rather than the ends and defined it as 'a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.'⁸ This emphasis on monopoly of violence over a territorially bounded population reflecting the empirical dimension of the state is largely the criteria used for defining a modern state. Laski, for example argues that the state's binding characteristic of commanding obedience legally and power to enforce its laws on all in its territory gives it primacy over other forms of social groupings.⁹ The Weberian definition reflects an

⁶ For Excerpts from the writings of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, see Cahn, S. M. (2005). *Political Philosophy: The Essential Texts*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 214-320.

⁷ See Engels, F. (2004). 'The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State', in *Marx/Engels Selected Works, Volume Three*. Resistance Books, St. Chipendale, NSW 2004.

⁸ Weber, M. (1970). *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Translated, Edited with an Introduction by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills*. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, p 78.

⁹ Laski, H. J. (1961). *Introduction to Politics*. George Allen & Unwin, London, p 9.

institutionalist approach of defining a state, wherein, the institutions of army, police, bureaucracy and judiciary extend state's monopoly of force and order within its territorial boundaries.

Modern state is further credited with possessing the juridical or external dimension of conducting autonomous relations with other sovereign entities in the international state system. Juridical sovereignty is a function of possessing a territorial boundary recognized by international law, obtained by states, either by declaration, or recognition by other states, which confers on it the right of statehood, even in the absence of empirical attributes. The juridical and empirical dimensions of statehood are combined by international law to define a state to possess a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.¹⁰ Since states are the principal subjects of international law, therefore, a state's recognized capacity to maintain external relations with other states is the most important qualification as far as international law is concerned. The modern state is therefore, understood to have a recognized territory, a population that sees itself as belonging to the state and a government that has a monopoly of legitimate force within its territory and the capacity to enter into formal relations with other entities.

European colonialism diffused modern statehood to other parts of the world but state growth did not follow its Western counterpart experience. Independence, conferred statehood on non-Western states irrespective of the growth of empirical characteristics associated with institutional and functional understanding of the state. To borrow Jackson and Rosberg's words, empirical attributes of statehood in the form of a stable population and effective government are seriously contested and challenged in these countries.¹¹ This did not prevent extension of a Weberian concept to define statehood in non-Western societies. Loose state control over territory, patrimonial governance, low service delivery capacity, lesser popular political participation and economic backwardness characterize these states. The prevalence of weak statehood does not affect juridical or external dimension of states because it is not synonym with the loss of sovereignty under international concepts of sovereignty. It is also not a criterion for state's recognition under international law, or its admission, or withdrawal

¹⁰ Article 1 of the 1930 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of the State, sets out these four criteria for statehood and most international law definitions follow it. See Shearer, I. A. (1994). *Stark's International Law*, 11th ed. Butterworths, London, p 85.

¹¹ See Jackson, R. H. and Rosberg, C. G. (October 1982). Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood. In *World Politics*, 35(1), pp. 1-24; and Jackson, R. H. (Autumn 1987). Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World. In *International Organization*, 41 (4), pp. 525-30.

from the international state system, because otherwise, it would collide with the UN principle of self determination of states.¹²

The above section argued that the concept of state is heavily Western inspired. Its functional meaning originated from the writings of social contract theorists who saw the state as a form of contractual relationship in which the monarch was bound to perform certain duties and the population was in turn meant to obey him. The institutional dimension of monopoly over the legitimate use of force came up as European rulers embarked on a process of state making in Europe. Among the current manifestations, state's juridical aspect of ability to engage in relationship with other states is significant. But, the extension of state system to non-Western societies created very weak replicas of Western counterpart, who were born with many feeble features of empirical statehood. And that is why a purely Weberian definition and understanding was never a reflection of the state in the non-Western societies.

State Failure and Fragility Indices: A Critical Appraisal

This section argues that the indices and indexes that predict future risk of state failure and rank states in accordance with their level of performance signify a pro-Weberian bias. The benchmarks for political, economic and social indicators for state performance are set against those present in developed countries. Most indices with the exception of 'Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance',¹³ provide rankings across the developing world. The State Failure Task Force (now Political Instability Task Force-PITF), is US government funded (1994) earliest attempt at predicting onset of instability in different regions of the world over a 50 year period. Defining state failure as a severe political crisis on account of revolutionary and ethnic wars, adverse regime change from authoritarianism to democracy and genocides/politicides, the Task Force developed a Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability.¹⁴ The findings of the Task Force Reports

¹² Here, if the empirical reality of statehood in non Western societies does not match the Weberian concept of statehood, is it not desirable to define states in non-Western weak settings from an alternate angle of possessing not an absolute monopoly of power over violence but just a reasonable control over violence?

¹³ It assesses 52 African countries performance against 58 individual indicators along five categories: security, rule of law, transparency and corruption, participation and Human rights, sustainable economic development and human development. For details see 2013 Ibrahim Index of African Governance: Summary. (2013). Retrieved May 15, 2014, from <http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/downloads/2013/2013-IIAG-summary-report.pdf>.

¹⁴ Its data set contains information on 13000 political, economic, social and environmental variables for 162 countries from 1955 onwards. See Goldstone, Jack A., Bates, Robert H., Gurr, Ted Robert., Lustik, Michael., Marshall, Monty G., Ulfeder, Jay., and Woodward,

suggest regime type as the most frequent type of state failure; Phase III Report (1955-2000) found partial democracies at seven times higher risk of failure than full democracies and autocracies.¹⁵ Phase V (1955-2003) Report found one third of all instability onset occurring in partial democracies that were characterized by factionalism. It also identifies state led discrimination, ethnic diversity, regime type, neighbourhood effects, recent ethnic war or genocide and youth bulge to be significant risk factors for the onset of ethnic wars and state failure.¹⁶

Other than the PITF, most indexes of state failure provide rankings for potential failures. The following table provides information on these indexes, briefly describing the methodology, major findings and their rankings of top 10 failed states. The end of the table is followed by a critical appreciation of these indexes and indices.

Mark. (September 1-4, 2005). A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability. Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC. Retrieved November 5, 2012, from <http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/documents/PITF/PITFglobal.pdf>.

¹⁵ In Sub-Saharan Africa, all partial democracies failed and among the Muslim countries (with a Muslim population of at least 40 %), both partial and full democracies had a 5 % high incidence of failure than autocratic regimes. See State Failure Task Force Report: Phase 3 Findings. (30 September 2000). Retrieved March 12, 2010, from <http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/ptif/>.

¹⁶ Gladstone, J. A., Bates, R., David, E., [et.al.], A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability. In *American Journal of Political Science*, 54 (1), January 2010, pp. 190-208. For Muslim countries, regime type, armed conflict on borders, infant mortality, ethnic or religious minority rule and leader's years in office were critical in determining the onset of war. See Gurr, Ted Robert., Woodward, Mark. and Marshall Monty G. (September 1-4, 2005). Forecasting Instability: Are Ethnic Wars and Muslim Countries Different? Prepared for delivery at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Table – 2: State Failure/ Fragility Indexes

Index	State Failure/ Fragility defined	Methodology	Top Ten Failed States Ranking	Main Findings
Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) State Fragility Index and Matrix 2012 ¹⁷	Inability to manage conflicts, make and implement public policy and deliver essential services, maintain system cohesion, and continue progressive development. ¹⁸	164 countries (population of 500,000 and above) are assessed on effectiveness and legitimacy in four performance dimensions: security, political, economic and social. Security effectiveness indicator is 'total residual war', and security legitimacy indicator is 'state repression'. For political	Congo DR, Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad, Myanmar, Sudan (North), Somalia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Guinea. ²⁰	Global Report 2011, analyzes global trends in conflict, governance and development. It observes a decline in major armed conflict (intra and inter-state) in the states affected by conflict. By late 2011, of the 21 countries suffering armed conflict, all were inter state, included Pakistan and Afghanistan. It reports an increase in High Casualty Terrorist Bombings (HCTB),

¹⁷ The CSP also manages the Polity IV project which monitors regime changes in 167 countries of the world and provides annual assessments of regime characteristics, changes and data updates. See Marshall, M. G., *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2012*. Retrieved May 20, 2013, from www.systemicpeace.org/polity4.htm.

¹⁸ Marshall, M. G., and Cole, B. R., *Global Report 2009: Conflict, Governance and State Fragility*. Centre for Global Policy, 2009, p 31. Retrieved May 20, 2013, from <http://www.systemicpeace.org/Global%20Report%202009.pdf>

²⁰ Afghanistan moved from 4th place in the 2009 index to 3rd place in 2011 and moved up to 2nd place in 2012. Pakistan that stood 27 in 2008 moved down to 29 in 2012 index. See *State Fragility Index and Matrix 2012*. Retrieved March 12, 2013, from www.systemicpeace.org.

		effectiveness, it is 'regime stability' and for political legitimacy, it is 'regime inclusion.' For economic effectiveness, it is 'GDP per capita' and for economic legitimacy, it is 'share of export trade in manufactured goods.' For social effectiveness, it is 'Human Capital Development (UNDP-HDI)' and for social legitimacy, it is 'Infant Mortality Rate,' 2010. It combines scores on eight of these indicators and ranges these from 0-no fragility to 25-extreme fragility. ¹⁹		militant activity in peripheral areas of Muslim countries. ²¹ In governance, it mentions increase in the number of democracies reaching 95 by 2011 and anocracies (partial democracies) to 48 in 2011. Autocracies decreased in number from 89 in 1977 to 21 in 2011. In the realm of development, report blames huge income disparities among regions to be responsible for factionalism, polarization and legitimacy deficit in the world's poorest regions. ²²
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¹⁹ Marshall, M.G., and Cole, B. R., *Global Report 2011: Conflict, Governance and State Fragility*. Centre for Systemic Peace, 2011, pp. 36-39. Retrieved May 20, 2013, from <http://www.systemicpeace.org/GlobalReport2011.pdf>

²¹ For a list of 315 episodes of armed conflict over 1946-2009, see Marshall, M. G., *Major Episodes of political Violence 1946-2009*. Retrieved March 17, 2012, from <http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.htm>.

²² Marshall and Cole. 2011, pp. 3-20.

Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger 2012 ²³	Failure to deliver core services and meaningful authority due to onset of revolutionary or ethnic wars, adverse regime change, and genocides/politicides.	This ledger ranks 163 states for estimated risks of political instability in three year period 2010-2012 by using five indicators for four domains: political domain- institutional consistency; economic domain-openness to international trade; social domain-infant mortality rate; and security domain-the extent to which a country is militarized (measured in terms of % of population in armed forces) and armed conflict in neighbouring countries. ²⁴	Afghanistan, Congo DR, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Mali, Sierra Leone (Highest Estimated Risk 2010-12). ²⁵	2010-12 ledger identifies 18 African states among a total of top 25 highest risk countries. The risk estimates indicate a decline in the risk of instability for countries designated at moderate, high or highest risk. Democracy flourished, but so did the number of anocracies with their estimated risk of conflict and instability increasing. 9 out of 10 countries that experienced greatest risk in the past 5 years were partial democracies. Their instability emanated from lesser capacity to address group grievances and manage competition among them. ²⁶
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²³ Retrieved March 12, 2013, from www.cidcm.umd.edu.

²⁴ Hewitt, J. J., Wilkenfeld, J., Gurr, T. R., and Heldt, B., *Peace and Conflict 2012: Executive Summary*. Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, Maryland 2012, pp. 5-6. Retrieved March 15, 2013, from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/pc/executive_summary/exec_sum_2012.pdf.

²⁵ Pakistan is a new comer to the 2010-2012 ledger's top 25 list. See, Hewitt et al. 2012, p. 8.

²⁶ See Hewitt, et al. 2012, pp. 7-12.

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) State Fragility Index 2011	Functional ineffectiveness in three dimensions of Authority (corruption and contract regulation), Legitimacy (regime type and human rights) and Capacity (GDP per capita and foreign aid); shortly ALC. ²⁷	Assesses 197 states performance in 10 areas of state responsibility: authority, legitimacy, capacity, gender, governance, economics, security and crime, human development, demography and environment (using 74 sub indicators). Averages are taken for a global rank score over a five year time frame for each indicator and then the results for a given country are averaged to produce its final score. ²⁸	Somalia, Afghanistan, Chad, DR Congo, Yemen, Central African Republic, Sudan, Eritrea, Pakistan. ²⁹	Sub-Saharan states pre-dominate the top 20 most fragile states. Countries that remained constant among the top 5 included, Afghanistan, Chad, DR Congo and Somalia. Myanmar tops the separate list of Authority challenged fragile states, followed by Sudan, Afghanistan, Somalia and Pakistan. In Legitimacy, Somalia, Myanmar and Iran top the list, whereas, in Capacity, Sub-Saharan countries top the list. ³⁰ The 2006 report identified state fragility to be co-related with a lack of capacity, rather than low levels of authority or legitimacy and authority and
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²⁷ Authority is defined as the ability to enact binding legislation, exercise effective control over national territory, and provide core public goods. Legitimacy is the capability exercised by a regime to command loyalty and support for its policies and Capacity is the power to mobilize resources towards public ends through competence in political and economic management. See Carment, David. and Samy, Ylagadeesen. (June 15, 2012). *Assesing State Fragility: A Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Report*. CIFP, Carleton University, Ottawa. Retrieved March 12 2013, from www.carleton.ca/cfip, pp. 3-4.

²⁸ Retrieved March 12, 2013, from www.carleton.ca/cfip.

²⁹ Afghanistan's position remained constant at 2nd in both the 2009 and 2011 Indexes. Pakistan, which was ranked 18 in 2007 index has climbed to no. 9 in the 2011 list. See *CIFP Country Ranking Table 2007*. Retrieved October 8, 2010, from www.carleton.ca/cifp/app/ffs_ranking.php; and *Fragile States Country Report No. 20. Afghanistan Updated for 2009*. (2009). Retrieved October 8, 2010, from cifp@carleton.ca; and *Fragile States Country Report No. 12. Pakistan October 2007*. (2007). Retrieved October 8 2010, from cifp@carleton.ca. For 2011 index, see Carment and Samy (June 15, 2012).

³⁰ See Carment and Samy (June 15, 2012).

				legitimacy weakly related to each other, meaning certain states were able to maintain higher levels of authority even in the absence of strong legitimacy or capacity (North Korea and Zimbabwe). Established democracies and entrenched autocracies were relatively stable whereas anocracies, tended to be more fragile. ³¹
Fund for Peace (FP) Failed States Index 2013	Loss of physical control over territory, lack of legitimacy for making and enforcing collective decisions, poor service delivery, and inability to interact with	177 states are measured in 12 indicators subdivided in two broad categories. Indicators in the social & economic basket (demographic pressures, refugees and IDPs, uneven economic development, poverty, brain drain, group grievance) and political (poor legitimacy, public services, human rights and rule of law,	Somalia, Congo DR, Sudan, South Sudan, Chad, Yemen, Afghanistan, Haiti, Central African Republic, Zimbabwe. ³⁴	State failure is chronic- Somalia occupied the top position for several consecutive years and since 2005, the top 10 positions rotate between 15 countries. South Sudan is a new addition, after its birth in 2011. Mali and Syria climbed in the instability indices due to rapidly deteriorating security situation. For Afghanistan, its position has remained constant on the top ten standing. Continuing

³¹ CIFP., *Failed and Fragile States 2006: A Briefing Note for the Canadian Government*. November 2006. Retrieved September 12, 2010, from <http://www.carleton.ca/cifp>; and CIFP., *Failed and Fragile States: A Concept Paper for the Canadian Government*. January 2006. Retrieved September 12, 2010, from <http://www.carleton.ca/cifp>.

	international community. ³²	external intervention, factionalized elites, security apparatus) baskets are ranked on a scale of 0-120; those scoring 90-120 are placed in the critical zone and those scoring 60-89 are in the danger zone, both signifying a high propensity to collapse. ³³		deterioration in social indicators, economic stagnation and worsening legitimacy scores, helped to maintain its position among the top failed or fragile states. ³⁵
Brookings Index of State Weakness in the Developing World 2008 ³⁶	Incapacity or unwillingness to provide sustainable and equitable economic growth, legitimate political institutions,	20 indicators in four baskets- political, economic, security and social welfare for 141 developing countries are standardized and aggregated for creating individual indicator and basket scores ranging from 0.0 (worst) to 10.0 (best). The 4 basket	Somalia, Afghanistan, DR Congo, Iraq, Burundi, Sudan, Central African Republic, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Cote D'Ivoire. ³⁹	Strong relationship between poverty and overall weakness- 9 of the 10 poorest countries in the world are critically weak states and 24 out of the 28 critically weak states are low income countries. Weakest states are least democratic, though some states ranking low in democratic governance were relatively good providers of

³⁴ *The Failed States Index 2013*. Retrieved June 16, 2013, from ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable.

³² The definition combines institutional, functional approach with liberal and juridical aspects of state failure. See The Foreign Policy magazine article on FSI 2010. (2010). Retrieved December 30, 2010, from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/the_failed_states_index_2010.

³³ For indicators, see *Failed States Index IX 2013*. The Fund for Peace, 2013. Retrieved June 16, 2013, from www.failedstatesindex.org. pp, 9-10. On its Conflict Assessment Tool (CAST methodology), see foreignpolicy.com/.../2009_failed_states_..., retrieved March 16, 2011.

³⁵ *The Failed States Index 2013*, pp. 15-20. Afghanistan Country Report with indicator scores for 2010 can be accessed at fundforpeace.org/web/index2.php?opti..., retrieved October 8, 2010.

³⁶ The Brookings Index has not provided new rankings of state weakness in the developing world since 2008.

	security against violence, control over territory and basic human needs. ³⁷	scores are then averaged to obtain an overall score for state weakness. The 141 countries are divided on the basis of their aggregate scores into bottom (critically weak), 2 nd (weak), 3 rd , 4 th and top quintile. ³⁸		social welfare (Syria and Cuba). More than 85% of the critically weak states experienced conflict in the past 15 years. Of the critically weak 28 states, bottom three, including Afghanistan are failed- without a functional central government that has lost the capacity to provide key goods to its citizens. ⁴⁰
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³⁹ Pakistan is in the 2nd quintile or weak states (overall 33 and 5th in the 2nd quintile). See Rice and Stewart. (2008).

³⁷ Susan Rice and Patrick Stewart. (2008). Index of State Weakness 2008. Brookings Global Economy and development. Washington DC.: The Brookings Institution, 3, Retrieved December 7, 2010, from brookings.edu.

³⁸ Data on 20 individual indicators for each of the 141 states is available at http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/reports/2008/02_weak_states_index/02_weak_states_index_indicator_scores_pullout.pdf, Retrieved December 7, 2010.

⁴⁰ For details see, Rice and Stewart. (2008), 5-37.

The state fragility indices delve comprehensively into the question of how to explain state failure, by applying largely a Western and Weberian lens. Inability of a state to deliver core functions in security, service provision, political and economic management and abiding by international transactions are recurrent themes in different indices. Whereas, lack of popular legitimacy constitutes a part of three indices, economic underdevelopment is taken up as a major determinant of weakness by Brookings Index of State Weakness, which strongly emphasizes its correlation with 'critical state weakness' or failure. The rest of the indices either specifically evade economic underperformance as a prominent feature of failure or grant it a lower place below security, order, service provision and legitimacy. CIDCM Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger, adopts the State Failure Task Force Report's state failure definition of authority deficiency on account of onset of revolutionary, ethnicity, regime change and genocides/politicides related wars in states.⁴¹ The equation of state failure with onset of wars is problematic⁴² and fails to account for relatively stable authority structures in some states long beset by civil war conditions. Sri Lanka is one example, where a civil war of 25 years failed to damage the authority and capacity of the central government. It is an exception, but demonstrates that in some cases, civil war and violence may not precipitate breakdown of authority or affect the legitimacy of the regime in power.

The state failure indices by measuring political, economic and social indicators for predicting a state's present status and its future risks of failure reveal a strong pro-Weberian bias. Most indices explain the phenomenon of state failure in contrast to Weber's dictum of an institutional, functional and legitimate state. The emphasis on non-provision of security as synonymous with the loss of monopoly over force is a highly debatable and contested concept. It is because monopoly over violence in a defined territory or state is not even the prerogative of the First World, let alone the Third World. Monopoly over violence in the developed world stands challenged by two processes: outsourcing of military tasks to private arms companies; and supra-national control by the UN over deployment decisions of the armed and security forces of these developed states, especially in post intervention conflict regions.⁴³ This situation is starker for the new members of the

⁴¹ This is because some scholars share positions both in PITF and that of the CIDCM and are instrumental in developing the data set for both the indices.

⁴² As Wallensteen argues, state failure can take place without a civil war and there can be a civil war without state failure. See Wallensteen, P., *Beyond State Failure: On Internal and External Ways of Ending State Failure*. Paper presented at the Conference on Failed States, Purdue University, Florence April 7-19, 2000.

⁴³ Wulf calls the concept of monopoly over violence as 'Eurocentric and myopic.' See Wulf, Herbert. (December 2007). Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State: The Future of the Monopoly of Violence. Occasional Paper Series Number 9, The American Centre for

international state system who compromise their sovereignty to the forces of globalization in different respects. State's sovereignty is being shared at a supra-national level with multinational companies and NGOs and at a bottom-up level with sub-national local governments.⁴⁴ In the developing world, various actors and structures (including violent manifestations), such as militant commanders and warlords, paramilitary group and criminal gangs, work to decentralize state's control over violence and security. In some weak and fragile states, they even maintain social orders and perform governance functions. Instead of monopoly over violence, such a scenario is manifested by 'oligopoly of violence'.⁴⁵ The phenomenon of monopoly is also challenged by wars and conflict in neighbouring states, which create conditions for loosening of state's monopoly over violence too, especially in situations when borders are defined by homogenous populations on both sides.

The state's exercise of monopoly over violence in the Third World is not only challenged internally by sub-state informal and traditional actors and structures, but also by supra-state International Governmental Organizations (INGOs) and regional organizations that often exercise control over the decisions of where the armed forces of a particular state needed to be deployed for peace keeping and peace building. Globalization and its concomitant effects have increased security predicaments for the developing world by making states address a broad range of environmental, economic, socio-political and security concerns that are largely beyond the control and capacity of their governments.⁴⁶ Historically too, several

Peace and conflict Studies. Retrieved December 17, 2011, from <http://www.issr.uq.edu.au/acpacs-publications>, p. 6.

⁴⁴ See Ibid. Axtman, terms this process 'denationalization of the state' or 'destatization' of the political system, where the state either entirely transfers public responsibilities or exercises these in partnership with para-statal, NGOs. See Axtmann, Roland. (July 2004). The State of the State: The Model of the Modern State and its Contemporary Transformation. *International Political Science Review*, 25 (3), 268-71.

⁴⁵ See Biro, Daniel. (2007). The (Un) bearable Lightness of...Violence: Warlordism as an Alternate Forms of Governance in the Westphalian Periphery? In Tobias Debiel and Daniel Lambach (Eds.), *State Failure Revisited II: Actors of Violence and Alternate Forms of Governance*. Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen, INEF Report. Retrieved, December 9, 2011, from <http://inef.uni-due.de/page/documents/Report89.pdf>, p. 89; and Wulf. (December 2007), p. 6.

⁴⁶ For globalization's adverse impacts on state's stability, see Clapham, Christopher. (2002). The Challenge to the State in a Globalized World. *Development and Change*, 33 (5), p. 786; Failed and Collapsed States in the International System. (December 2003). The African Studies Centre, Leiden, The Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, The Center of Social Studies, Coimbra University, and The Peace Research Center- CIP-FUHEM, Madrid. Retrieved December 22, 2007, from <http://www.sarai.net/publications/readers/04-crisis-media/04soenke.pdf>; Bilgin, Pinar. and Morton, Adam David. (2007). Rethinking State Failure: The Political Economy of Security. In Daniel Lambach and Tobias Debiel (Eds.),

processes in the Third World, have prevented them from achieving this monopoly and it is unrealistic to expect them to deliver on this function in a short period of time, when the Western World took a much longer time to realize the same.⁴⁷ The so called 'Third World' has been independent for only a few decades and therefore, Milliken and Krause stress that while Europe took hundreds of years to provide security and services to its citizens, it is unrealistic to expect the developing world to acquire it in a short time horizon.⁴⁸ In a similar vein, Bilgin and Morton, are highly critical of using Western criteria of statehood to define failed states and call it 'deception of sovereignty', which result from comparing a Western institutional transplant possessing conditions and processes that developed over a much longer period.⁴⁹ By emphasizing monopoly over violence, these explanations fail to appreciate the different international environment of state formation in the Western and non-Western societies and First World's role in conflict perpetuation in the Third World.⁵⁰ That is why, Lambach, accuses scholars of ethno-centricism, on their attempts to apply Weberian ideal norms to inapplicable empirical situations in non-Western societies.⁵¹

State Failure Revisited 1: Globalization of Security and Neighborhood Effects. INEF Report 87, Institute for Development and Peace. Retrieved December 9, 2011, from <http://inef.uni-due.de/page/documents/Report87.pdf>; Stoddard, Abby. (January 2002). Ethnonationalism and the Failed State: Sources of Civil State Fragmentation in the International Political Economy. A Graduate Journal of International Affairs, no. 3. Retrieved September 24, 2010, from http://www.carleton.ca/emerge/docs_vol3/articles/ethnonationalism/pdf, pp. 3-6; and Yannis, Alexandros. (2002). State Collapse and its implications for Peace-Building and Reconstruction, *Development and change*, 33 (5), pp. 817-835.

⁴⁷ Brooks, terms the category of failed states as largely deceptive and emphasizes that Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Congo or Somalia were never functioning modern states because from the very beginning these exercised little monopoly of violence over their territories including their border areas. See Brooks, Rosa Ehrenreich. (Fall 2005). Failed States or the State as Failure. *University of Chicago Law Review*, 72 (4), p.15.

⁴⁸ They argue that such success is possible only if the idea of the state is taken completely out of its historical context and regarded as an institutional form that owes little or nothing to the historical forces that created it. See Millikin, Jennifer. and Krause, Keith. (2002). State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies. *Development and Change*, 33 (5), p. 762.

⁴⁹ See Bilgin, Pinar. and Morton, Adam David. (2002). Historicising Representations of Failed States: Beyond the Cold-War Annexation of the Social Sciences? *Third World Quarterly*, 23 (1), pp. 55-67.

⁵⁰ These include ignoring good governance requirements in resource rich countries, providing financial havens for ill gotten wealth of the Third World elites, sustaining demands for narcotics, timber, diamonds and engaging in armaments trade in conflict zones of the world. See Patrick, Stewart. (2007). Failed States and Global Security: Empirical Questions and Policy Dilemmas. *International Studies Review*, 9, pp. 644-62.

⁵¹ Lambach, D., Close Encounters in the Third Dimension: The Regional Effects of Failure. In Daniel Lambach and Tobias Debiel (Eds.), *State Failure Revisited 1: Globalization of Security and Neighborhood Effects*. Institute for Development and Peace INEF Report 87. 2007. Retrieved December 9, 2011, from <http://inef.uni-due.de/page/documents/Report87.pdf>, pp. 35-37.

The emphasis in state failure indices on state's monopoly over service provision is also a contested issue. Such explanations, not only fail to account for the useful contribution to service provision of indigenous, traditional, kinship and religious institutions, but also paint a wrongful picture of failed states, where absence of formal service provision is supposedly commensurate to total chaos and disorder.⁵² Such a picture is hardly true; even in cases of protracted war and violence informal institutions have managed to provide some form of social and political order.⁵³ Understanding failed states from a liberal legitimacy deficit is further contested. Though, weak and fragile states may be lacking in Western democratic legitimacy features, however, their governance institutions are supported by other forms of traditional, populist or ideological legitimacy.⁵⁴

As for the use of indicators to predict fragility, all the indexes use a combination of political, social and economic indicators, with differences in the use of sub indicators. The use of differing sub-indicators provides different rankings for states as well as their failure predictions. The differences are especially stark when ranking regimes that are designated as authoritarian and autocratic. The indices that define state failure to embody loss of regime legitimacy, accord states which are deficient in democratic legitimacy, a descending position in order of merit, despite their relatively stable structures of authority. It is because regime legitimacy is measured through sub-indicators of popular political participation, civil society growth, media independence, regular and periodic elections and guarantee of fundamental rights, including women and minority rights. Other indices accord a first place to states deficient in authority and capacity, or economic growth, rather than democratic legitimacy and, therefore produce results that

⁵² As Boege insists that absence of state order should not be confused with absence of any kind of order, rather it is better to see failed states as hybrid orders, where 'pre-modern, modern and post modern elements mix and overlap'. See Boege, Volker. (January 2007). Traditional Approaches to Conflict Transformation-Potential and Limits. The Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Occasional Paper Series, Number 5. Retrieved May 20, 2010, from <http://www.issr.uq.edu.au/acpacs-publications>, pp. 15-20.

⁵³ Raeymaekers, Timothy. (May 2005). Collapse or Order? Questioning State Collapse in Africa. Conflict Research Group, Working Paper No 1. Retrieved November 8, 2010, from <http://ideas.repec.org/p/hic/wpaper/10.html>, pp. 6-7. Anderson recognizes the important role of religious groups in service provision in fragile settings. See Anderson, Lisa. (Fall 2004). Antiquated Before They Can Ossify: States that Fail Before They Form. *Journal of International Affairs*, 58 (1), pp. 13-14.

⁵⁴ See Menocal, Alina R. (March 2010). State Building for Peace: A New Paradigm for International Engagement in Post-Conflict Fragile States? European University Institute, EUI Working Papers. Retrieved, November 5, 2012, from http://ddrn.dk/papers_and_reports-thematic-news-administration-democracy-human-rights-papers-and-reports.html, p. 15.

are conflicting with each other. Over all, the various indices provide more weightage to coercive apparatus strength and development of legal and juridical structures for predicting stability and failures.

The use of dissimilar indicators for measuring state effectiveness in service delivery, monopoly over violence, territorial control, legitimacy and economic development makes the concept of state failure difficult to quantify. For example, the economic position of a state may be aggregated by using statistics on GDP, GNP, per capita, openness to international trade, balance of payments and others, therefore, each list producing a different set of economically fragile states. Ziaja and Mata, criticize the fragility indices on using simple, additive aggregation methods for risk estimates and argue that since security is the most essential condition for stabilizing states, indices should not allow other dimensions such as economic or social to compensate for insecurity. They also argue that the thresholds for determining categorization of states are not theoretically or empirically justified, but are mostly simple fractions used by the index on a 0-10 scale. 'These could be either theorized e.g. which fraction of its terrain must a state control to plausibly claim the monopoly of legitimate violence? Or empirically verified e.g. at which level of income has civil war never occurred?'⁵⁵ The aggregate sources may poorly reflect how states are actually performing across varied functions. Brinkerhoff, points to another weakness in these indices. He argues that the indices by using combinations of socio-political and economic indicators to predict failures, neglect root causes that failed the state in the first place and fail to highlight solutions for addressing fragility, including international intervention for rebuilding such states.⁵⁶ The fragility indices also suffer from problems of finding reliable data to base their indicators on. Online government websites in developing states are usually relied upon to determine socio-economic and political data, however, these may suffer from reliability problems. Reliability issues arise on account of tendency to play around with such figures for reflecting a government's stand point or because of data collection problems that stem from weak administrative capacity for conducting surveys and other techniques.

⁵⁵ See Mata, Javier. and Ziaja, Sebastian. (2009). Users Guide on Measuring Fragility. German Development Institute/ Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik and the United Nations Development Programme. Retrieved November 12, 2010, from [http://www.die-gdi.de/CMS-Homepage/openwebcms3.nsf/\(ynDK_contentByKey\)/ANES-7W89TW/\\$FILE/UNDP-DIE%202009%20Users%20Guide%20on%20Measuring%20Fragility.pdf](http://www.die-gdi.de/CMS-Homepage/openwebcms3.nsf/(ynDK_contentByKey)/ANES-7W89TW/$FILE/UNDP-DIE%202009%20Users%20Guide%20on%20Measuring%20Fragility.pdf); and German Development Institute, Briefing Paper. (October 2010). State Fragility Indices: Potentials, Messages and Limitations. Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik.

⁵⁶ Brinkerhoff, Derick W. (2011). State Fragility and Governance: Conflict Mitigation and Sub-national Perspectives. *Development Policy Review*, 29 (2), p. 134.

The rankings place Afghanistan among the list of the top failed, most fragile or critically weak states. Afghanistan's relative position in CIDCM Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger 2012 is at the top in terms of estimated risk levels in all governance indicators, whereas, in other indexes, it stands among the top 5 most fragile states. The countries ahead of Afghanistan in terms of risk assessment are all African and mostly Muslim (Somalia and Sudan). In most indices, Afghanistan's position has remained stagnant, but in CIFP State Fragility Index 2011, it went up from 3rd position (in previous indices) to being the 2nd most fragile state in the world. This reflects a highly volatile state building process, which despite the passage of more than a decade of state building and the presence of large numbers of external security forces has largely failed to give a stable policy to Afghanistan. Worrying trends of insecurity, lack of authority, low state capacity, rising militancy, violence, unstable economy and declining legitimacy, characterize in varying degrees the post 2001 state building process in the country.

The main findings of the reports attached to these indices, reflect interesting conclusions on the rankings as well as the estimated risk of failure and instability for future states. An interesting finding is that entrenched autocracies are less vulnerable to instability than partial democracies (anocracies) and in some instances, full democracies. Such a prediction is in itself challenged by the US invasion of Iraq, which not only dislodged the autocratic regime of Saddam Hussain, but also ushered in a period of extreme instability for the state. Therefore, these indices fail to provide external invasion as a factor for adverse regime change and instability while predicting risks of state failure. Similarly, internal pressures for popular participation and accountability that led to the breakdown of some Arab regimes (termed in literature as Arab uprising or Arab spring) is also unaccounted for in these indices. In the light of findings of these indices, the autocratic regimes were strong and maintained a semblance of order associated with state strength and stability. The experience of Arab spring shows that quantitative measurement of monopoly over force and order may conceal the qualitative underpinnings of the system in terms of popular dissatisfaction with regime performance, and popular notions of greater participation and accountability of such regimes.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ It is for this reason that Wennmann, criticizes these indices for using data on past events and conditions, which fail to provide the dynamics of fragility in either the current passing year or the coming future ones and their failure to identify processes and actors involved in making states fragile. See Wennmann, Achim. (2010). Grasping Strengths of Fragile States: Aid Effectiveness Between Top-down and Bottom-up State Building. Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, CCDP Working Paper, The Graduate Institute of Geneva. Retrieved November 11, 2011, from

With the exception of Index of State Weakness in the Developing World, the rest including, PITF, CSP State Fragility Index and Matrix, CIDCM Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger, and CIFP State Fragility Index, find partial democracies at greater risk of failure than autocracies or full democracies. Transition to full democracy fails, PITF, argues when electoral competition is introduced sans checks on the powers of the executive and a system of civil rights properly in place, as in an institutionalized political competition. CIDCM Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger, found partial democratic societies at a greater risk of failure owing to an inability to provide for group grievances and their tendency to contain dissension through repression. Some conclusions may be drawn here. First, increase in the number of democracies in post Cold War period has made the world more unstable- the odds for such partial democracies failing and destabilizing have increased substantially. Second, conventional state building emphasis on liberal democracy and electoral competition may not herald greater stability or peace in post conflict societies. Evidence in many peace building missions in 1990s substantiates the argument, as armed conflict and violence has immediately followed the withdrawal of foreign forces. Therefore, state building approach must look beyond simple introduction of democratic governance institutions in such conflict settings, where governance practices largely draw legitimacy from indigenous structures and institutions, such as Afghanistan. Third, coercive apparatus growth under prolong autocratic regimes is not reflective of stable statehood, unless, it serves to provide an outlet for accommodation of common grievances and expectations. And fourth, a significant youth bulge, especially in Muslim states may serve to indicate growth in levels of radical or revolutionary movements, resulting in adverse regime displacements, as lessons from Arab Spring suggest.

A few words on the merit of constructing indexes for measuring state fragility and failure. These indices are sponsored by institutions that are based primarily in the First World- mostly universities, private think tanks or in case of the PITF reports, the US government. The arguments in defense may be that since these indices measure state's performance in relation to its past and present, as well as relative to that of the more successful states, therefore, changes in country performance in crucial sectors may be monitored and risk factors determined beforehand. The timely evaluation of risk assessment may help the international community in adopting preemptive steps for responding to crisis situations. In other words, the global instability forecasting models are valuable tools for making appropriate policies underlining state building intervention. These indices

may help when international community finds it harder to interact with reliable local partners for aid prioritization in failed settings. They may also be helpful in determining which sectors need precedence over others, in terms of planning and financing development. In addition to prioritization of funding for needed sectors and fields, these indices may help donors to re-evaluate and reappraise the impact of aid policies and conditionalities on a timely basis.

The above section argued that institutionalist, functionalist and liberal approach of understanding a state has inspired qualitative and quantitative studies that measure state's effectiveness and capacity across a broad range of service provision. These then either rank the states accordingly, or predict their future risk of instability and failure. This section contends that besides reflecting a Western account of state failure, these indices while noting state weaknesses and ranking them on a broad range of state functionality, fail to account for the relative differences in the strength of state institutions and variations in stability across autocratic and democratic regimes. It also criticizes such Indices for using differential or dissimilar indicators for measuring state strength and predicting failure, and therefore producing differing results in rankings and predictions across it. The merit of such indices stands in helping to guide donor agencies and policy makers in prioritizing funding by basing it on institutional performances across a broad range of state functions.

Conclusions

The humanitarian and security dilemmas connected to state failure and growing international intervention to arrest such failure, has stimulated researchers and scholars interest in defining and understanding the concept of failed states, developing indices for measuring state failure and predicting crisis of political instability for them. The state fragility indices predict state weakness and failure on the basis of defining a state purely on Weberian and Western statehood terms. Such a Weberian influence conceals the growth of non-Western states on a path that was very dissimilar to its Western counterpart. By stressing a total monopoly over force inside a state's territorial boundary, these indices fail to appreciate that the modern state is challenged by a variety of supra-national global and sub-national local forces, actors and structures.

This paper explored the various state failure indices and indexes and criticized them for using dissimilar indicators to predict instability and, therefore, producing results that are reasonably at variance with each other. It also raises objections on these indices being based on empirical and quantitative data and therefore, ignoring the qualitative socio-political

undercurrents in a state, which may lead to sudden and violent regime displacements. The result is that none of the indices could predict authoritarian Arab regimes being challenged by popular discontent and had instead predicted stability for these. The indices gave high scores of stability and authority to autocratic regimes and could not foresee the rise and spread of the Arab spring/revolt.

In constructing the merit for such state failure indexes, it is argued that these contribute to our understanding of the risks of failure on the basis of detailed analysis of socio-economic and political indicators. This may help in guiding international agencies and donor governments in timely and pre-emptive intervention for restoring authority and order in such states. But it is a just a theory bound assumption. The fact of the matter is that powerful states intervene in response to national and security interests and, not according to the merit of a particular case.

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SECTARIAN VIOLENCE IN HANGU: GENESIS, FACTORS AND REMEDIES

Abdul Rauf Farmanullah***

Abstract

The menace of sectarianism, like other sectarian-ridden zones in the other provinces of Pakistan, is also spreading in some parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Hangu has had a history of sectarian violence that has struck the city five times since 1980. The sectarian hatred has divided the people of Hangu which has considerably damaged the social and political harmony of the district. Many valuable lives and properties of worthy in millions have been lost in sectarian clashes. If it is not checked and addressed properly may spill over to the other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa which are free or less affected from religious ecclesiastical sectarianism. In the following paper an attempt has been made to diagnose the cause of the malaise and suggest certain remedies to curtain this problem. The issue of sectarianism is first looked in available published literature followed by a field work in district Hangu.

Introduction

In recent years, religious intolerance and bigotry has reached deep inside our society. There is less tolerance and respect for other's views and opinions among the people. The followers of a sect consider themselves as 'true Muslims' and others as 'infidels'. Innocent worshipers are targeted in mosques and *Imam Bārgāhs* in the name of religion. The narrow interpretation of Islam and *Jihād* by semi-literate *mullahs* has damaged the true image of Islam.

Shia-Sunni differences have its roots in the election of the successor of the Prophet (PBUH). Shia claimed Ali, a companion and cousin of the holy Prophet, as successor on the basis of a pronouncement of the Prophet at

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Ghadir¹ while the Sunni believes that not designating any successor by the Prophet means the matter is left to the community. The political/personality dispute² between Shia and Sunni transform into religious and transmitted to next generations which sometime converted to clashes between these two Muslim communities.

The menace of sectarianism is not new to Pakistan. Even before the creation of Pakistan, sectarian clashes used to happen off and on in Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. After the formation of Pakistan, there was harmony between *Shi'as* and *Sunnīs* to some extent. However, the 'divide and rule' policy adopted by Zia ul Haq³ and Iranian Revolution compounded the already existed sectarian divide. Other major developments that led to sectarian divide were Saur Revolution and the subsequent Soviet Union intervention in Afghanistan, the emergence of *Jihādī* and militant organisations, Iranian Revolution and Iran-Iraq war. For an objective comprehension of the sectarian conflicts, local realities at micro level need to be explored while keeping in view the macro perspectives. In fact it is the interaction and interplay of these two levels of analysis, macro and micro that need to be taken into account.

Sectarian problem is no more of an occasional nature, or limited to isolated localities. It is becoming the problem of national concern because it is spreading its tentacles rapidly in the country. It has hit those areas which were free of sectarian riots. If the problem continues unabated, it will soon undermine the integrity and solidarity of Pakistan. To protect Pakistan from disintegration and destabilisation, it is necessary to provide first hand information regarding the problem in each sectarian ridden locality so that one can reach at better solution. The present study on sectarianism in Hangu is an attempt in this connection.

Scope and Methodology

In the present study the universe consists of Hangu district. The sample of *Shi'as* and *Sunnīs* was taken from Hangu city for the following two reasons. Firstly, it is the Hangu city in which both the communities co-exist. Secondly, it is from here that sectarian violence starts and spreads to other parts of the district. Keeping in view the existing conditions in the area a sample of fifty respondents having different background was selected. A questionnaire was distributed and collected back [after sometime.] Informal

¹ A place between Madina and Makkah. The Shia referred to the saying of the Prophet, "He for whom I was the master, should hence have Ali as his master".

² Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought*. I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, New York 2005, pp.1-7.

³ Lodhi, M., Zia's Tenure Fragmented Pak Society. In *The Sunday Guardian*, May 5, 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/zias-tenure-fragmented-pak-society>, accessed on 05/05/2014

and casual discussions were also held randomly with about two hundred persons which helped in understanding various aspects of the issue and analysing the data.

In order to have an equal representation, equal number of respondents (25 from *Sunnīs* and 25 from *Shi'as*) were selected from each sectarian group. Efforts were made to distribute these respondents cross-sectional, i.e. to represent various professional groups. (See table No.1)

Table No. 1
Professional Affiliation of the Respondents

Profession	No. of Respondents
Common masses	16
People representatives	8
Teachers	6
<i>Mullahs</i>	6
Shopkeepers	6
Lawyers	4
NGO's heads	2
Journalists	2
Total	50

Background

Hangu is one of the most important districts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In the past Hangu was a sub-divisional headquarter of Kohat district. It comprised the area called lower Miranzai (Hangu) mixed with Upper Miranzai (Kohat). During the British rule, it was made a tehsil in 1903. On June 30, 1996, it was made a district and separated from Kohat.⁴

The district is spread over an area of 1097 sq. km. or 546 sq. miles. It is surrounded in the north by Orakzai agency, in the east and south-east by Kohat district, in the south by Karak district, in the south-west by tribal areas adjoining Kurram agency, North Waziristan agency and F.R. Bannu and on the north-west by Kurram Agency. Hangu district shares most of its boundary with tribal territory whereby parts of the district like, Zergeri, Samana, Shahu Khel, Lodhi Khel, Wach Bazar and Tora Wari have over the years practically become tribal areas and thus makes it geographically and strategically very important.⁵ (See Figure 01)

⁴ Orakzai, N. M. K., *Hangu, Land and People*, unpublished Masters Thesis, Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, Peshawar 2001-03, pp. 1-2.

⁵ Ibid.




Fig. 01

Source: Google map (maps.google.co.in/)

It has two tehsils, Hangu and Thall, a town Doaba, 17 Union Councils, two Municipal Committees i.e., Hangu and Thall, and one town committee i.e., Doaba. It is 39 km away from Kohat and 102 km from Peshawar. The district is famous for its scenic beauty spots, much mineral and forests wealth. The valley is thoroughly green, charming and attractive. Samana is one of the loveliest picnic spots.⁶

According to the census of 1998, the total population of Hangu district is 314529. It is inhabited by a number of tribes including Bangash, Orakzai, Khattaks, Afridis, Syeds, Shinwaris, Qureshis, Parachas, Mians and Niazis. Due to exodus from Orakzai Agency the Orakzais now constitute 50 % of the total population. Besides these, Afghan refugees have also contributed to the make up of Hangu population. Afghan refugees have affected the district economy by occupying some of the sources of income especially of the

⁶ Ibid.

lower classes. Bangash is the biggest tribe.⁷ The second largest tribe is the Orakzai who entered from Orakzai Agency by purchasing land from the locals. Besides Bangash and Orakzai, other tribes are confined to few villages.⁸

Hangu inhabitants are divided into *Sunnī* and *Shi'a*. *Sunnīs* are in majority and thus enjoy more economic and political power due to their heavy numeric strength. However top and good businessmen are *Shi'a*. Both the sects are stuck to their beliefs and follow their faith in its most conservative form. Towards the east of Hangu city, there is *Shi'a* dominant area, where Lodhi Khel is inhabited by *Shi'as* and Shahu Khel by both *Sunnīs* and *Shi'as* sects with majority of the latter. Towards the west of Hangu there is *Sunnī* dominant area where hardly a *Shi'a* lives. In main Hangu bazaar both the communities co-exist. During the sectarian strives in the Hangu city, help for the *Shi'as* come from the east while for the *Sunnīs* from the west.

Religion is seams to be the final word for both the sects . They have great regard for their respective 'religions'. Religious emotionalism is the main characteristic of the people of both the communities. Majority of the lower class people are ignorant and are therefore, exploited by politicians, *mullahs* and *moulvis* and sectarian organisations for the fulfilment of their ulterior motives. Secondly, they are so much emotional towards their religion that they can do anything, including killing innocent people of the other sects. They find it their religious obligation to safeguard their faith and to fight against the 'enemy'. The men on pulpit also play a leading role in building emotional attitude of the people towards their religion. They have not been just taught to live and die for the beliefs for their religion, but they are also taught to kill for someone (followers of own sect). The adherents of each sect consider themselves the only true Muslims. The followers of one sect cannot tolerate the religious ideologies of other and thus oppose each other with full vigour and violence, which leads to deaths and property damage between the sects.

Origin and Escalation of Sectarianism in Hangu

Sectarian violence between *Shi'a* and *Sunnī* sects in Hangu district is a known phenomenon for the past four decades. Hangu was a peaceful city before 1980. Both communities used to live together in harmony and helped each other in times of need and necessity. They participated in marriages and funerals of each other. One of the deputy superintendents of police (DSP) at Hangu talked about those days that 'during my three years job at Hangu I

⁷ Khans and Maliks belong to this tribe. The Khans, Maliks and the Syeds are claiming the ownership of Hangu.

⁸ Orakzai, *Hangu, Land and People*, pp. 66-67.

could hardly find a person with a small knife.’ However, towards the close of 1970s some internal and external developments took place which directly and indirectly affected the *Shi’a-Sunnī* relations. The ‘Islamic Revolution’ in Iran, Zia’s Islamization programme and Saudi Arabia and Iran support to their ideological comrades fomented the sectarian feelings in the area. Consequently, sectarian clashes started in the early 1980s and continued in 1990s and the first decade of twenty first century. Following is a brief history of the genesis escalation of sectarian clashes in Hangu.⁹

The Clashes of 1980

It is reported that the sectarian clash of 1980 has its origin in the local dispute between two families i.e., Khans and Maliks over the issue of possession of a *Hujra*¹⁰ situated in Khan Bari Union Council, a *Sunnī* dominant area. The former family was *Sunnī* while the latter was *Shi’a*. The *Sunnī* community used to gather in the *Hujra* throughout the year while the *Shi’a* only gathered on 9th *Muharram*. The structure of the *Hujra* was such that there was no wall around it. The *Sunnīs* wanted to construct a wall around it. They brought bricks and stones and started construction during night. This was resented by the *Shi’a* community and registered a complaint in the police station.¹¹

It was further reported that next morning 25 policemen came to the disputed place. They collected ten *Shi’a* and 15 *Sunnī* elders to solve the matter through negotiation. In the meantime, a *Shi’a* extremist Khadim Hussain along with 15-armed men reached the spot. He lifted the slogan of Ali and started firing. He also opened fire at police when the police stopped him. Both *Sunnī* and *Shi’a* started firing at each other. The DSP announced through mosque loudspeakers to halt the firing but both the parties did not heed to his pleas. Ultimately tear gas was used against them. When the situation deteriorated, Superintendent of Police and Deputy Commissioner called for further police along with Frontier Constabulary personnel. Now the *Shi’a* extremists climbed the Shah Almast Mountain and opened fire over the entire village from their trenches. As a result of this firing four *Sunnīs* died. Though the *Sunnīs* are taking care of the *Hujra* but the dispute is still unresolved.¹²

⁹ Khan, S., Peace at a Glance in Hangu. In *The News*, May 6, 2003.

¹⁰ A common place for guests in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa villages. It also serves as place to get together in sorrowful and joyful events.

¹¹ FIR No. 220 Dated. 18-07-1980, Police Station Hangu.

¹² Interview with Shafiquallah Khan, Peshawar, May 28, 2014.

The Dispute of 1988

Since Zia's Islamization process alienated the *Shi'a* community, therefore on his death on 17th August 1988, the *Shi'a* community of Hangu committed aerial firing to express their happiness.¹³ They laid a dog in the coffin and pretending it to be Zia's dead body, walked with it as a funeral procession. This was resented by the people of Orakzai Agency. They, therefore, entered the area and ultimately *Shi'a-Sunnī* clashes erupted in Shahu Khel and Lodhi Khel killing one *Sunnī*.¹⁴

No. of FIRs	Casualties		Injured		Property Losses		Remarks
	Sunnī	Shi'a	Sunnī	Shi'a	Sunnī	Shi'a	
4	1	-	-	-	-	-One Suzuki pick-up. -Two Buses	All the accused nominated/ arrested in these FIRs had been acquitted by the concerned courts.

Source: Police Department Hangu.

The Conflict of 1998

The clashes of 1998 were very severe which caused killing of many lives on both sides. These happened on *Al-Quds*¹⁵ day as well as on *Nauroz*¹⁶ day. On 23rd January 1998 when the *Shi'a* community was observing the *Al-Quds* day, Imamia Students Organization (ISO)¹⁷ took out a procession in

¹³ A Statistical Snapshot of Sectarian Clashes in Hangu, (Unpublished), Police Department, District Hangu.

¹⁴ Interview with Saboor Khan, Journalist of *Dawn* newspaper, Hangu, Dated May, 25, 2004.

¹⁵ Literally means the holy day. *Shi'as* observe the last Friday of *Ramazān* (fasting month) as *al-Quds Day*. The day has been fixed by Imam Khomeini for arranging rallies and seminars after Friday congregation in order to show support for Palestinian cause.

¹⁶ Literally means 'New Day'. *Nauroz* was part of Persian culture which the Persians celebrate on the starting day of each year. On this day they promise that they would start the first day of the year (based on Persian calendar) from the message of peace, love, kindness and sympathies for each other. According to the solar calendar, the day is 21st March. In the context of Hangu, *Shi'as* celebrates this day because it coincided with day when Hazrat 'Ali proclaimed Khilafat. According to *Sunnis*, *Shi'as* also arranges celebrations on this day in which they dance, drink, fire and gamble.

¹⁷ Imamia Students Organization is a *Shi'a* organization formed on May 22, 1972 at the University of Engineering and Technology in Lahore and its founders included Dr. Majid Naroze Abidi and Ali Raza Naqvi. Dr. Marghoob Zaidi became its first president. Purpose

main Bazaar Hangu. According to *Sunnīs* they were raising slogans against the companions of the Holy Prophet (SAW). Responding to these slogans Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)¹⁸ workers also came out on the road in the form of procession. In the meantime, some unknown terrorists fired on Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan's followers in Hangu Bazaar killing one *Sunnī* and nine injured. The *Sunnīs* believed that the militants were *Shi'as*.¹⁹

The *Sunnī* Supreme Council of Hangu²⁰ appealed for observing a strike on coming 20th and 21st March 1998. On 21st March the *Shi'as* had to celebrate their traditional festival *Nauroz*. The government therefore, deployed militia and Frontier Constabulary (F.C.) at important places and in the surrounding hills to avoid the possibility of any unpleasant event.²¹ At about 9.00 AM on 21st March, as the *Nauroz* procession was about to proceed from its usual starting point near Hangu College, some unidentified assailants opened indiscriminate firing on the crowd killing 10 *Shi'as* and injuring 25. The *Shi'as* believed that they were *Sunnīs*. Violence spread to other villages as well. In the exchange of fire, heavy weapons, including mortars, rocket launcher and missiles were used.²²

Clashes between the two warring sects continued for the second day, killing and injuring many more. Sporadic firing took place in several parts of the district. The district administration of Hangu managed to broker a cease-fire between the two warring sects with the help of FC and army after losing 5 more lives.²³

On 24th March 1998 an armed *Sunnī lashkar* (group) of tribesmen from the adjacent Orakzai and Khyber agencies attacked the Shahu Khel village, some 18 km away from Hangu, killing 15 *Shi'as* and injuring several others. The attackers used locally made anti-aircraft guns, missiles, rocket launchers and other heavy weapons. As a result, the entire village was burnt down to ashes. In Saidano Banda village, a college student was also gunned down

of the organization is to protect the interests of, and provide financial support to, *Shi'a* students all over Pakistan. By 1977, ISO had proliferated all over the country and had developed contacts with a number of similar organisations in Iran. This relation became further strong with the 'Islamic Revolution' in Iran in 1979. ISO has played an active role in protesting against the Islamization process of Zia regime.

¹⁸ Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan is one of the major anti-*Shi'a* splinter group in Pakistan. On September 6, 1985, Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, a *Deobandī 'alim* of JUI (F) founded Anjuman-i-Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan in Jhang, later renamed it as Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan. It was the first organized *Sunnī* party with the exclusive professed objective to defend the honour of *Sahāba* (companions of the Holy Prophet (SAW)) and counter and contain the influence of 'Islamic Revolution' of Iran in Pakistan.

¹⁹ Interview with Saboor Khan (Journalist of *Dawn* newspaper), Hangu, May 25, 2004.

²⁰ It is a body consisting of Sunni Ulema in Hangu. It spoke for the rights of the Sunnis in the area.

²¹ *Daily Mashriq*, Peshawar, March 21, 1998.

²² *Daily Dawn*, Karachi, March 22, 1998.

²³ *Daily Dawn*, Karachi, March 23, 1998.

during night raising the toll to 31 persons. Thus clashes between the two sects continued for the fourth day.²⁴

No. of FIRs	Casualties		Injured		Govt. Official Injured	Remarks
	Sunnī	Shi'a	Sunnī	Shi'a		
4	5	21	26	48	4	All the criminal proceeding had become in effective due to peace agreement of impartial Jirga of 1998.

Source: Police Department Hangu.

With the help of a *Jirga* (grand assembly) a peace agreement was signed on 27th November 1998 between the *Shi'as* and *Sunnīs*. A sum of two crore rupees was declared *teghah*²⁵ between the two sects.²⁶

The Clashes of 2001

On 1st March 2001 an unidentified armed man, boarding a pick-up fired at *Shi'a* shopkeepers at 12.00 noon in Jamal Market, situated in main Bazaar Hangu killing three *Shi'a* shopkeepers and injuring one. This incident erupted clashes between *Shi'as* and *Sunnīs*. All Bazaars and commercial centres were closed down as a mob set ablaze many vehicles and shops at the main bus stand. Extensive firing continued between the two warring sects. In this exchange of fire, heavy and sophisticated weapons were used including mortars and rocket launchers. District administration called militia and FC and curfew was imposed in the district and orders of shoot-at-sight were given for those found violating the curfew. The curfew lasted for 70 days.²⁷

No. of FIRs	Casualties		Injured		Property Losses	Remarks
	Sunnī	Shi'a	Sunnī	Shi'a		
4	12	4	23	6	Rs.30 Million (Approx)	Curfew was imposed for 70 days.

Source: Police Department Hangu.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Literally means stone. A tradition among the tribesmen in which the two warring tribes temporarily agree for cease-fire.

²⁶ Jirga Decision, November 27, 1998

²⁷ *Daily Dawn*, Karachi, March 2, 2001.

After March 2001 incident, government formed a Jirga. It took statements from both sides and carried out decisions on 4th July 2002. An amount of one crore rupees was fixed as a *teghah* between the parties.²⁸

The period between 2002-05 did not witness sectarian conflict in Hangu. The reason could be that they remembered the heavy human and capital losses in 1998 and 2001 sectarian clashes. As a result, the sectarian clashes were in dormant phase. With the passage of time, these sectarian conflicts again came to surface and in 2006 an escalation is observed in sectarian strife.

The Clashes of 2006

On 9th February 2006, a suicide bomber entered the Ashura procession and exploded in the main Hangu Bazaar at about 9.35am. This blast was followed by another blast which caused many casualties. In this incident 37 died and 91 injured. After the explosion, rioters burnt down hundreds of shops, vehicles and banks in the main bazaar and started indiscriminate firing. About 390 shops (75% shops) in the bazaar were burnt or damaged during the violence. There was heavy exchange of fire between the rival parties and sophisticated weapons including mortars and rocket launchers were used in the fire. In order to control the situation, curfew was imposed by the paramilitary and police forces. At least 100 rockets were fired from the hilltops on Ibrahimzai village, about 10 kilometres to the east of Hangu city on Friday night. Finally a ceasefire was brokered in the troubled Hangu on Saturday after three days of intense clashes between the two Muslim sects.²⁹ A peace agreement was made by 24-members committee comprising elders of both sects on 12th February and an amount of Rs.20 million was fixed as a *teghah*.³⁰

The sectarian violence started over a dispute on a hujra in 1980 continued till the last major incident of 2006 and contributed much to the human and capital loss of both *Shia* and *Sunni*.

Factors Responsible for Sectarianism

The menace of sectarianism has its causative factors. To find a durable solution to sectarianism, it is necessary to identify the local factors followed by national and international factors. In case of sectarianism in Hangu, the following international, national and local factors have been highlighted.

²⁸ Jirga Decision, July 4, 2001.

²⁹ *Daily Dawn*, Karachi, February 11, 2006.


³⁰ *Daily Dawn*, Karachi, February 12, 2006.

Local Factors

1) Orakzai and Khyber Agency

The residents of Orakzai and Khyber agencies (Tirah) are also a factor of sectarian violence in the area. The situation is further compounded by tribesmen's love for weapons and easy availability of the arms from Dara Adam Khel. The involvement of tribesmen is evident from the clashes on 24th March 1998 in which armed *lashkar* of tribesmen from adjacent Orakzai and Khyber agencies attacked the Shahu Khel village using anti-aircraft guns, missiles, rocket launchers and other heavy weapons. All *Shi'as* and some *Sunnīs* testify their involvement.³¹

Fig. 02
Tribe Greatly Responsible for
Sectariaism




2) Fanaticism

In informal discussion with the respondents, it was found that majority of the people are religiously enthusiastic because fourth-fifth of the respondents participates in religious processions. *Shi'as* participates in religious processions more than *Sunnīs*. The element of fanaticism is also evident from the survey results which is 6% of the total respondents. This percentage is although less but it is significant in the sense that such fanatic elements ignite the fire of hatred on the eve of processions. The element of fanaticism has been measured in terms of the responses collected with regard to the question, "Is it the service of Islam to participate in sectarian clashes?"

It is due to the presence of these fanatics that provocative slogans are raised in processions which usually lead to sectarian clashes between the rival communities. *Muharram ul Haram* and *Nauroz* are the occasions for participation.

Fig. 03
Participation in Sectarian
Clashes and Islam



³¹ Ibid.

3) The Controversy of Nauroz

Nauroz was part of Persian / Iranian culture which is celebrated by *Shi'as* in Iran, Turkey, Central Asian republics, Iraq, Azerbaijan as well as Afghanistan on the starting day of each year.

On this day they promise that they would start the first day of the year (based on Persian calendar) from the message of peace, love, kindness and sympathies for each other. According to the solar calendar, the day is 21st March.

In the context of Hangu, *Shi'as* celebrates this day because on this day Hazrat 'Ali was elected as a caliph. According to *Sunnis*, *Shi'as* also arranges celebrations on this day in which they dance, drink, fire and gamble. The *Shias* denied this allegation of the *Sunnis*. *Nauroz* started to become a bone of contention between *Sunnīs* and *Shi'as*. *Sunnīs* object to this festival because according to them it corrupts the minds of their youth due to dancing, drinking and gambling. Moreover, they also opined that it should be celebrated in the *Shi'a* dominant area only so that its impact may not spread to *Sunnī* areas. *Sunnī-Shi'a* controversy regarding *Nauroz* is so important that clashes of 1998 took place on the very day of *Nauroz* which led to human and capital losses.³²

National Factors

1) *Mullahism*

Before explaining this factor, it is necessary to differentiate between '*ālim* and *mullah* keeping in view the respondents' point of view. They regard '*ālim* as the true religious leader, broad-minded in outlook and knowing the true teachings of Islam and one who teaches peace and religious tolerance. On the other hand, *mullah* was regarded as semi-literate

Fig. 04
Occasions of Sectarianism






Fig. 05
People Responsible for
Sectarianism?



³² Based on personal communication with the people in Hangu.


narrow-minded called religious leaders who influence people towards extremism in every aspect of life including the killing of the believers of the same religion.

In the case of Hangu, *Mullahism* has also become a factor of sectarianism. It was found that a large number of people hold *mullahs* responsible for sectarian hatred. *Mullahs* from both sides actively play role in fanning sectarian hatred among the people. They are poisoning the people against each other by using loudspeakers in mosques and by issuing religious verdicts. They have found religious verdicts as good tools for declaring each other as *kāfir* (infidel). The Friday sermon is rich in inflammatory tone and content. During sectarian riots, they announce through loudspeakers to participate in the strives as holy obligation. They term such strives as *jihād* (holy war) and an easy way for getting place in Heaven. They deceive ignorant people in the name of *jihād* and malign the true image of Islam.



2) Political Leaders


Political leaders have not taken the problem seriously. Majority of the people complained that politicians did not play any active role in solving the problem. By manipulating this problem, they have diverted public attention from the fallacies of their politician's lack of work and policies for uplift projects in Hangu. Secondly, they do not focus on the problem because only the common people are becoming its victims and no political leader has ever been killed or injured yet. The survey results show that so far they have not done positively to eradicate the evil. Figure 05 portrays the manipulation of the problem by the local politicians.



3) Zia’s Islamization

The Zia’s Islamization programme is one of the factors responsible for the growth of sectarianism in Pakistan in general and Hangu in particular. Since his Islamization programme was based on *Hanafi* school of thought, it alienated the *Shi’a* community. The process of Islamization was resented by the local *Shi’as*. The immediate result of this development was that it led to the emergence of the first sectarian clash in 1980 between *Shi’as* and *Sunnīs*. The local *Shi’as* had so much hatred for Zia that when he died, the local *Shi’as* celebrated the occasion with aerial firing to express their pleasure in 1988 followed by sectarian clashes. The survey results show that the phase (1988-04) witnessed a tremendous sectarian violence in the district.


Fig. 08
Intense Phases of Sectarianism



4) Administration Negligence

Government is said to have no interest in solving the issue. It is not taking measures which can ensure long-term peace and tranquility in the area. The performance of government functionaries, even in anticipated situations, presents a dismal picture. They intervene when blood has been shed and hatreds are intensified. There is no comprehensive national policy to curb this menace. There is a tendency to go for ad hoc and temporary solutions such as cease-fire and imposition of curfew but nothing is done on sustainable bases to build confidence and peace between the two communities. When *Nauroz* comes near, the administration becomes serious; when the festival is over, the government

Fig. 09
Organisations Responsible for Sectarianism



forgets about it. The weakness of government is also clear from the fact that people of both sects are using heavy weapons against each other including mortars, rocket launchers, aircraft guns and missiles etc and the administration is doing nothing to take proper action in this regard. The law and order situation is so volatile that every time the clashes are started by unknown terrorists and the government neither arrested them nor safeguarded the people from facing such terrorist acts in future.³³

5) Shi'a-Sunnī Sectarian Organizations


Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Sipah-i-Muhammad (SM) and Imamia Students Organization (ISO) are the dominant sectarian organizations operating in the area. The SSP is a *Sunnī* extremist organization while the other two are *Shi'a* extremist organizations. Many times sectarian strives took place in the area because of these rival groups. The event of 1998 can be quoted in this regard, in which the provocative slogans of ISO and SSP on *Al-Quds* day led to the *Shi'a-Sunnī* clashes in the main Bazaar Hangu. These extremist organizations pursue the local ignorant people for sectarian killing as their religious obligation and a source of going to Heaven. *Tehreek-e-Jafaria* Pakistan (TJP) has also been pointed out by the respondents, however, it is a religio-political party which is not militant in nature. The informal discussion highlighted that by TJP the respondents meant the *Shiah* militant organisations.

International Factors

1) Afghan Refugees

Afghan refugees are one of the factors responsible for sectarianism. They have been trained in warfare against former USSR as well as in civil war of *Tālibān* with Northern Alliance. When they migrated to Pakistan, they knew nothing except warfare. They, therefore, merged with the extremist organizations of Pakistan and started taking part in sectarian strives. In the context of Hangu, the Afghans have been on the front lines in

Fig. 10
Internal Factors of Sectarianism



³³ *Daily Dawn*, Karachi, March 25, 1998.

igniting and worsening the sectarian problem due to the proximity of Afghanistan boarder with Hangu as well as the presence of Afghan refugees in the area. The past sectarian clashes also show that many times they attacked the area with the help of heavy weapons in support of the *Sunnīs*.³⁴

Moreover, Afghan refugees are the beneficiaries of *Shi'a-Sunnī* riots of Hangu. During riots when both communities are engaged in sectarian riots, they start plundering the shops irrespective of which sect owns these shops. The previous unidentified militants' attacks in the bazaar that led to sectarian strife also make local Afghan people suspicious due to their vested interests. The local peoples especially the labour class; also complain about the socio-economic impact that has been caused by Afghan refugees in the district. Majority of vendors on footpath and wheelbarrow are Afghan refugees. The local labour class also holds the Afghan refugees responsible for local unemployment as Afghan refugees have occupied their sources of income. The respondents confirmed that the on one side they participate in sectarian clashes for the *Sunnīs* and on other hand they plunder the local shops after the eruption of sectarian conflicts.

2) *Tālibān* of Afghanistan

The *Tālibān*³⁵ of Afghanistan have been directly involved in fanning sectarianism in the district of Hangu. The then government's pro-*Tālibān* policy in 1990s is also responsible for the local clashes. They directly participated in the sectarian strives in Hangu on the side of the *Sunnīs* and against *Shi'as*. The pre-planned attack of 28th March 1998 over the houses of Shahu Khel, a village of Hangu bordering on the Orakzai agency and consisting mixed population of *Sunnīs* and *Shi'as*, is proof of their involvement. During the firing they used heavy weapons like mortars, rocket launchers and missiles which burnt down the village to ashes. The local people recognised them as *Tālibān* of *madrasahs* in Afghanistan due to their appearances. They had long curly hair, long beards, wearing long shirts and speaking Persian and Pashto. It was due to *Tālibān* that sectarianism intensified in the major portion of the phase of 1988-2004 up to the decline of *Tālibān* in Afghanistan.³⁶

3) 'Islamic Revolution' 1979 in Iran

'Islamic Revolution' in Iran is one of the leading external factors responsible for the radicalization of *Shi'as* in Pakistan. This revolution

³⁴ *The Scenario*, Islamabad, May 1998, pp. 21-22.


³⁵ Literally means students or those who seek knowledge. It refers to those who were ruling in Afghanistan at the time of 9/11 event in America.

³⁶ *Daily Dawn*, Karachi, March 29, 1998.

created a sort of energy in the *Shi'a* community of Pakistan. The literature and messages of *Imam Khomeini* were circulated extensively. In Hangu, it also affected the *Shi'a-Sunnī* long existing cordial relations. It gave a psychological boost to the local *Shi'as*. It was due to this reason that after the passage of one year of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, sectarian riots took place in this area on the nominal issue of *Hujra* was the start of *Shi'a-Sunnī* riots; because it was actually a dispute between two families which later on took the shape of *Shi'a-Sunnī* riots. All *Sunnīs* and a few *Shi'as* also blamed Iran for providing financial aid to the *Shi'a's* extremist organisations.

4) Foreign Agencies

The foreign agencies of countries like Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran are also reported to be responsible for the escalation of sectarianism in Hangu. These countries helped their respective communities for the development of their state religions. Iran is backing the *Shi'a* extremist organisations like Sipah-i-Muhammad and Imamia Students Organisation in the area while *Sunnī* extremist organisation like Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan is backed by Saudi Arabia. The former statement has been agreed by all the *Sunnīs* and a few of the *Shi'as* while the latter statement has been approved by many *Shi'as* and a few of *Sunnīs*. It is concluded that majority of the respondents accept the involvement of both the countries.



Implications

All these causes of sectarianism have affected the social set up in the district of Hangu. Its implications have reached deep in the social and political structure. A polarized social structure can be observed based on *Sunnī* and *Shi'a* cleavages. Following are the implications of sectarianism in district Hangu.

Firstly, it has deprived many people of the low-income class from their properties. The poor law and order situation compels the people to sell their lands and buy weapons in order to ensure their family's protection. Many people of low-income group wept over the lack of their own houses, which they had in the past. Whenever, the respondents of low-income class had to enter the source of income in a questionnaire, they wrote 'house sold'. Some

of the respondents reminded their deceased, whom they had lost in these sectarian clashes.

Secondly, apparently there seems to be harmony between the *Sunnīs* and the *Shi'as*. However, it is not so because the survey results show that the sectarian hatred has reached deep in the minds and hearts of the people. In a gathering of *Shi'as*, the *Sunnīs* are criticised and vice versa. However, in mixed gatherings members of both sects keep their biases to themselves. Survey shows that they rely on each other. However, the informal discussions with each community respondents show that they do not rely on each other. They participate in each others' ceremonies of grief but rarely share each others' joys. The *Shi'a* customers try to buy their goods from *Shi'a* shopkeepers and the *Sunnīs* try to deal in with the *Sunnīs*. The high ups of the district also try to support their own community. Thus the concept of sectarian division has deeply penetrated into the social and political structure.

Thirdly, the fear of being killed or hurt by terrorists is also there in Hangu bazaar. The shopkeepers close their shops in the noon and reopen them after noon in summer to avoid any unpleasant event. Similarly, before or soon after the *Āzān of Maghrib* (call for prayer soon after sunset) the people close their shops. Only the restaurants, the bread bakers' shops and some of the shops of those who are living in city, are open. The fear is so much in the bazaar that a cracker blast can lead to a communal clash. Fourthly, women are so uncertain about peace in the bazaar that they hardly visit it.

Suggestions

Hangu is newly sectarian hit place as compared to Parachinar, Karachi and certain districts in Punjab. It has badly affected the socio-economic life in the district. In order to curb sectarianism in Hangu and other parts of the province, there is a need to take some steps by all stake holders. Suggestions can be categorized as; long term measures, short term and local administrative measures.

Long-Term Measures

Religious Tolerance

Freedom of expression is the right of every person. However, no one should impose his own opinion on others. An argumentative approach should be adopted towards others rather than conflictive. The imposition of one's opinion over others creates antipathy and vanish the feelings of brotherhood and sympathy. It leads to the social segregation on the basis of

sectarian adherence. In such a situation the possibility of a sustainable peace becomes difficult. For the maintenance of a lasting peace and tranquillity in the society, it is obligatory to observe the principle of right of expression and respect to others opinions. The theme of tolerance should be incorporated in the school curriculum as well as manifested in the co-curricular activities of the students.

Non-Sectarian Council of ‘Ulama

The sectarian identity of the people is due to the sectarian ideology taught by the *mullah* and ‘*Ulama* of their respective sects. This ideology widens the gap between the people of various sects. Resultantly, the followers of every sect consider themselves the only true Muslim in the world. They have been taught in such a way that they feel proud of the sect they belong to and consider other sect as *batil* (not on right track).

The ‘*Ulama* in Hangu are influential in the sense that people hold them in great esteem. They should discourage such ideology and uphold inclusivism in their daily sermons. This would be automatically followed by unity among the masses. It is possible if ‘*Ulama* constitute a council consisting of the ‘*Ulama* of all the sects. This common platform of ‘*Ulama* will affect the attitude of the masses so far as respect to other sects is concerned. It would also provide a common platform for solving various sectarian problems through various consultations.

Religious Awareness

Majority of the masses are unacquainted about the true teachings of Islam. The ignorance of the masses is exploited by the *mullahs*. Masses of the opposite sects are killing each other in sectarian strives and term it as *Jihād*. Awareness should be created among the masses regarding the true teachings of Islam. This can be effectively done if the ‘alim of every sect takes responsibility of conveying true Islam to the advocates of the concerned sects. Narrow interpretation of Islam should be strongly discouraged. The true concept of *jihād* should be highlighted. Suicide attacks should be condemned. Respect for human beings and punishment for killing of a human should be implemented. Books and pamphlets should be published to discourage sectarian killing. Live programmes should be telecast and broadcast for the promotion of unity.

Elimination of Unemployment and Poverty

Majority of the terrorist activities are carried out by the people of poor class. Some of them accept this choice due to unemployment and poverty.

Having nothing to do, these people can be bought easily for carrying out terrorist activities. Steps should be taken by government for elimination of unemployment and poverty. Employment will not only decrease intensity of poverty but it will also keep people busy and thus away from sectarian violence. It also eradicates the sense of envy. Government should create equal job opportunities so that poor and deprived people may earn their livelihood through legal means. It should also launch welfare projects for elimination of poverty. Beside social uplift, these projects will also provide job opportunities to the jobless.

The Role of NGO's

Non-governmental organisations should be encouraged to set up in each sectarian hit place. Its staff should consist of local religious people of all the local prevailing sects. The collective work of NGO's staff members will not only create a sectarian harmony within NGO but also in the locality where it exists. It will also provide a common forum for solving sectarian issues. Inclusion of 'Ulama in the staff of NGOs will also eliminate general apprehension which 'Ulama and masses have regarding the negative role of NGO's.

Short-Term Measures

Ban on Sectarian Speeches and Gatherings

Sectarian speeches are delivered by the *mullahs* from the loudspeakers of their respective mosques as well as by the leaders of the sectarian organizations from the forums of their respective organizations. These speeches motivate the ignorant masses particularly the young ones for fighting for the cause of their sect as their foremost religious obligation.

Similarly, sectarian gatherings increase religious fanaticism because it is in these gatherings that more emphasis is made on adherence to a sect. The sectarian leaders on such occasion also demand more and more loyalty from its followers for the propagation and protection of their sectarian ideology. It is on such occasions that bombs are blasted.

A strong embargo should be levied by the government so far as delivering of sectarian speeches and sectarian gatherings are concerned. The local administration in a sectarian ridden place should strictly implement various laws in this connection and those who violate them should be brought before justice.

Ban on Sectarian Organisations

All the sectarian groups and parties fanning sectarian hatred should be banned. Their offices should be sealed. Their workers and leaders should be put behind bars. Though this practice is against the notion of freedom of association and expression, but it is essential for maintaining public peace and order. However, this imposition of ban should not be extended to peaceful groups who are in no way involved in fanning fanaticism.

Ban on Arms and Ammunition

Due to the proximity with the tribal areas, the tribesmen's trigger-happy temperament can be seen in Hangu. This situation is further compounded by the easy availability of weapons from the tribal areas. Similarly, sectarian organisations are reported to have heavy weapons through which they carry out their militant activities. In sectarian clashes these arms are used against the opponent in a more violent form.

The government should impose a ban on the mobility of the weapons. Arms without license should be seized and the offenders should be punished severely. Great care should be taken while issuing arms license. Those involved in illegal selling, buying and trafficking of arms should be severely dealt with.

Effective Law and Order Situation

Poor law and order situation is the main threat to life and property. It provides an easy opportunity to the assailants for conducting their terrorist activities. The 1998 and 2001 sectarian clashes took place in Hangu due to the poor law and order situation. The law and order situation is therefore needed to be revived and improved. The efficiency of the law enforcing agencies should be increased. The number of policemen should be increased. They should be trained along the modern lines. They should be equipped with modern and heavy weapons so that no one has the dare to disturb the social peace. The local influential *mullahs* and politicians should wholeheartedly cooperate in this connection.

Ban on Publishing Sectarian Literature

The sectarian organisations publish their sectarian literature for the protection and propagation of sectarian ideologies. The literature is mainly composed of articles regarding sectarian issues which have been discussed in a provocative manner. Various pamphlets are distributed among masses for creating alienation against the rival sect.

For sectarian harmony, a ban should be imposed by the government on composing, publishing and distributing sectarian literature. Violators should be put behind bars and subjected to severe punishment. In addition, efforts should be made by the 'Ulama of all sects to produce literature which contributes to cordial relations among various sects. The common masses should also avoid reading literature of sectarian nature. This collective struggle of government, 'Ulama and masses will fully discourage publication and distribution of sectarian literature.

Local Administrative Measures

Deployment of Frontier Corps on Orakzai-Hangu Border

Orakzai Agency is situated to the north of Hangu. Orakzai tribesmen had entered Hangu by procuring land from the Hangu residents. Now it constitutes the second largest tribe in the area. During sectarian clashes, Orakzai tribesmen intervene in Hangu and fight for the local *Sunnī* cause. It increases not only the intensity of the sectarian strife but also lengthens its duration because heavy and sophisticated weapons are used in this fight.

In order to halt the intervention of the Orakzai tribesmen in Hangu, there is need of deploying frontier corps along the Orakzai-Hangu border. The presence of FC would reduce the aggression from Orakzai side.

Celebration of Nauroz

Nauroz should be celebrated in the *Shi'a* dominant area rather than in the areas where only *Sunnīs* or both the communities exist. Since majority of Hangu residents are religious fanatics, therefore, hurdles may be created by the ignorant and fanatic masses in the celebration of *Nauroz*. Consequently, it is in the best interests of both the communities if *Nauroz* celebration is held in *Shi'a* majority area. It will also abolish the chance of criticizing *Nauroz* by the *Sunnīs*.

Secondly, the *Shi'as* should celebrate the *Nauroz* in its actual spirit so that to fulfil its very purpose for which the Persians and Afghans used to celebrate it. Its purpose is to start the first day of the year (based on Persian calendar) from the message of peace, love, kindness and sympathies for each other. But in case of Hangu it contributes to the loss of lives and properties on both sides. This is due to some of the controversial activities carried out on the eve of *Nauroz*. e. g. dance, gambling, firing, drinking. The *Shi'a* community should therefore avoid the observance of such activities in *Nauroz* which are repugnant to Islam.

Covering of Hilltops

After the sectarian disturbances in Hangu, it has been seen that the rival parties try to be first in covering the hilltops of the town. The mountains of the town, has many trenches which are highly suitable for firing at down villages. For example in the sectarian clash of 2006, about 100 rockets were fired at villages down to the mountains. During such clashes, the national forces should first cover these hilltops so that to stop the rioters from further deterioration. Secondly, during the entire month of Muharram, the national forces should permanently cover the hilltops and other key locations so that to make the combatants unable to occupy these strategic locations. This would certainly avoid the chances of the happenings an unpleasant event in the district.

Conclusion

Hangu, like other sectarian-ridden places, too has suffered from the menace of sectarianism. Hangu has witnessed many sectarian strives including the sectarian clash of 1988, 1998, 2001 and 2006. There are many local, national and international factors that have contributed in escalating the sectarian violence in Hangu. The local factors include the fanaticism of the tribesmen particular those belonging to Orakzai Agency, the celebration of Nauroz and the 'Ashura' procession. The national factors Zia's Islamization, administrative negligence, *Mullahism*, *Sunni-Shia* sectarian organisations and militant *madrasahs*. The international factors are 'Islamic Revolution' in Iran, *Taliban* of Afghanistan and foreign agencies. In order to contain the issue, various local-based, short-term and long-term measures have being suggested. In terms of local-based measures, it has been recommended to deploy FC on Orakzai-Hangu border, celebrate *Nauroz* in *Shia* dominant area and covering of the hilltops in Hangu by national force. Regarding the short-term measures, it has been proposed to impose ban on sectarian speeches and gatherings, ban on sectarian organisations, ban on arms and ammunition and ban on publishing and circulating sectarian literature. Referring to the long-term measures, it has been suggested to adopt a tolerant religious attitude, create religious awareness, eliminate unemployment and poverty, establish non-sectarian council of *Ulama* and mobilize NGOs for playing their positive role. All these measures will reduce the intensity of the issue of sectarianism in Hangu to a greater extent.

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FRONTIER ABLAZE: THE PAKHTUN UPRISING OF 1897-98

*Salman Bangash**

Introduction

This research article expounds one of the most complicated frontier quandaries that were faced by the British Empire in India. The North-West Frontier region, defined topographically, by the British, as a strategic zone, always posed a complex defence problem for the British Imperialist power in India. The region was indispensable and central part of their grand strategy during the high days of the Great Game to counter their opponents in this part of the world and therefore, for the British, the protection and maintenance of this area inhabited by warlike tribesmen was a geo-political and geo-strategic necessity. The British Raj in order to control the Pakhtun Belt was tied up in a sequence of difficult and dangerous military campaigns against the tribesmen.

Of all the military operations on the India's Northwest Frontier, the uprising of 1897-98 was the most threatening and worrisome to the British Empire. During the insurrection, the whole frontier line from Malakand to Kurram was ablaze. The year became one of the most troublous years in all Indian history. India was directly threatened and Britain's international prestige lowered. It took the British almost a year to crush the resistance of the tribes who rose *en masse*, motivated by tribal norms and values, religious zeal and passion. During the uprising, the British admired the professionalism and the fighting spirit of the tribesmen, and acknowledged some of their own weaknesses and shortfalls. This paper will critically evaluate the Pakhtun uprising of 1897-98, the difficulties that the imperial troops faced while fighting the tribes and the lesson that the British learnt from this great uprising.

Background

The British imperialist power in India throughout the nineteenth century was almost incessantly and unremittingly occupied in a string of

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complex and difficult military campaigns against the Pakhtun¹ tribesmen in the North-West Frontier region of British India.² These expeditions were nicknamed tip and run, butcher and blot, were also known to the army as 'small wars' to distinguish them from interstate warfare. Such campaigns were alternatively known as hill warfare, tribal warfare, and frontier warfare.³

Tribal warfare exerted vital and significant influence on the organisation, equipment and training of imperial units and throw light on the aptitude and capacity of the British Indian army to counter its adversary. These military operations observed Philip Mason provided imperial troops with 'perhaps more sustained practical experience of colonial warfare than in any other part of the British Empire.'⁴ On the other hand the tribesmen resisted the British encroachment into the difficult belt of mountainous terrain they inhabited which commanded the strategic passes leading to Afghanistan. Tribesmen, who were accustomed to the use of weapons as part of their normal existence, lived by the ancestral code of *Puhktunwali*, which demanded, revenge and retribution for any injury to his own or his clan's honour.

For the British, retaining peace and stability along this sensitive border area with Afghanistan was a tactical and strategic obligation and compulsion. The Pakhtun borderland was adjudicated mainly upon military contemplations to protect and defend India. For the British, the area was a strategic zone of defence⁵ a no man's land, a buffer zone, a buffer to a buffer, a bulwark and a first line of defence. The British Government undertook as many as sixty-two punitive expeditions and sometimes large scale military operations against the tribesmen in between 1849 and 1899⁶ in order to control this strategic zone and to crush their resistance and love for freedom.⁷ The Umbayla Campaign of 1863, The Jowaki Operation 1877-78, The Miranzai Campaign of 1891, The Mahsud Campaign, The Chitral Campaign of 1895, are just some of the major campaigns which the British undertook in the North West Frontier.

¹ Also pronounce as Pathan and Pashtoon, For the sake of this study I will use the term 'Pakhtun' but will use the original spelling in direct quotation.

² Latham, R.W., *North-West Frontier, 1837-1947*. Osprey Publishing, Oxford 1977. p. 3.

³ Moreman, T.R., *The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849-1947*. MacMillan Press Ltd, London 1998, p. xxi

⁴ Mason, Philip., *A Matter of Honour, An Account of the Indian Army, Its Officers and Men*. J. Cape, London 1975, p. 337.

⁵ Haroon, Sana., *Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland*. Hurst & Company, London 2007, p. 5.

⁶ Baha, Lal., *NW.F.P. Administration under British Rule, 1901-1919*. National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad 1978, p. 5.

⁷ Latham, R.W., *North-West Frontier, 1837-1947*. Osprey Publishing, Oxford 1977, p. 3.

The Frontier Uprising of 1897-98

Hardly two years after the famous Chitral Campaign of 1895, occurred the most potent and formidable insurrection ever witnessed by the British in the tribal land. Many factors were responsible for the upheaval of 1897: The delineation of the Pakhtun territory in 1893, the setting up of the five Political Agencies with its administrative peculiarities, the forward move of the troops through Pakhtun territory and the establishment of British garrisons in Chitral, Chakdara, and Malakand. A part from this, the activities and propaganda of the Mullahs,⁸ the Greeco-Turkish War, Pan-Islamism and false and exaggerated hopes of moral and material support from the Amir of Afghanistan, also augmented the flames of revolt.⁹

During the summer, autumn and winter of 1897-98 large-scale risings broke out along the length of the Frontier region. The year became "surely one of the most troublous years in all Indian history."¹⁰ With astonishing rapidity the conflagration spread and the whole frontier line from Malakand to Kurram was ablaze. The uprising took the British by surprise. In H. Woosnam Mills words 'for the first time in our frontier history we have seen the most powerful Pathan tribes from Boner to Bolan take the field in unison and flaunt defiance at the Sirkar.'¹¹

Fighting started when on 10 July 1897 a British Political Officer and his military escort were unexpectedly attacked by Wazir tribesmen during a *jarga* at Maizar in North Waziristan. 'The killings at Maisar' remarks J.W. Spain, 'touched off a flame which spread all over the Frontier and culminated in the uprising of 1897, the greatest the British ever had so.'¹² He further said that in Waziristan, 'great and proud men have tasted defeat and humiliation.'¹³ The British sent troops immediately into Waziristan to punish those implicated in the attack, and to prevent unrest spreading along the frontier.

On 26 July the isolated fort at Chakdara at Malakand was surrounded by thousands of Swati tribesmen, who then attacked the British garrison at the Malakand Pass. This attack was organised by Saddullah, known to the

⁸ Mullah means a priest. Mullahs like Najmuddin alias Hadda Mullah, Saadullah alias Mad Mullah, Mohyuddin alias Mullah Powindah, Mawlana Hamza Khan, and Sayyed Akbar of Khyber agency were some of the leaders of the uprising.

⁹ Khan, Teepu Mahabat., *The Tribal Areas of Pakistan: A Contemporary Profile*. Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore 2008, p. 47.

¹⁰ Rome, Sultan-e-, The Durand Line Agreement. 1893):Its Pros and Cons, *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, Vol.XXXI, No. 1,(July, 2004), pp.1-26.

¹¹ Mills, H. W., *The Pathan Revolts in the North-West Frontier*. Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore 1996, pp. 6-7.

¹² Spain, J.W., *The Way of the Pathan*. University Press, Karachi 1963, p. 131.

¹³ Ibid.

British the 'Mad Mullah',¹⁴ together with mullah Najmuddin , popularly known as Hadda Mullah took the British by surprise.³¹

The initial assault overran part of the position, but heavy fighting continued for possession of the remainder between 26 and 30 July 1897. H.L. Nevill's, an experienced frontier military officer wrote that the 'desperate and repeated attacks on the garrisons of Malakand and Chakdara are conspicuous examples of the savage side of the methods of war practised by the Muhammadan tribes inhabiting the north-western borderland of India.'¹⁵ The tribesmen were defeated after a hard fight. Acknowledging the fighting abilities of the Swatis T. H. Holdich another of British military man wrote, 'We need not think of the Swatis as a degenerate and cowardly race. They fought like the Arab races of the Sudan-like Zulus-like Afridis; and we may be thankful that they were not armed like Afridis.'¹⁶ Lord Elgin, the Viceroy on 2 August 1897 sent a congratulatory letter to General G.S George White and appreciated the success of the British troops in defeating the tribesmen.¹⁷

Lord Elgin was very much concerned about the spreading of the uprising and the strategy, which his government should adopt in order to stop such happening again. On August 7, 1897, he sent a letter to W. Mackwork Young Lt. Governor of the Punjab and explained to him that 'The very completeness of the dispersal of the rising at the Malakand increases the difficulty of the question, what is to be done next....What is necessary to prevent the recurrence of these outbreaks, and to make clear our power and determination to put them down.'¹⁸ On the other hand, General G.S White had his own apprehension fearing the spread of the insurrection all over the Pakhtun belt.¹⁹

An attack on the fort of Shabkadr in Peshawar District on 7 August by 5000 Mohmands tribesmen suddenly widened the scope of hostilities. The attack was 'an audacious act on the part of the tribesmen.'²⁰ While operations were in progress in Mohmand country unrest spread southwards to affect the Afridis and the Orakzais who inhabited the strategically important area between the Khyber Pass and Kurram Valley, they were led by a mullah of Tirah known as Sayed Akbar.²¹ The Government of India

¹⁴ MacMohan A.H., & Ramsay, A.D.G., *Report on the Tribes of Dir, Swat and Bajaur along with the UtmanKhel and Some Ranizai*. Saeed Book Bank, Peshawar 1981, p. 109.

¹⁵ H.L. Nevill quoted by Sultan -e-Rome in *The Malakand Jihad. 1897: An Unsuccessful Attempt to oust the British from Malakand and Chakdara*, Quarterly Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society, Vol. XLIII (April, 1995), pp. 171-86.

¹⁶ Holdich, T. H., *Swatis and Afridis*, The Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol. 29, No. 1/2. 1899, pp. 2-9.

¹⁷ Elgin to George White , 2nd August 1897, No.41, p.39. MSS/EUR.F.84/71.

¹⁸ Elgin to W.Mackwork Young Lt. Governor Punjab, 7th Aug. 1897, No. 48.p. 46.MSS/EUR. F. 84/71.

¹⁹ General G.S White, to Elgin, 9th Aug.1897, No; 97, p. 94.MSS/EUR. F. 84/71.

²⁰ Maj. General H.H. Collen, to Elgin, 9th August , 1897. No. 98, p. 95.MSS/EUR.F.84/71.

²¹ Holdich, *Swatis and Afridis*.

showed great concern because the tribes were well-armed as C.C. Trench stated that they had acquired by 'theft, capture or purchase from Afghan soldiers a fair number of modern weapons.'²²

On 23 August Afridi *lashkars* or war party attacked outposts and forts in the Khyber Pass held by the locally recruited levies. The Khyber Rifles fought their own brethren and proved their loyalty as Robert Warburton, who served 18 years as Political Officer in Khyber Agency acknowledged by saying 'they had eaten White Queen's salt.'²³ Thomas Holdich's acknowledged Afridi devotion in defending the Khyber Rifles at Landikotal and criticized the British response to this particular event; he said 'Whilst the Afridi fought for us we failed to fight for ourselves.'²⁴

The fall of Ali Masjid and LandiKotal, and the securing of the Pass was generally held to be the most awful blow the 'British prestige could suffer on the north-west frontier.'²⁵ In the plains of India 'no one ever dreamed that Khyber Pass could fall into the hands of the tribesmen.'²⁶ In Macmunn words "It was a day of shame and humiliation for every Briton".²⁷ Regarding the rising of Afridis, Warburton wrote, 'it makes me quite sad to think how easily the labour of years- of a lifetime- can be ruined and destroyed in a few days.'²⁸ He believed that the trouble could have been avoided had the government acted quickly enough to resolve minor local grievances.

As clashes continued in the month of September, the British started to believe that the uprising was stimulated and encouraged by the mullahs and was religious and fanatical in nature.²⁹ On several occasions during the operations, the fighting capabilities of the tribesmen were acknowledged. Writing on 7th of October 1897, Bindon Blood admitted 'the superior smartness of the enemy.'³⁰

As the uprising spread some British believed that tribesmen insurrection was well- coordinated and planned. There was a great deal of trepidation and apprehension among the high ups in London and Calcutta that the way the uprising started, foreign involvement can't be ruled out and one of their

²² Trench, C.C., *The Frontier Scouts*. Jonathan Cape, London 1986, p. 6.

²³ Warburton quoted by Javed Iqbal in *Khyber Pass: Geography, People and History*, unpublished Thesis, Area Study Centre, Russia (China & Central Asia), University of Peshawar, 2005, p. 245.

²⁴ Thomas Holdich's cited by S.S. Thorburn., *The Punjab in Peace and War*. William Blackwood and Sons, London & Edinburgh 1904, p. 325.

²⁵ Mills, H. W., *The Pathan Revolts in the North-West Frontier*, p 108.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 107.

²⁷ Macmunn quoted by Iqbal Javed in *Khyber during the Uprising of 1897: Lessons to Learn from the British Policy in the Tribal Areas*, *Journal of Central Asia*, No. 64. (Summer, 2009), p 113.

²⁸ Warburton, Robert., *Eighteen Years in the Khyber: 1879-1898*. Oxford University Press, Karachi 1975: p 11.

²⁹ Keith, Surridge., *The Ambiguous Amir: Britain, Afghanistan and the 1897 North-West Frontier Uprising*, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 36, No.(3), 2008, pp. 417-434.

³⁰ Blood to White, 7th Oct. 1897, White Papers, MSS.EUR. F 108/38.

apprehension was the potential role of pan-Islamic sentiment within the tribesmen. As a result, attention and concentration fixed on Amir Abdur Rehman, and the role and support of Afghanistan. Robert Warburton, the long-serving Political Agent wrote in May 1897, that 'reports were circulated in Peshawar that an agent from Constantinople had reached Kabul had meeting with the Amir, and he asked the mullahs to go to their homes and preach a religious war.'³¹

C.C. Davies also blamed the Afghan Government and said "It has been Afghan intrigues, either instigated directly from Kabul with the full cognizance of the amir, or carried on by his local officials".³² Olaf Caroe believed that Afghanistan provided fodder to the tribes for continual agitation, including financial and emotional support.³³ The political agent of the Malakand Agency, Harold Deane also blamed the Amir of Afghanistan for the uprising.³⁴ But Viceroy was not convinced and believed that the British had no concrete proof of Afghanistan's involvement in the uprising.³⁵

The Tirah Expedition

In order to conduct operations against the Afridis and Orakzai tribesmen the British assembled and deployed one of their largest force *The Tirah Expeditionary Force* (TEF), under the command of General Sir William Lockhart,³⁶ consisted of two divisions, which includes infantry, cavalry and mountain artillery totalling 34,506 troops, 19,858 non-combatant followers and 34,000 assorted pack animals to transport and supply it in the field.³⁷ Since that time, few outsiders have penetrated into the Afridi's land.³⁸ It was believed that the two tribes with an approximately fighting strength of

³¹ Surridge, *The Ambiguous Amir: Britain, Afghanistan and the 1897 North-West Frontier Uprising*,

³² Davies, C.C., *The Problem of the North-West Frontier, 1890-1908: With a Survey of Policy since 1849*. Curzon Press, London 1975, p.180.

³³ Caroe, Olaf., *Soviet Empire: the Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*. Macmillan, London 1967, p. 397.

³⁴ Surridge, *The Ambiguous Amir: Britain, Afghanistan and the 1897 North-West Frontier Uprising*,

³⁵ Elgin to W.Mackwork Young Lt. Governor Punjab, 7th August, 1897, No. 48.p. 48.MSS/EUR. F. 84/71. Hassan Kawim Kakar, the biographer of Amir AbdurRehman argued that the Amir, through his Commander in Chief, might have encouraged the Hadda Mullah with false and phony promises and rewards, only to make him suffer the humiliation and shame of defeat at the hands of the British. Furthermore, he said that the Amir notion of jihad was not to launch a holy war against his enemies, but to 'cement his own position in the country.'

³⁶ The Adj.-General in India to Lieutenant- Gen., Cammending the Forces, Punjab, Confidential, Foreign Office, 1897, No. 963, File No. 41, S. No. 2097, B.N. 19., Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar.

³⁷ Expeditionary Force against the Afridi and Orakzai Tribes on the Peshawar and Kohat Borders, L/MIL/7/15867.

³⁸ Spain J.W.*The Way of the Pathan*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 61.

40–50,000 men would offer strong resistance as they were relatively well armed.³⁹

During the campaign the British troops faced determined and well-trenched tribesmen, fought a guerrilla war and who gave a tough time to the British and Indian troops.⁴⁰ As one officer observed in his memoirs that a good number of the imperial forces did not realise that they were apposed by active and alert enemy, ready to grab every chance for turning the tables on his enemy.⁴¹ When the British Army entered the Maidan Valley, the heart of Tirah valley on 31 October 1897; the British thought that the Orakzais and Afridis would now submit.⁴² However, the tribal *lashkars* continued fighting the British. Many British officers admired the skill with which the Afridis fought.⁴³ General Lockhart admitted 'It must be remembered that the Force is opposed to perhaps the best skirmishers and best natural rifle-shots in the world; and that the country they inhabit is probably the most difficult on the face of the globe.'⁴⁴

The foraging operations mounted from Camp Maidan during November 1897 dramatically exposed insufficient training and limited knowledge about the peculiarities of hill warfare in both British and Indian regiments,⁴⁵ as against the watchful tribesmen ready and willing to exploit the slightest mistake.⁴⁶ On 18 November 1897 a rough *ad hoc* guide was distributed to the rest of troops which was an open admittance that the imperial troops lacked proper training for the operations.⁴⁷

Despite large scale destruction and demolition of houses, villages and large quantity of foodstuffs in Tirah and a blockade of tribal territory,⁴⁸ the Tirah operation dragged on into 1898, but a number of Afridi sections continued to oppose the imperial troops, by attacking outposts, military convoys and destroying telegraph lines. On 29 January 1898, the 36th Sikhs and the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry suffered heavy casualties at Shinkamar.⁴⁹ The Tirah Campaign proved the most difficult and protected military operation during the rising. This campaign was one

³⁹ White to Elgin, 1st Sept. 1897, Elgin Papers, MSS/EUR. F. 84/71.

⁴⁰ GOC Tirah Expeditionary Force to Adj.- Gen. in India, 9th Dec. 1897, L/MIL/7/15887.

⁴¹ Haldane, A. *A Soldier's Saga: The Autobiography of General Sir Alymer Haldane*. Edinburgh and London 1948, pp. 107-8.

⁴² GOC Tirah Expeditionary Force to Adj.- Gen. in India, 31st Oct./1st Nov. 1897, L/MIL/7/15867.

⁴³ T.R. Moreman, *The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849-1947* London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998, p. 61.

⁴⁴ Field Force Memorandum, 18th Nov. 1897, White Papers MSS/EUR.F.108/38.

⁴⁵ Henderson, G.F.R., *Technical Training of Infantry*. Dublin, 1899, pp. 9-10.

⁴⁶ Moreman, *The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849-1947*, p. 63.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

⁴⁸ Richards, D.S., *The Savage Frontier: A History of the Anglo-Afghan Wars*. Macmillan Ltd, London 1990, p. 147.

⁴⁹ Lt.-Gen. Sir A.P. Palmer to Chief of Staff, TEF, 31st Jan. 1898, L/MIL/7/15899.

of the serious encounters that the imperialist troops faced in India since the Mutiny of 1857-58.⁵⁰ Hutchinson who took part in the Tirah operations admired the fighting spirit of the Afridis and Orakzai. He said 'they are enterprising and bold, and thoroughly understand how to make the best use of the natural advantages which their woods and mountains and a rocky defile... gives them. Such a foe is to be treated with respect.'⁵¹

Critically Analysis

Throughout the spring of 1898 fighting continued while a settlement was negotiated at a series of *jargas* attended by Lockhart and tribal *Malaks* or elders. Finally after a year of incessant, relentless, unremitting and costly fighting, the tribes subsided, into an uneasy quiet, while thousands of British troops remained in tribal territory.

The Frontier risings of 1897-8 invigorated and rejuvenated the debate on the hill warfare both in British India and United Kingdom. For some, the lessons of fighting were significant for gaining information and knowledge of the possible nature of future war in the region. Colonel Thomas Holdich observed that the frontier uprising taught the English new ways and means of the war and all 'this puts an entirely new complexion on our little frontier fights of the future.'⁵²

H.L. Nevill argued that the root of the whole matter was a misunderstanding regarding the Durand mission and the subsequent demarcation of the frontier and religious beliefs of the tribesmen.⁵³ Winston Churchill acknowledged that the extension and consolidation of the border with Afghanistan were correctly considered by the tribesmen as a danger to their sovereignty and freedom.⁵⁴ In any event, he maintained, was futile to argue against a policy which, like a ship in a storm, was 'dictated by

⁵⁰ T.R. Moreman, *The Arms Trade and the North-West Frontier Pathan Tribes, 1890-1914*, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 22, No 2. 1994, pp. 187-216. Major-General William Lockhart summed up the difficulties encountered by imperial troops: No campaign on the frontiers of India has been conducted under more trying and arduous circumstances than those encountered by the Tirah Expeditionary Force. ... The enemy were for the most part skilled marksmen, exceptionally active and well armed and expert in guerrilla tactics. (Adj.-Gen. in India to the Secretary to the Government of India Military Department, 24th Feb. 1898. L/MIL/7/15887).

⁵¹ Hutchinson cited in Robert A. Johnson, *The 1897 Revolt and Tirah Valley Operations from the Pashtun Perspective*, <http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/PDFTAC/The%201897%20Revolt%20and%20Tirah%20Valley%20Operations.pdf> accessed 12/3/2010.

⁵² Holdich, T.H., 'Tirah', *Geographic Journal*, 12 /4. 1898, p. 357.

⁵³ Nevill, H.L., *Campaigns on the North-West Frontier*. Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore 1977, p. 124.

⁵⁴ Churchill, W., *The Story of the Malakand Field Force*. Dover Publications, New York 2010, p 309.

circumstances rather than men.⁵⁵ General Lord Roberts Fredrick believed that it was breakdown of the frontier policy. George Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India was of the opinion that 'in governing Orientals an assertion of strength and fighting power is periodically necessary.'⁵⁶

General Sir George White, also insisted that it was militarily unthinkable that the Indian government could tolerate on its borders 200,000 'of the most turbulent and finest fighting material in the world, unrestrained by civilised government and fired by fanaticism'.⁵⁷

Another of British officer admitted the need for the imperial troops to prepare properly for the future war in the frontier region and he warned that any weakness would result in disaster. Captain F.M. Edwards admitted that the difficulties which the British faced during the Tirah campaign and the casualties they had to bear had caused a substantial chorus of disapproval against the conduct of operations.⁵⁸ One British official in his argument emphasized that the imperial troops must be thoroughly educated to face their enemies, and the troops stationed in India should be trained not only for European warfare, but 'also in the irregular methods of fighting which must be adopted against uncivilised races.'⁵⁹

For some British officials religious fanaticism was the core cause of the uprising and they blamed the mullahs mainly responsible for that. But there were others who rejected this notion and considered many other factors for the uprising. General J.G. Elliot admitted that in reality; the 1897 uprisings attracted various section of the populace, and not all of them backed the mullahs on religious grounds.⁶⁰ Robert Nichols says that colonial views of religious fanaticism became 'justification for conquest, repression, and, often, the indiscriminate destruction of villages and communities.'⁶¹ In his opinion religion would have been just one of the many more inspiring dynamics added to a multifaceted social movement of resistance against the British imperialist.⁶² S.S. Thorburn gave a more critical evaluation of the situation: "Fanaticism" was merely the inspiration to brave deeds,..when they saw us giving bribes to their leaders, marching troops through their countries, surveying and mapping their hills, and erecting cairns of stone

⁵⁵ Jablonsky, David., Churchill's initial experience with the British conduct of small wars: India and the Sudan, 1897-98'. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 11, No.(1) 2000, pp.1-25.

⁵⁶ Surridge. *The Ambiguous Amir: Britain, Afghanistan and the 1897 North-West Frontier Uprising*.

⁵⁷ Auckland, *The Problem Beyond The Indian Frontier*, Nineteenth Century: a monthly review, 42:250. December, 1897, pp. 845-68.

⁵⁸ Adj.-Gen. in India to the Secretary to the Government of India Military Department, 24th Feb. 1898. L/MIL/7/15887.

⁵⁹ Moreman, *The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849-1947*, p. 82.

⁶⁰ Elliot, J.G., *The Frontier 1839-1947: The Story of the North-West Frontier of India*. Cassell, & Company Ltd, London 1968. p.62.

⁶¹ Nichols, Robert., *Settling the Frontier: land, law, and society in the Peshawar Valley, 1500-1900*. Oxford University Press, Karachi 2001, p. 92.

⁶² Ibid., p. 92.

along the Afghan side of their hinterlands.⁶³ The natural reaction would have been resistance.

Arnold Fletcher also argued that, "Nevertheless, such tribal fanaticism was exaggerated by British writer, who often confused nationalist opposition with frenzy. The tribesmen were Moslems to a man, and their leadership often came from among the articulate semi educated priests; but without question the major cause of their resistance was a desire to preserve their old tribal independence."⁶⁴

Fraser Lovat pointed out that the British should learn from its mistakes in order not to repeat it in future. He said 'we shall discover the results of our carelessness in the tale of the dead and wounded if we ever again have to send a big expedition into the hills between the Khyber and the Gomal.'⁶⁵ Lord Curzon, who took charge as a Viceroy in 1899 condemned the campaigns as wasteful act without any durable solution.⁶⁶

In short the general uprising of 1897 was evidence not so much of religious fanaticism as of a socio-political event that although used common religious idioms.⁶⁷ In 1900 the Quarterly Review also emphasized the need to learn from the famous uprising.

*We believe that the lesson to be learnt from the history of our Indian frontier policy during the past thirty years is to keep our powder dry, to strain every nerve to perfect our defences on the border of the Indian Empire,..The fate of the Empire is in the lap of the god; ...But there must be none of that deplorable lack of common-sense preparation on the part of our statesmen, none of the dilettante treatment of vital questions, of which they have so recently been guilty. From a defeat at Magersfontein or Colenso the nation can recover, but a crash at Quetta or at the mouth of the Khyber might bring down the Empire in India.*⁶⁸

Conclusion

The frontier Uprising of 1897-98 was a paramount event in the history of Frontier wars. It took the British almost a year to crush the resistance of the tribes who rose *en masse*. The revolt having socio-political and religious dimensions, shook the foundation of British Empire in India. During the fighting the British admired the professionalism and the fighting spirit of the tribesmen and acknowledged some of their own weaknesses and shortfalls.

⁶³ Thorburn, *The Punjab in Peace and War*, pp. 339-40.

⁶⁴ Fletcher,Arnold, *Afghanistan: Highway to Conquest*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y 1965, p 168.

⁶⁵ Lovat, F., *Arms Traffic*. London 1911, p. 43.

⁶⁶ James, Lawrence., *Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India*. St: Martin's Press, New York 1998, p 409.

⁶⁷ Khan Teepu. Mahabat, *The Tribal Areas of Pakistan: A Contemporary Profile*, p 88.

⁶⁸ North-West Frontier Policy. *Quarterly Review*, 191:382. (April, 1900), pp 467-91

As Churchill acknowledged 'Every man is a warrior'.⁶⁹ The uprising generated great debate in the British Parliament and the Military Junta in order to sort out plan and strategy in case of similar uprising in future. The immediate result of the uprising was the separation of Pakhtun land from the rest of Punjab and the formation of a new province: the North West Frontier Province in 1901 and a separate administrative structure for the Tribal Areas. The British military machine managed to crush the resistance of the Pakhtun tribesmen for the time being but further deepen the animosity, enmity and hatred between the two contending groups which continued till the end of British Raj in India.

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⁶⁹ Churchill W., *My Early Life*. London Eland, 1930, p 10.

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OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE TEACHING LEARNING OF ENGLISH IN GOVERNMENT GIRLS' HIGH SCHOOLS OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA

*Parveen Khan**

Abstract

It was descriptive study that explored the obstacles faced by English teachers and students in the Government Girls' High Schools in Peshawar, province of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, Pakistan. The tool for the study was a closed-ended questionnaire which was administered to senior teachers and students in order to get a clear picture of the challenges faced by them. The quantitative and qualitative treatment was given to the data. The data were converted into percentages which were further supported by graphic presentation. The outcome of the study indicated that overcrowded classrooms, heavy workload, out-dated curriculum, lack of financial resources, allocation of insufficient time and inadequate arrangements for any workshops for learning new techniques by teachers were major hurdles in teaching English. In order to solve these problems, some implementable measures were made which suggested that competent and well-qualified teachers should be recruited for teaching English, exposure should be provided for students in learning English, use of A.V. Aids should be made compulsory for teachers during teaching, new text books, mainly based on drill exercises should be introduced, spoken English should be made compulsory and district level education officers should visit the schools and check that proper teaching techniques were used by English teachers for teaching English.

Keywords: *Obstacles, English teachers, students, high schools, problems and implementable suggestions.*

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Introduction

There has been development of new means of communication among countries with the advancement of educational technology. The world has now turned into a “global village” where people communicate and connected with each other through a common language. English is the only language which is widely used in most parts of the world and provides a base for modern knowledge in all fields of human life.

The role of English language remained a controversial for many years in Pakistan. English is being taught as a secondary compulsory language in Pakistan. The major source of learning English in our country is the schools and formal classrooms where teachers focus their attention simply on English spellings, drills, syntax, morphology, and some formal grammar rules, cramming and vocabulary.

Today, in Pakistan we need to learn English mainly from the ‘utilitarian’ point of view rather than ‘cultural purposes’. But recent trends in the study of English in Pakistani schools are the challenges and problems faced by teachers and students. These problems and challenges warranted a systematic study to identify them for remedial solutions.

Objectives of the Study

1. To identify the problems faced by English teachers and students at higher secondary level.
2. To know the academic and professional qualification of English teachers for teaching English.
3. To make recommendations for improving the teaching of English and how to teach effectively, productively, and proficiently.

Significance of the Study

The study would be significant not only for the teachers and students, but also for the curriculum planners and school administrators. It would not only prove useful and helpful for concerned, but also motivate them to take corrective measures for the solution of the problems faced by English teachers and students. It would also provide guidelines for the teachers and students in the teaching learning process.

Review Literature

English is the dominant international language of the 21st century. There is a huge demand of English language in the world. It is accustomed by a quarter of the world’s population. As a result, English has assumed the role of international language instead of a language of a particular nation. It

is spoken by billion of people around the world. By 2020, it is forecasted that two billion people will be using it or learning to use it.¹

It is a fact that English is taught as compulsory subject in Pakistani schools and colleges, but students are still not able to communicate in English with confidence and success. This is also true about the secondary schools students in Pakistan. It is therefore, high time that we should treat English as a secondary language and take corrective measures to facilitate teachers and learners in both rural and urban areas to acquire proficiency in English. Education department should design its courses with specific objectives and especially pay attention to useful books that link theory to application and last, but not the least, a proper feedback mechanism for teachers.²

The standard of teaching English in Pakistan has deteriorated. Teaching of English in Pakistan is not up to the mark. The functional aspect is totally ignored in the schools and emphasis is only on learning grammatical rules through rote memorization and thus resulting in further decline.³

The condition of learning English at secondary level is worse and there is a need to address the consequential problems seriously. Learning English language is a priority in the subconscious of people, but they are precluded to devise remedial measures for fulfilling their urge. The students got few occasions to learn English. Its not that the learner lacks the capacity, but the whole educational setup needs to be reshuffled and built up from the beginning.⁴

The teachers were not sufficiently qualified and trained and there was no specific criterion for the selection of English teachers, but preference was given to those having master degree in English. The teachers used traditional grammar, translational methods for teaching English and there were no incentives for their good performance.⁵

English is a major window through which we acquire the distilled essence of modern knowledge in all fields of human activity. It is through this language that we can come to know the day to day progress being made in the scientific, technological, agricultural, cultural and especially in literary fields. In order to teach English in schools, we need to change the existing

¹ British Council. *The English Effect: The Impact of English, What Its Worth to the UK and Why It Matters To The World*. Mark Robinson, UK 2013

² Warsi. J., *Conditions under which English is Taught in Pakistan: An Applied Linguistic Perspective*. Harvard University, Cambridge 2007. Retrieved from <http://www.saridjournal.org/2004/warsi.htm>.

³ Mueen, A., *English Language Teaching In Pakistan*. National Book Foundation, Islamabad 1992.

⁴ Ahmad, N., Ahmad, M. A. Bukhari & T.A. Bukhari., The Nature of Difficulties in Learning English by the Students at Secondary School Level in Pakistan. In *Journal of Education and Practice* .10(2), 2011, pp. 18-24.

⁵ Ahmad, N., Khan. N; Munir, N. Factors affecting the learning of English at secondary school level in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. In *International Journal of English Language and Literature Studies*, 2(2), 2013, pp. 95-101.

conditions. If the conditions remain the same, the standard of English will further deteriorate and teaching of English will be merely a waste of time and energy.⁶

In spite of making all the efforts, the desirable results have not been still achieved. The major factors are out-dated English courses, teaching programs, proper training to teachers, and availability of local materials so as to meet the students' needs and expectations.⁷

Input by the government, to improve the teaching of English, is not up to the mark but are also abysmally poor. The main cause of failure in English subject is a poor examination system, flawed pedagogy, and outdated teaching material and curriculum.⁸

Many causes were identified for showing poor results in English which included no proper teacher training program, non-availability of facilities to teachers and students, out-dated curriculum, no particular attention to reading, writing, speaking and listening skills. Though majority of the schools have their libraries, but none of them have the provision of English newspapers, computers, and audio-visual aids.⁹

Realizing the need and the importance of English, the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in collaboration with the British Council and Society of English Language Teaching (SPELT) provided professional assistance to teachers at each level across the province. But no improvement was observed in English teaching and learning and we still need to do a lot in order to achieve the desired results.¹⁰

Methodology

It was a descriptive. The population included 200 senior English teachers and 200 students of 20 government girl's high schools in Peshawar district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. The sample was randomly selected from all the high schools which was 80 (40%) senior teachers and 80(40%) students. A closed-ended questionnaire was administered both to teachers and students. The primary data were collected from teachers and students while secondary data were obtained from office record, documents, and review of literature.

⁶ Tahir. M.S., *Modern Approaches to Teaching of English as a Second Language*. Majeed Book Depot, Lahore, 1991.

⁷ Sabiha, S., Language Planning in Higher Education: Issues of Access and Equity. In *The Lahore Journal of Economics*, 8(2), 2003.

⁸ Abbas, S., Sociopolitical Dimensions in Language: English in Context in Pakistan. In *Journal of Applied Language Studie*, 23(42), 1998..

⁹ Teevno, R.A., Challenges In Teaching and Learning of English at Secondary Level Class X. In *International Journal of Human Resource Studies*, 2(31), 2011.

¹⁰ British Council. *The English Effect: The Impact of English, What Its Worth to the UK and Why It Matters to the World*. UK 2013.

The study used closed-ended questionnaire for teachers and a separate questionnaire for students containing 20 items each. There was no problem in developing rapport with the participants. All the respondents willingly supported the study. The researchers personally distributed and collected questionnaires.

Data Analysis and Discussion

Qualitative and quantitative techniques were used in research. The quantitative data were converted into percentages and further illustrated with the help of graphs. Analysis of data collected from teachers is as follows:

Table No.1 Responses of English Teachers (80)

S No.	Questions	Positive Responses		Negative Responses	
		Yes	%	No	%
1.	Classrooms are over-crowded	80	100%	Nil	Nil
2.	Ask questions to review the previous knowledge of students	10	12.5%	70	90%
3.	Speak English with students in class	05	6%	75	93%
4.	Any professional training for Teaching English	03	3.7%	77	96%
5.	Use A.V. Aids during teaching	Nil	Nil	80	100%
6.	Translation in Mother tongue	80	100%	Nil	Nil
7.	Encourage English discussions in class	05	6%	75	93%
8	Any preparation for lesson planning before class	10	12.5%	70	90%
9.	Satisfied with students performance	Nil	Nil	80	100%
10.	Access to new technologies	Nil	Nil	80	100%
11.	Attend any workshop / refresher courses for learning new techniques	05	6%	75	93%
12.	Guidebooks are available in schools	Nil	Nil	80	100%
13	Satisfied with the present curriculum of English	10	12.5%	70	90%
14.	Face heavy load	80	100%	Nil	Nil
15.	Breakdown lesson in small segments	40	50%	40	50%

16.	Question answer session at the end of each lesson	Nil	Nil	80	100%
17	Sufficient time allocation	Nil	Nil	80	100%
18	Classroom inspection on daily basis	10	12.5%	70	90%
19.	Parental support for emphasis on English	60	75%	20	25%
20.	Use translation method	80	100%	Nil	Nil

The analysis of data in Table No.1 indicated that 80 (100%) respondents agreed that classrooms were overcrowded. Another, 10 (12.5%) respondents were of the opinion that they asked questions to review the previous knowledge of students and they prepared their lessons in advance. A negligible number of 05 (6%) respondents opined that they used English in class with students during teaching where as 03 (3.7%) respondents stated that they did not attend any professional training in teaching English. However, all the 80 (100%) respondents agreed that they did translate into their mother tongue, they were not satisfied with students' performance and they faced heavy work load in schools. All the 80(100%) respondents agreed that they had no access to new technologies because of lack of resources. Only 05(6%) respondents opined that they attended workshop/refresher courses for updating their pedagogical skills. 80 (100%) respondents agreed that no guide books were available in schools from which they could seek guidance. A negligible number of 10(12.5%) respondents were of opinion that they were satisfied with present curriculum. 40(50%) respondents opined that they had question answer session at the end of each lesson. Only 10(12.5%) respondents agreed that they conducted classroom inspections on a daily basis. Another, 60 (75%) respondents were of the opinion that parents gave priority to English language. The graphic presentation of data in Figure-1 further highlighted the responses. Analysis of response of students is given in Table-2.

Table No.2: Responses of Students (80)

S No.	Questions	Positive Responses		Negative Responses	
		Yes	%	No	%
1.	The teacher states the objectives of the lesson to the student	40	50%	40	50
2.	Discuss the importance of the lesson	Nil	Nil	80	100%
3	Gives examples to teach main points	Nil	Nil	80	100%
4.	Give information, step by step & gradually	Nil	Nil	80	100%
5.	English conversation class	Nil	Nil	80	100%
6.	Teachers command over subject & used correct pronunciation	20	25%	60	75%
7.	Utilize and manage class time	10	12.5%	70	90%
8.	Group/pair work techniques used by teachers	Nil	Nil	80	100%
9.	Emphasis on improving reading and writing skills	Nil	Nil	80	100%
10.	Provide positive feedback and made corrections	Nil	Nil	80	100%
11.	Satisfied with the teachers performance	20	25%	60	75%
12.	Classroom environment conducive for learning English	10	12.5%	70	90%
13.	Need to introduce changes in curriculum	80	100%	Nil	Nil
14.	Voice clarity& eye contact	10	12.5%	70	90%
15.	Assign homework to students on daily basis	Nil	Nil	80	100%
16.	Teachers use English in class	Nil	Nil	80	100%
17.	Encourage students for good performance	20	25%	60	75%
18.	Emphasis on cramming or conceptual ideas	20	25%	60	75%
19	Importance to course content or go beyond the syllabus	10	12.5%	70	90%
20.	Use of A.V. Aids during teaching	Nil	Nil	80	100%

The analysis of data in Table No.2 indicated that 40(50%) respondents agreed that teachers stated objectives of the lesson to students. Another, 80

(100%) respondents were not of the opinion that teachers neither discussed the importance of lesson nor did they give examples to teach main points. However, 80(100%) respondents opined that teachers did not give information gradually and had no English conversation class. A negligible number of 20 (25%) respondents opined that teachers had command on English subject and used correct pronunciation whereas 10 (12.5%) respondents stated that teachers utilized and managed class time properly. 80(100%) respondents were of the opinion that teachers never used group techniques in class nor did they give importance on improving reading and writing skills. However, 20 (25%) respondents agreed that they were satisfied with their teachers performance, encouraged students on their good performance and paid attention on concepts rather than rote memorization 10(12.5%) respondents agreed that classroom environment remained favorable for learning English and teachers were not always stick to the course content. 80(100%) respondents opined that the teachers neither used A.V. Aids during teaching nor did they used English in class. Only 10(12.5%) teachers had correct pronunciation. The graphic presentation of data in Figure-2 further highlighted the responses.

Conclusions

- Majority of the teachers did not have sound knowledge of the English language.
- English teachers faced heavy load work at their respective schools and teaching is adversely affected.
- Modern methods were not used for teaching of English. Teachers used translation method or did explain in their mother tongue.
- Incorrect pronunciation, no command on the subject and no fluency in spoken English were major obstacles for all respondents.
- It was found that students remained passive listeners and were not involved in various learning activities during teaching.
- Overcrowded classrooms are considered one of the major problems for teachers. They couldn't spare a single minute to provide extra guidance to weak students.
- It has been observed that all the teachers and students were of the opinion that A.V. Aids were never used during teaching because of lack of resources.
- Majority of the students were facing problems due to incorrect pronunciation; incompetency of teachers in English subject; no clarity in teachers voice and teachers did not follow the principle of easy to complex.
- It was also found that the English teachers had not attended adequate refresher courses/ workshop in order to improve their pedagogical

skills for teaching English and thus they were not able to teach according to the needs of students.

- Most of the teachers and students were not satisfied with the present curriculum of English which was only based on bookish knowledge and was not practical to meet the needs of the students.
- Most of English teachers used lecture method where students remained only passive listeners and did not assign homework to their students on daily basis.
- Teachers neither used additional books for teaching English apart from text books.
- It has also been observed that teachers neither utilized nor managed their time. They came to class late and left early.
- Emphasis of majority of teachers were to complete course content in due time and never go beyond it. They neither break lengthy lessons in small segments nor motivated students through questions, jokes and story telling.

Recommendations

Based on the analysis of data and conclusions drawn from them, the following recommendations were made for remedial solutions of the problem.

- 1 It is recommended that teaching of English is a tough task, so well qualified and competent English teachers must be recruited having full command on English subject.
- 2 The number of English teachers should be increased to relieve teachers heavy work load. So that they could pay attention to individual student.
- 3 Refresher courses and pre-service training for teachers should be made compulsory.
- 4 Ample opportunities should be provided to the students so that they can speak English and learn it, not only to pass examination but use it as a medium of communication as well.
- 5 The teacher should not pay attention on learning the rules of grammar alone but it should be considered as one of the tool for learning the language.
- 6 The English teachers have to keep themselves abreast with the current trends in English with a view to prepare and produce delightful and attractive material for the pupils.
- 7 The atmosphere for learning English should be conducive and permissive and examination as well as evaluation system should be changed.
- 8 Teachers should use A.V. Aids during teaching in order to make lesson more interesting and attractive.

- 9 Such type of text books should be introduced in which 85% of the portion should be based on constant revision, repetition of basic rules of grammar and vocabulary.
- 10 District Education Officers and Directors of education should inspect schools, approach the English teachers with constructive criticism and check that proper teaching techniques are employed by the teachers.
- 11 It is the responsibility of government, teachers, parents, and heads of institutions to make it compulsory for the teachers and students to speak English during teaching hours.

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